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Friedrich Nietzsche’s contribution to philosophy is mostly recognized in relation to moral 
philosophy. His distinction of master and slave morality, critique of the Judeo-Christian 
morality is what is commonly considered as the main contribution of his philosophy. How-
ever, on the other hand, his examination of metaphysics and epistemology comprises fun-
damental constituents to apprehend his philosophy. Accordingly, it can be said, Nietzsche’s 
approach towards morality and politics is a demonstration of his analysis of metaphysics 
and epistemology. Since the construction of metaphysical and epistemological grounds 
precedes the construction of ethical systems, the critique of morality is presupposed by the 
critique of its metaphysical and epistemological foundations. 
Therefore, the focus of this paper will not be Nietzsche’s critique of morality and politics. 
Rather, it will critically examine his criticism of the metaphysical and epistemological ba-
sis that by virtue of their structural fundamentality acquired the generative potential of 
values (moral, political, economic, etc.). In view of that, by exposing the vitality of Nie-
tzsche’s critique in his discourse on nihilism, the analysis will try to claim the conceptual 
centrality of nihilism in his philosophy. Furthermore, assert the possible understandability 
of his critique and discourse, which is mostly concentrated on the advent of European ni-






WRITINGS AND CONCEPTS 
 
1.1 THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOPENHAUER 
The stream of philosophy has been flowing for thousands of years with its line of great minds 
toiling to unriddle the world and man’s place in it. To go through the books of a philosopher re-
calls the journey of millennia—it seems like pulling a string that holds together the products of 
longstanding brilliance. Hence, to discuss Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche at least in-
volves the remembrance of the German idealism—a philosophical movement in which Schopen-
hauer was the last great representative (IEP 2000). This movement is generally associated with 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy primarily instigated by the rationalist-empiricist debate. This de-
bate mainly concentrated on what constitute our understanding; accordingly, the rationalist camp 
asserted the primacy of reason and the deceitful tendency of the senses in the edification of 
knowledge; moreover, this camp contended the prevalence of innate ideas. On the other hand, 
the empiricist camp (except George Berkeley)1 asserted the senses are the primary source of 
knowledge, and challenged the presence of innate ideas. Among the empiricist philosophers, Da-
vid Hume’s devastating critique of rationality interrupted Kant’s “dogmatic slumber, and gave 
his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction” (Prolegomena To 
                                                 




Any Future Metaphysics , 7). With the aim of resolving the debate, Kant proclaimed the limits of 
pure reason. He asserted the presence of the “Noumenon” and “Phenomenon” the former repre-
senting the “thing-in-itself” a realm that we can know nothing and the later indicating “thing as it 
appears”. Furthermore, Kant contended that “knowledge begins with experience, it by no means 
follows that all arises out of experience” (The Critique of Pure Reason). In his attempt to circum-
scribe the limits of pure reason, Kant has identified three kinds of ideas that go beyond the capa-
bility of reason. These ideas include the psychological, the cosmological and theological idea. In 
the case of psychological ideas, reason tries to go beyond its limits in search of the ultimate sub-
ject or absolute substance. On the other hand, cosmological idea is the result of the search for the 
ultimate condition. Finally, in theological idea reason attempts to go beyond its limits and com-
prehend a highest, most perfect, primeval, original Being (Wikipedia). For Kant, these unsuc-
cessful attempts of pure reason have hampered the development of metaphysics; the reason be-
hind is the wrong use of reason beyond the realm of experience—trying to know the “Noume-
non” or the thing-in-itself. Another important figure in German Idealism that has a prominent 
influence on Schopenhauer is Friedrich Hegel. Hegel’s significant contribution in the philosophi-
cal movement is related to the dialectical method. After Kant’s critique of pure reason, Hegel 
tried to reestablish the power of reason. He contended that with pure logic (in his case dialectical 
reasoning) we could know our past and anticipate our future. For Hegel, history is ruled by ra-
tional process; hence, its goal is determined by this underpinning rationale. Schopenhauer’s ap-
pearance in the scene can be understood in reaction to the assertions of Kant and Hegel. He 
agreed with Kant’s assertion of   “Phenomenon” world as an appearance of things produced by 
faculties of the individual from experiential realm; however, Schopenhauer departed from Kant 




He rejected the position that asserted our sensations have an external cause in the sense that we 
can know there is some epistemologically inaccessible object—the thing-in-itself—that exists 
independently of our sensations and is the cause of them. Accordingly, for him, Kant's reference 
to the thing-in-itself as a mind-independent object (or as an object of any kind) is misleading. 
Schopenhauer maintains that if we are to refer to the thing-in-itself, then we must come to an 
awareness of it, not by invoking the relationship of causality — a relationship where the cause 
and the effect are logically understood to designate different objects or events (since self-
causation is a contradiction in terms) — but through another means altogether. Rather, he assert-
ed a “universal will” as the source of human intelligence and the phenomenal world. This will 
for Schopenhauer is a blind, illogical, aimless impulse, without any original ethical tendency 
whatsoever (IEP).  This assertion of Schopenhauer also opposed Hegel’s rational and teleologi-
cal account of history.  It now becomes an irrational and endless progression, and “Ethics, as the 
philosophy of the ultimate purpose of the world can only proclaim the aimlessness of the cosmic 
process and seek to put an end to it by stilling the will. This quietizing of the will is effected by 
recognizing the aimlessness of the process and resigning oneself to it completely.” (SEP) Scho-
penhauer discussed this position in his book titled The World as Will and Representation, he 
used the phrase “world as will” to describe the “universal will” behind human intelligence and 
the phenomenal world, and “world as representation,” to signify the world as it appears to the 
senses. Furthermore, he asserted, we must look behind appearances to see the wills at work in 
nature (SEP). This book of Schopenhauer was published in 1819, twenty-five years before Nie-
tzsche’s birth. Nietzsche read The World as Will and Representation, forty-six years after its 
publication. Until 1865, Nietzsche considered himself as a wanderer in search of a true philoso-




tzsche briefly inscribed his picture of Schopenhauer by considering it from two dimensions. The 
first picture embeds Schopenhauer as a writer and the second as a philosopher, with these two 
pictures Nietzsche paints “Schopenhauer as educator”. In his  book titled Ecce Homo, Nietzsche 
looked back to his essay published 14 years ago with the title Schopenhauer as Educator, and 
remarked, “I do not wish to deny that at bottom they speak only of me… in Schopenhauer as Ed-
ucator my innermost history, my becoming, is inscribed. Above all, my promise!” (EH, 281). 
These words by themselves can proclaim how profoundly Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche’s 
philosophical journey.  
Nietzsche’s portrayal of Schopenhauer the writer has three significant qualities, namely, honesty, 
cheerfulness and steadfastness. Nietzsche found honesty in Schopenhauer’s works because he 
writes to himself and for himself. He does not consciously imply deceptive means, he was “a 
philosopher who has made it a rule for himself: deceive no one, not even yourself!” (SE, 134)  
Nietzsche’s admiration for the honesty of Schopenhauer implicates the lack of such writers in his 
time. The second quality, i.e. cheerfulness involves Schopenhauer’s conquest of the hardest task 
by thinking and his way of expressing his thoughts with certainty and simplicity, courage and 
strength, perhaps a little harshly and valiantly. The third quality, i.e. steadfastness includes Scho-
penhauer’s firm and agile journey that was calm and un-wavered by the external initiation (SE, 
135). On the other hand, Nietzsche’s admiration for Schopenhauer (as a philosopher), emanates 
from the three constitutional dangers he endured, namely, isolation, despair of the truth, as well 
as the melancholy and longing caused by discovering limitation in himself. In Schopenhauer as 
Educator, Nietzsche states, “I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example…” 
(SE, 136). For him Schopenhauer was a philosopher who lived what he thought and wrote. 




caste. Nietzsche states,  
For philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its 
way, the inward cave, the labyrinth of the heart: and that annoys the tyrants. There 
the solitaries conceal themselves: but there too lurks their greatest danger. (SE, 
139)  
The above words of Nietzsche indicate the even greater dangers found in isolation. Schopenhau-
er endured these dangers. His philosophy developed throughout the encounters.  Schopenhauer’s 
deviation from the scholarly caste mainly signifies his rejection of the Kantian picture of man. 
Nietzsche expresses this picture as “mere clattering thought- and calculating- machine” (SE, 
140).  For him every thinker who deviates from Kantian philosophy attends this danger provided 
he is a vigorous and whole man in suffering and desire and not a mere clattering thought- and 
calculating- machine. This point of departure involves despair of the truth, which is the second 
constitutional danger of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche explains this despair in relation to what he 
calls the challenge of every great philosophy, “which as a whole always says only: this is the pic-
ture of all life, and learns from it the meaning of your own life. And the reverse: only read your 
own life and comprehend from it the hieroglyphics of universal life.” (SE, 142) Schopenhauer 
lived through the latter approach. Nietzsche states, Schopenhauer's philosophy should always be 
interpreted at first: individually, by the individual only for himself, so as to gain insight into his 
own want and misery, into his own limitedness, so as then to learn the nature of his antidotes and 
consolations. (SE, 142) This feature of Schopenhauer is related to his honesty as a writer. Nie-
tzsche elucidates it in relation to the third danger. He states, “Every human being is accustomed 
to discovering in himself some limitation, of his talent or of his moral will, which fills him with 




formed individually. When one turns his eyes into oneself, when his sight is unmediated by “hi-
eroglyphics of universal life”, he will confront his naked existence—an uncompromised exist-
ence. Nietzsche found this state in the work of Schopenhauer. He was astonished by Schopen-
hauer’s strength, he states, and “how inconceivably whole and unbreakable must Schopenhauer's 
nature have been if it could not be destroyed even by this longing and yet was not petrified by 
it!” (SE, 143) Moreover, Schopenhauer’s “unscientific” approach has profoundly influenced Nie-
tzsche. This “unscientific-ness” is not used pejoratively, rather it signifies a mode of understand-
ing that involves humanness. Nietzsche laments the situation of his time by saying, “nowadays, 
however, the whole guild of the sciences is occupied in understanding the canvas and the paint 
but not the picture” (SE, 141) 
As stated before Schopenhauer’s appearance in philosophy can be conceived in relation to Ger-
man idealism. Accordingly, his influence on Nietzsche also covers Nietzsche’s stand in this phil-
osophical movement. In his book titled Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought, 
William Richardson states, “Between Hegel and Nietzsche stood Schopenhauer”. (2003, 361) 
Considering this, the works of Schopenhauer can be said to shape the influence of Hegelianism 
on Nietzsche. Since Schopenhauer marks the culminating stage of German idealism, Nietzsche’s 
approach towards Hegelian rational-teleological feature of history and human existence in it is 
schematized by the position of Schopenhauer. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s reaction towards the 
step taken by Schopenhauer in relation to Kantian and Hegelian foundations of German Idealism 
induces the beginning of his own philosophy.   Despite this influence, Nietzsche’s departure 
from his educator involves an irreconcilable difference. In spite of the previously mentioned 
merits, Nietzsche considered Schopenhauer as honest representative of his age. Nietzsche’s ap-




sophically. Accordingly, Nietzsche strongly opposed and renounced most philosophers who have 
lived in this century, also noting he has reproached the centuries before with the exception of the 
pre-Socratic philosophers (and among them, of Heraclitus). Nietzsche considered his age as the 
dead-end of the road on which philosophers of millennia contemplated upon, this philosophiza-
tion, for Nietzsche could have not taken the meditators towards another destination but the one 
that is honestly represented by Schopenhauer, an age marked by the advent of nihilism—the de-
valuation of the hitherto highest values. For Nietzsche this devaluation and reigning meaning-
lessness is not a mere coincidence or inexplicable phenomenon, rather the necessary logical and 
psychological conclusion of a philosophization sustained for millennia.  
Besides his astonishing merits, Nietzsche criticized Schopenhauer for following the same path. 
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche examines this similarity by analyzing the extent of Schopenhau-
er’s atheistic philosophy follow from the same ideal that created Christian theism. According to 
Nietzsche this ideal has created a thinking climate where, “One  felt  so  certain  about  the  high-
est  desiderata,  the  highest  values,  the  highest  perfection that the philosophers  assumed this  
as  an  absolute certainty,  as  if  it  were  a-priori:  "God"  at  the  apex  as  a  given  truth.” 
(TWP, 15)   However, Schopenhauer has attempted to deviate from this way, Nietzsche asserts, 
Schopenhauer’s departure from the ideal posed by Christian theism was unsuccessful. For Nie-
tzsche found the essential constituents of the ideal in the atheistic philosophy of Schopenhauer. 
These vital constituents include, the search for “the true ‘reality,’ the ‘thing-in-itself’ compared 
to which everything else is merely apparent.” (TWP, 15)  Moreover, this idealization involves a 
“dogma  that  our  apparent  world,  being  so  plainly  not  the  expression  of  this ideal,  cannot 
be ‘true’—and that,  at  bottom,  it  does  not  even lead  us  back to that metaphysical world  as 




as, “the unconditional,  representing that highest perfection,  cannot possibly  be  the  ground  of  
all  that  is  conditional.” (TWP, 15) In view of that, Nietzsche asserts the failure of his educa-
tor’s attempt to depart from the tradition of millennia by stating,      
Schopenhauer  wanted  it  otherwise  and  therefore  had  to  conceive  of  this  
metaphysical  ground  as  the  opposite  of  the  ideal—as  "evil,  blind  will":  that  
way  it  could  be that  "which  appears,"  that  which  reveals  itself  in  the  world  
of appearances.  But even  so  he  did  not  renounce  the  absoluteness  of the  
ideal—he sneaked  by2.—(Kant  considered  the  hypothesis  of  "intelligible  
freedom"  necessary in order to  acquit the Perfect being of responsibility for  the  
world's  being  such-and-such—in  short,  to  account  for  evil  and  ills:  a  
scandalous  bit  of logic  for  a  philosopher.—) (TWP, 15) 
Schopenhauer has failed to renounce the ideal, for the essential constituents persisted in his own 
philosophy. His abandonment of the ideal remained as a rejection of the ideal as it is created by 
Christian theism. Accordingly, he failed to renounce the ideal itself—he atheistically re-created 
the ideal, retaining its absoluteness.  Nietzsche’s recognition of this failed attempt and the advent 
of nihilism mark the outset of his own philosophy. In relation to this recognition Nietzsche 
states, 
 I was the first to see the real opposition: the degenerating instinct that turns 
against life with subterranean vengefulness (Christianity, the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer, in a certain sense already the philosophy of Plato, and all of 
idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation, born of 
fullness, of overfull-ness, a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering, 
even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence. (F. 
Nietzsche, EH 1989, 272) 
                                                 




Nietzsche’s philosophy involves a confrontation with a tradition that has reigned for two millen-
nia in western philosophy. In the coming sections this confrontation will be briefly discussed.  
1.2 THE TRANSVALUATION AND REVALUATION OF VALUES 
Nietzsche in his most famous declaration of the divine decomposition uncovers the greatest deed 
in history. Through his madman he proclaims, “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have 
killed him.” (GS, 181)This statement of Nietzsche does not signify the actual death of God, be-
cause for him God has never in fact existed. In a narrower understanding it means, “The belief in 
the Christian god has become unbelievable… some ancient and profound trust has been turned 
into doubt; to them our old world must appear daily more like evening, more mistrustful, 
stranger, ‘older’.” (GS, 279) On the other hand, besides the historical event i.e. the fading away 
of the Christian God Europe, a broadened understanding of Nietzsche induces the more basic, 
and ahistorical features that can be called essential-collapsibility of the constitution (wherever 
and whenever it is constituted). This point will be discussed in detail in the coming chapter, thus 
for this time the narrower / historical understanding will considered. Accordingly, the death of 
God represents the undermined faith; it signifies the bold attempts of man to make sense of the 
world without an underpinning belief in God. It is the diminishment of Christian ideals as in-
structing force in the valuation of existence. Through his mouthpiece (the madman), Nietzsche is 
describing an event that is marking the collapsing of a foundation that maintained the edifice that 
served to value human existence. The belief in God shaped the interaction of man with himself, 
other men, and the external world. Nonetheless, with the achievements of science, notable nu-
merosity of atheist and agnostic thinkers, the faith in God became weaker. Nietzsche recognized 




In his words, “what was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to 
death under our knives…” (GS, 181) Nietzsche characterized his mouthpiece as a madman to 
signify how he was approached by his contemporaries. He states,  
“I have come too early,’… ‘My time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on 
its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and 
thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still 
require time to be seen and heard. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 182)      
Knowing the oblivious stance of his contemporaries in relation to the eventual unfolding of this 
tremendous event and the magnitude of its consequences, Nietzsche embarked a project that in-
cludes two major phases—transvaluation and revaluation. These two stages are hierarchically 
situated; i.e. revaluation psychologically and logically presupposed transvaluation. For its most 
part, the project is concentrated on morality. Accordingly, Nietzsche approaches morality from 
different angles—morality as a cause as well as a consequence. In the former case, he considered 
morality as means of compulsion, “morality as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poi-
son.”(GM, p. 20) On the other hand, in the latter sense, Nietzsche considered “morality as symp-
tom, as mask; as Tartuffe, as illness, as misunderstanding” (GM, p. 20) In relation to our subject 
the discussion will concentrate on the later approach of Nietzsche. To consider morality as a con-
sequence brings the question “of what?” for the philosopher this demand incites too much work. 
In the Gay Science Nietzsche explains what is on the table by saying, 
Whatever men have so far viewed as the conditions of their existence—and all the 
reason, passion, and superstition 'involved in such a view-has this been researched 
exhaustively? The most industrious people will find that it involves too much 
work simply to ,observe how differently men's instincts have grown, and might 




generations, and generations of scholars who would collaborate systematically, to 
exhaust the points of view and the material. The same applies to the 
demonstration of the reasons for the differences between moral climates ("why is 
it that the sun of one fundamental moral judgment and main standard of value 
shines here and another one there?"). And it would be yet another job to 
determine the erroneousness of all these reasons and the whole nature of moral 
judgments to date.3 (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 82) 
Nietzsche engaged in this rigorous examination of morals within a strategy that involves depart-
mentalization of the problem of morality; he distinguished ages, peoples, and degrees of rank 
among individuals. Morality as a developing phenomenon  that has a cause other than what has 
been often associated with it, Nietzsche says, “the project is to traverse with quite novel ques-
tions, and as though with new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—
of morality that has actually existed, actually been lived…” (GM, 21). Through this approach 
towards morality, Nietzsche discovered differentiation of acts and thoughts, as good and bad, as 
well as good and evil. However, these differentiations were not the substantial ground; he dug 
further, the result showed the prevalence of Valuation beneath these values that has been con-
ceived as given so far. Transvaluation and revaluation emerged as underpinning moralizations, as 
an explanation of the past and the anticipation of the future of morality. Nietzsche approached 
the prevailing Christian-European morality of his day with the aforementioned framework. Ac-
cordingly, behind the development of Christian-European morality, he claimed to discover a col-
lision of the knightly-aristocratic value judgments and the priestly-noble mode of valuation. 
Since the latter arose from Israel, Nietzsche called it the “Jewish revaluation”4 he states, “with 
                                                 
3 My emphasis 
4 Nietzsche has been associated with anti-Semitism, especially after his death his writings were used to propagate 




the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand 
years behind it and which we no longer see because it—has been victorious. (GM, 34) Nie-
tzsche’s name is mostly related to the criticism of this revaluation that is followed by a call for 
the revaluation of the values posed by the “Jewish revaluation”. His thought has been misunder-
stood in this manner—his denunciation of Jewish revaluation has been considered as denouncing 
the Jewish people.  Regardless of this confusion, what Nietzsche recognized in it is important to 
understand his reproach towards the Jewish revaluation. The philosopher’s denunciation mainly 
aims at the mode of valuation within. It targets the lamentable psychological state contained by 
the slave revolt in morality. In the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche says,   
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and 
gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, 
that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While 
every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave 
morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is 
“not itself;” and this No is its creative deed. (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 36)  
Nietzsche asserts the slave revolt in morality is a transfiguration of ressentiment. For him this 
interwoven element of the revolt indicates the prevalence of a concealed creative force that logi-
cally and psychologically molded the revaluation of the values of the noble morality. Nietzsche 
                                                                                                                                                             
abeth Forster-Nietzsche) he states, “You have committed one of the greatest stupidities-for yourself and for me! 
Your association with an anti-Semitic chief expresses foreignness to my whole way of life, which fills me again and 
again with ire or melancholy… It is a matter of honor with me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal in relation to 
anti-Semitism, namely, opposed to it, as I am in my writings. I have recently been persecuted with letters and Anti-
Semitic Correspondence Sheets. My disgust with this party (which would like the benefit of my name only too 
well!) is as pronounced as possible, but the relation to Forster, as well as the aftereffects of my former publisher, the 
anti-Semitic Schmeitzner, always brings the adherents of this disagreeable party back to the idea that I must belong 
to them after all… It arouses mistrust against my character, as if publicly I condemned something which I favored 
secretly-and that I am unable to do anything against it, that the name of Zarathustra is used in every Anti-Semitic 




denounced ressentiment and all that is begotten through it, when he says, “enough! enough! I 
can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where ideals are manufactured—it seems 
to me it stinks of so many lies.” (GM, 47) The philosopher’s discovery of something essentially 
suffocative became audible. Nietzsche identified reactivity at the heart of ressentiment as crea-
tive force. He states, “Slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physio-
logically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction”. 
(GM, 36) For Nietzsche the triumph of the slave revolt is the result of the vengeful cunning of 
impotence. Nietzsche dramatized the oppressed saying,        
“…let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not 
outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who 
leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and 
desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just”—this, listened to 
calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no more than: “we weak ones 
are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing for which we are not 
strong enough”… (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 46) 
Through cursing and demonizing of the noble, the slave becomes blessed. Accordingly, the val-
ues generated by it are the transfiguration of something that is believed to be unchangeable into 
something that must not be changed, i.e. “Those slow in knowledge suppose that slowness be-
longs to knowledge”. (GS, p. 212)  Nietzsche demands of revaluating the values that are generat-
ed in this way, most importantly the very mode of valuation that gave birth to the great ideals, 
because it necessarily takes to the deadlock of human existence. Nietzsche symbolized the occur-
rence of this tremendous event in Europe as the death of God. However, referring to Buddhism 
he states, “The same evolutionary course in India, completely independent of ours, should prove 




thinker Nietzsche felt alone, he regarded his contemporaries as unmindful of the lightning and 
thunder, so he considered himself as a philosopher having a duty to engage in unfolding the ad-
vent of Nihilism, as well alerting the lurking crisis of the need for philosophical preparation. He 
conceived himself “to be the first decent human being … to stand in opposition to the menda-
ciousness of millennia … the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as 
lies” (EH, 327). Moreover, (also above all) as the first philosopher who embarked the attempt at 
a Revaluation of All Values—the formulation of the counter-movement which will take place in 
some future. Before discussing these two cornerstones of Nietzsche’s philosophy, lets shortly 
discuss the philosopher’s torch that illuminated his journey into the underworld of the ideal—the 
human, all too human outlook.  
1.3 HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN 
In the discussion of Nietzsche’s project of transvaluation and revaluation of values it has been 
stated that his famous proclamation, “God is dead” does not signify the actual death of God, be-
cause God has never in fact existed. This stance incites the question what was substrate of God. 
An attempt to unriddle the scene at the proclamation might help to expose possible insights in 
answering the question on God’s substrate. In the Gay Science Nietzsche states, “Have you not 
heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the marketplace, and 
cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!’ (GS, 181). Through this riddle, at least three mes-
sages are conveyed, the “madness” of the madman representing untimely presence of Nie-
tzsche’s philosophy. The bright morning symbolizing the oblivious stance of his contemporaries 
about the Sunset, the darkening—the death of God. Moreover, the marketplace indicates the nu-




mendousness of the future. Lastly, crying representing Nietzsche’s discovery of an event (the 
Sunset—the death of God) that have two-folded implication for better and for worse: the darken-
ing (the advent of nihilism) and the dawning (the opening of new horizon). In the next paragraph, 
after stating, “God is dead, God remains dead and we have killed him” the madman asks antici-
patory questions5 demanding a means of overcoming the overwhelming time to come.  After 
enumerating the type of (otherworldly) solution with a question mark—since the origin through 
which all these solutions got their efficiency is dried, Nietzsche proposes another type of solu-
tion (still holding question mark) resolution signifying the desperateness to overcome the great-
est deed. The madman states, “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of 
it?” (GS, 181).  
The human, all too human outlook resonates in this dramatized expression of Nietzsche. Even 
though in the pragmatic sense, he used the death of God as “the belief in the Christian god has 
become unbelievable”. (GS, 279) It is noted that with this proclamation Nietzsche wanted to 
convey more than this, i.e. something profound—the same ideal leads to the same conclusion. 
Taking this into account, “the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable” can be ap-
propriated as the belief in such ideals and above all, such idealization has become unbelievable. 
This more inclusive interpretation incites suspicion about the prevalence of a paradigm, in Nie-
tzsche’s words: “Where you see ideal things, I see what is—human, alas, all-too-human!”—I 
know man better. (EH, 283) This point connects the points that has been made so far, it is worth 
marking one more point to enrich it, 
                                                 
5 "How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the 
world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us 
to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of 





Long experience, acquired in the course of such wanderings in what is forbidden, 
taught me to regard the causes that so far have prompted moralizing and 
idealizing in a very different light from what may seem desirable: the hidden 
history of the philosophers, the psychology of the great names, came to light for 
me. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 218)      
The message behind Nietzsche saying, “Where you see ideal things, I see what is—human, alas, 
all-too-human!” can now be explained as meaning, where you see ideal things I see the causes 
that so far have prompted the moralization and idealization. Moreover, beneath this penetrating 
approach Nietzsche’s saying, “I know man better” bears his reason of calling the moralizing and 
idealizing as “human, all too human!”  Nietzsche assimilated the psychology of the idealizers 
and moralizers—most importantly the philosophers. This unlishing of the ideals as idealized (by 
humans) reminds him saying, “I was the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience 
lies as lies” (EH, 327). In the history of philosophy, Nietzsche pronounced himself as the first to 
discover the truth by being the first to experience the ideal things as idealized (by humans). 
The “human, all too human” outlook resonates throughout the writings of Nietzsche as a con-
cealed force—from his opposition of the mendaciousness of millennia unto his attempt at a Re-
valuation of All Values. However, what caused its philosophical significance? In short, its pene-
trating ability can be considered as a merit of its vital philosophical significance in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. Here, the philosopher approaches unmercifully, digging, mining, undermining the 
ultimate safety of everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. In the preface 
of Human, all too human6 Nietzsche states the significance of the outlook by saying, “What? 
Everything only - human, all too human? It is with this sigh that one emerges from my writ-
                                                 




ings…” (HA I, 5). Accordingly, the next section will contain a prefatory analysis of Nietzsche 
books: Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. (1878 and 1880), The Gay Science 
(1882), and The Will to Power (Notes written 1883-1888) with the aim of demonstrating the 
philosophical significance of the outlook “human, all too human”  
1.4 WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE: A PREFATORY ANALYSIS  
1.4.1 Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits   
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche inscribed the intellectual environment wherein he wrote his books. Ac-
cordingly, he portrayed the beginning of Human All Too Human in relation to a profound aliena-
tion from everything that surrounded him; resembling his feeling with an awakening from 
dreaming. Nietzsche states, “Wherever was I? There was nothing I recognized; I scarcely recog-
nized Wagner.” (EH, 284)  This statement incites a question—who is Wagner? Precisely ask-
ing—why does Nietzsche mention this name in an event that has a momentous significance in 
his philosophical journey? To enquire the philosophical significance of the mentioning of Rich-
ard Wagner7, let us briefly discuss Nietzsche’s long companionship with Wagner. In 1876, Nie-
tzsche wrote an essay with the title Richard Wagner in Bayreuth that was later published as book 
(including other three essays) with the title Untimely Meditation. In this book, he paid tribute to 
Wagner and Schopenhauer. However, after twelve years, he wrote another essay concerning 
Wagner with the title Nietzsche Contra Wagner. The content of the latter essay is clearly mani-
fested on the title—Nietzsche against Wagner. Before discussing, the preface of Human All Too 
Human let us refer to what Nietzsche’s intent is when he reproaches individuals (attack persons 
                                                 
7 Richard Wagner (1813-83), the composer and dramatist who was, like Schopenhauer, an  object of the youthful 




as in the case of Nietzsche Contra Wagner). In discussing the principles of his war8 Nietzsche 
states,   
I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as of a strong 
magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but creeping and 
elusive calamity9… Thus I attacked Wagner—more precisely, the falseness, the 
half-couth instincts of our “culture” which mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the 
late for the great. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 232)      
Considering this, let us recall Nietzsche saying, “Wherever was I? There was nothing I recog-
nized; I scarcely recognized Wagner.” (EH, 284)  Now one can see when Nietzsche barely rec-
ognized Wagner, he precisely meant, he scarcely recognized “the falseness, the half-couth in-
stincts of the “culture” which mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the late for the great.” Remark-
ing Nietzsche’s long companionship with Wagner, the beginning of Human, All Too Human also 
coincides with his retirement from the professorship at University of Basel. However, for Nie-
tzsche the retirement from professorship and break with Wagner involves a more profound mes-
sage than resigning from job and friendship. He states,   
“Whether Wagner or the professorship at Basel, were mere symptoms. I was 
overcome by impatience with myself; I saw that it was high time for me to recall 
and reflect on myself. All at once, it became clear to me in a terrifying way how 
much time I had already wasted—how useless and arbitrary my whole existence 
as a philologist appeared in relation to my task. I felt ashamed of this false 
modesty.” (EH, 286)  
                                                 
8 Nietzsche’s statements of warrior-like philosophization  mostly manifests the stance that he stated in Ecce Homo, 
regarding the spirit within the Human, All Too Human  outlook, Nietzsche proclaims: “This is war, but war without 
powder and smoke, without warlike poses…” (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 283) 




These regretful words resonate in the preface of Human All Too Human, loudening until the phi-
losopher reconciles with himself by saying “one remains a philosopher only by—keeping silent. 
(HA I, 11)  In the preface of this book, Nietzsche included significant points, which he devel-
oped in his latter writings. In the beginning of this chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s admi-
ration of his educator (Schopenhauer) for his honesty, cheerfulness and steadfastness, as well as 
for his endurance of what he called the constitutional dangers—isolation, despair of the truth, 
and the melancholy and longing caused by discovering limitation in himself. In Human, All Too 
Human Nietzsche emerges not as pupil but as educator. The profoundly suspicious approach to-
wards the world marks the outset of the philosopher’s reflection on himself—the first step into 
the destruction of the false modesty. Nietzsche described the falseness of the modesty as follows:          
In an effort to recover from myself, as it were to induce a temporary  self-
forgetting,  I have sought shelter in this or that—in some piece of admiration  or  
enmity  or  scientificality  or  frivolity  or  stupidity;  and  why,  where  I could  
not find what I  needed, I had artificially to enforce, falsify and invent a suitable 
fiction for myself. What I  again  and again  needed  most for my  cure and  self-
restoration, however,  was  the belief that  I  was  not thus  isolated, not alone  in  
seeing as  I  did - an enchanted  surmising  of  relatedness and  identity  in  eye  
and  desires,  a  reposing  in  a  trust  of  friendship, a blindness  in  concert  with  
another without  suspicion or question-marks, a pleasure  in  foregrounds,  
surfaces,  things close and closest, in everything possessing color, skin and 
apparitionality.  (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 5) 
Nietzsche now embarked into his own journey—in solitude, honesty, and steadfastness. Howev-
er, in relation to those he venerated in his youth, he claimed to employ a certain amount of ‘art’ 
of closing his eyes or deceiving himself. In view of that, while having a sufficiently clear-sight 




well, let himself to be deceived over  Richard Wagner's incurable romanticism, as though it were 
a beginning and not an end (HA I, 6).  However, this false modesty tensed up the philosopher 
culminated with an “enough” to the beginning of his own journey. Nietzsche states,     
Supposing, however, that all this were true and that I was reproached with it with 
good reason, what do you know, what could you know, of how much cunning in 
self-preservation, how much reason and higher safeguarding, is contained in such 
self-deception - or of how much falsity I shall require if I am to continue to 
permit myself the luxury of my truthfulness? (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 6) 
After realizing, his sheltered, arbitrary and useless existence, Nietzsche directed his journey with 
the afore-quoted questions. In his philosophy, these questions mark his declaration of independ-
ence—“better to die than to go on living here… this 'here', this 'at home' is everything it had 
hitherto loved!” In his preface, Nietzsche marked this outbreak as the sowing of the “free spirit” 
a kind that do not exist, did not exist at his age and before. Nonetheless, Nietzsche embarked on 
the history of the great liberation; with the strength and will to self-determination—to evaluating 
on one's own account, as well as, a pursuit of  demonstrating his mastery over things, and stead-
fastness to endure the bad and painful parts of the journey. Acquiring the courage to doubt what 
has been loved and admired appears to the first victory for the philosopher; however, from psy-
chological point of view it poses as a questionable victory declared halfheartedly, with an “in-
wardly exultant shudder, which betrays that a victory has been won - a victory? over what? over 
whom?” (HA I, 7).  With this first victory, the perilously curious rebel proceeds to strengthen his 
position, this is also the point where Nietzsche moves stealthily around the things most for-




'Can all values not be turned round? And is good perhaps evil? And God only 
an invention and finesse of the Devil? Is everything perhaps in the last resort 
false? And if we are deceived, are we not for that very reason also deceivers?  
Must we not be deceivers? (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 7)       
The examination of these questions requires a means of knowledge that allows wandering with 
the purported possibilities. Accordingly, at this point Nietzsche introduces his notion of Perspec-
tivism10. Presupposed by the declaration of independence from what one use to venerate, this 
means and fishhook of knowledge involves an inclusive feature that permits access to many and 
contradictory modes of thought (HA I, 8). Moreover, this comprehensiveness excludes the dan-
ger that the spirit may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain 
seated intoxicated in some corner or other (Ibid. , 8). Within this expansive context, the philoso-
pher “unseals” what has been wrapped by dogmas and prejudices.  In the preface, after such dan-
gerous activities Nietzsche asks decisive questions that could jeopardize the journey he has un-
dertaken so far. This moment poses a challenge on the steadfastness of the wanderer, also on the 
wherefore of the wandering, “'Why so apart? So alone? Renouncing everything I once rever-
enced? Renouncing reverence itself? Why this hardness, this suspiciousness, this hatred for your 
own virtues?'” (Ibid. , 9)  For a person who has gone out of a shelter where he used to get com-
fort (though unsatisfying), the loneliness in the expedition, the long way ahead inflicts a funda-
mental question mark on the necessity of upholding the wandering. For the castaway philosopher 
in search of consolation with himself, overcoming such moments can be regarded as a triumph 
over weariness. Nietzsche asserts, 
                                                 




'You shall become master over yourself, master also over your virtues. Formerly 
they were your masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other 
instruments. You shall get control over your for and against and learn how to 
display first one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal. (F. 
Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 9)         
We have read Nietzsche’s regretful words of his time wasted under false modesty, moreover, 
about how it culminated in an existential crisis. In the beginning of the journey, Nietzsche states 
the causes of the overwhelming, nauseated feeling of uselessness of existence resides in not be-
ing isolated and not seeing with his own eyes.  However, the realization of these manifestations 
indicates the prevalence of underpinning. For the philosopher this signal opens the inner world 
called ‘man’ with a tremendous long ordering—with mastery and servitude. In the above quota-
tion, Nietzsche asserts the necessity of circumnavigating and overcoming this inner world—man.  
In the preface of the second volume Nietzsche states, “My writings speak only of my overcom-
ings:  'I' am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me, my very own self, indeed, 
if a  yet prouder expression be permitted,  my innermost self” (HA, 209). These words of Nie-
tzsche convey the archetype beneath his writings that are open to various interpretations.   his 
writings the recognition of these contexts could appropriate our understanding. Another im-
portant point in the preface involves his perspectival shift that is manifested in his renunciation 
of romantic pessimism “Optimism, for the purpose of restoration, so that at some future time I 
could again have the right to be a pessimist” (Ibid., 212). To understand the philosophical impli-
cation of this shift, knowing what romantic pessimism meant for Nietzsche is important. In The 
Will to Power, Nietzsche discusses about romantic pessimism in relation to eternalization, he 
identifies two forms in which eternalization could proceed. In the first form, eternalization per-




form of eternalization, Nietzsche states,         
proceed  from  gratitude  and  love-an  art  of  this  origin  will  always  be  an  art  
of apotheosis,  dithyrambic  perhaps  with  Rubens,  blissful  with  Hafiz, bright 
and gracious  with  Goethe,  and shedding  a  Homeric  aureole over  all  things 
(F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 446) 
Considering this, he discusses the other form of eternalization, i.e. romantic pessimism. In this 
case, through eternalization, the pessimism of the renunciators takes revenge on all things. Nie-
tzsche states,    
The tyrannic  will  of  a  great sufferer who  would  like  to forge  what  is  most 
personal,  individual, and  narrow-most  idiosyncratic-in  his  suffering,  into  a  
binding law  and  compulsion,  taking  revenge  on  all  things,  as  it  were,  by 
impressing,  forcing,  and  branding  into  them  his  image,  the  image of his  
torture.  (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 446) 
Nietzsche states Schopenhauerian philosophy of will or Wagnerian music as the most expressive 
form of the second form of eternalization (Ibid. , 446). Taking this into account, Nietzsche states 
his “perspectival shift” by saying,  
I conducted  with  myself a patient  and  tedious  campaign  against  the  
un-scientific  basic  tendency  of  that  romantic  pessimism  to  interpret  and 
inflate  individual  personal experiences  into  universal  judgments  and, indeed, 
into condemnations of the world (F. Nietzsche, HA II 1996, 212)   
Accordingly, the philosophical significance of Nietzsche’s perspectival shift resides in mastery 
over the given. Similarly, Nietzsche’s opposition of romantic pessimism resides in their lack of 
“a will there stands courage, pride, the longing for a great enemy” and consequently their roman-




of Nietzsche’s writings, he states,     
Here a sufferer and self-denier speaks as though he were not a sufferer and self-
denier.  Here there is a determination to  preserve  an equilibrium  and  composure 
in the face of life and even a sense of gratitude towards it,  here there rules a 
vigorous, proud, constantly watchful and sensitive will that has set itself the task  
of  defending  life  against  pain  and  of  striking down  all  those  inferences  that  
pain,  disappointment,  ill-humor,  solitude,  and  other swamp-grounds usually 
cause  to  flourish  like poisonous fungi. (F. Nietzsche, HA II 1996, 212) 
The preface of The Gay Science can be the archetype of Nietzsche’s perspectival shift and its 
philosophical significance. Moreover, it also demonstrates how individual personal experiences 
can be interpreted and inflated into universal judgments, and into condemnations of the world.        
1.4.2 The gay science  
The preface of the Gay Science involves Nietzsche’s attempt to shed light on the relation be-
tween health and philosophy. Within this context, he tries to reflect on the psychology of philos-
ophers in relation to the concealed factors that presupposed their philosophies. Similarly, Nie-
tzsche also explains the difference between philosophies by distinguishing two types of philoso-
phizations that are found in the history of philosophy. The first types of philosophers are those 
whose deprivation philosophizes and the second type is philosophers whose riches and strengths 
philosophize. The basic question demands “what  will  become  of  the thought  itself when  it is  
subjected  to  the  pressure  of sickness?” For Nietzsche, the answer of this question involves 
possible explanation on the difference among philosophies.  The philosophizing of deprivation 
necessitates philosophy, whether as a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-




merely beautiful luxury-in the best cases, the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that even-
tually still  has  to  inscribe  itself  in  cosmic  letters  on  the heaven of concepts. Nietzsche re-
lates this distinction of philosophies to the actual history of philosophy, he states, 
But in the former case, which is more common , when it is distress that 
philosophizes,  as is  the  case  with all  sick  thinkers—and perhaps  sick  thinkers  
are  more  numerous  in  the  history  of  philosophy—what  will  become  of  the 
thought  itself when  it is  subjected  to  the  pressure  of sickness?. (F. Nietzsche, 
GS 1974, 34) 
 The above differentiation of philosophies puts a sharp distinction in relation to their presence in 
the history of philosophy. It also covertly indicates the possible metaphysic, epistemic, ethic and 
aesthetic edifice that could emerge because of the philosophizing type. Noting this approach con-
solidates the “human, all too human” outlook, Nietzsche’s examination of the relation between 
health and philosophy sheds light on the exploration of seeing what is human in the idealization 
and moralization. Let us add one more point that enriches its demonstrability, Nietzsche states,  
Behind the highest value judgments that have hitherto guided  the history of 
thought, there are concealed misunderstandings of  the  physical  constitution-of  
individuals  or  classes  or  even  whole races.  All those bold insanities of 
metaphysics, especially  answers  to  the  question  about  the  value  of  existence,  
may  always  be  considered  first  of  all  as  the  symptoms  of  certain  bodies. 
(F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 35)     
Through the first passage, Nietzsche develops the basic distinction of philosophizations, namely 
the philosophization of deprivation and of riches as well strength. In the second quotation, by 
retaining the distinction he deploys an estimative mechanism that evaluates the aforementioned 




Nietzsche asks is it your deprivation that is “philosophizing” or your riches and strength. While 
answering this question Nietzsche tells us, most of the philosophers before him are in some sense 
urged, pushed, and their spirit lured towards the sun, stillness, mildness, patience and medicine 
by their sick body. (1974, 34) In The Will to Power, Nietzsche makes an assertion that can eluci-
date this point. According to Nietzsche in the philosophies of these philosophers, “What is inher-
ited is not the sickness but sickliness: the lack of strength to resist the danger of infections, etc., 
the broken resistance; morally speaking, resignation and meekness in face of the enemy.” (1968, 
28)  In this remark, Nietzsche distinguishes sickness from sickliness to indicate the prevalence of 
something that is essential exhibited in their philosophy. Through their philosophy they transfig-
ure—eternalization, dogmatization and moralization of their sickness sickliness. For Nietzsche 
this kind of philosophization has dominance in the history of philosophy. In the preface of The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche identifies the ethic, metaphysics, and aesthetics of such philosophers as:     
Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative 
definition of happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, 
some final state of some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving 
for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not 
sickness that inspired the philosopher. (GS, 34) 
Recalling Nietzsche’s distinction of philosophizations (of deprivation and of riches) as well as 
his claim of why philosophy is needed in these two types, the above quote sheds light on the phi-
losophies of millennia—it is the philosophization of sickness. However, this kind of assertion 
incites a question, is deprivation a drive independent of the philosopher? Or who is responsible 
for the numerous “philosophizations of sickness”? This question leads to recall what Nietzsche 
asserted in the preface of Human, All Too Human—“'You shall become master over yourself, 




and his notion of overcoming, helps to answer this question. Accordingly, the numerous philoso-
phers, in whom their deprivation philosophizes, are men who have not overcome their depriva-
tion—who did not master themselves. In terms of man as “inner world”, it is to mean deprivation 
underpins the metaphysic, ethic and aesthetic edifies of these philosophers. What is important is 
that the underpinning of deprivation is not willed, as in the case where the thinker consciously 
and willingly deploys deprivation retaining his control to put it aside. In the preface of the Gay 
Science Nietzsche emphasizes the possibility of developing this mastery, he states,         
In the end, lest what is most important remain unsaid: from such abysses, from 
such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe suspicion, one returns 
newborn,11 having shed ones skin, more ticklish and malicious. with a more 
delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier 
senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childlike and yet a 
hundred times subtler than one has ever been before. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 37) 
Noting he was a man who has spent most of his life with a fluctuating physical health, as well as 
the sickness of severe suspicion (as discussed in last section), it is appropriate to examine how he 
stood up. However, we need not go far but read the Gay Science. Nietzsche states,  
I am very conscious of the advantages that my fickle health gives me over all 
robust squares.  A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health  and  
keeps  traversing  them,  has  passed  through  an equal number of philosophies  
he  simply cannot  keep  from  transposing  his  states  every  time  into  the most 
spiritual from and  distance:  this  art of  transfiguration  is philosophy. (F. 
Nietzsche, GS 1974, 35) 
The Gay Science inscribes Nietzsche’s celebration of sickness and recovery. With this book, he 
                                                 




transfigured his health into a philosophy—for philosophy is the art of transfiguration (1974, 35). 
The philosopher experiences each phase of deterioration and recovery of health illness and vig-
orousness as entrances to perspectives—source of philosophy. Concerning the theme of the Gay 
Science Nietzsche states, 
This  whole  book  is  nothing but a  bit of merry-making  after  long  privation  
and  powerlessness, the rejoicing of strength that is returning, of a reawakened 
faith  in  a  tomorrow  and  the  day  after  tomorrow.  of  a  sudden sense and 
anticipation of a  future,  of impending adventures, of seas  that  are  open  again,  
of  goals  that  are  permitted  again, believed  again. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 32) 
This ‘art’ of the philosopher recurs in all his books. The following section will briefly discuss the 
preface of The Will to Power—a foreword of prophecy.  
1.4.3 The will to power 
In the preface of this book, Nietzsche speaks prophetically, ringing the warning bell, he states, 
“Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with greatness, with greatness—that means 
cynically and with innocence” (TWP, 3).  For Nietzsche, cynicism involves an essence that is 
most needed in times when no one speaks while calamity is impending. In Beyond Good and 
Evil Nietzsche describes cynicalness as honest approach without shame or a scientific satyr 
(BGE, 38). Accordingly, in the preface of The Will to Power Nietzsche relates “the history of the 
next two centuries. He describes what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the ad-
vent of nihilism12 (TWP, 3). Accordingly, Nietzsche uses the slipping European culture as an 
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in the coming chapters I will try to show how Nietzsche transfigures a philosophy from a historical happening—how 




input to reflect on a matter that has broader axiological implication. Noting this, the most signifi-
cant point in the preface regards the essence of the inevitably advancing nihilism and Nietzsche’s 
approach. He states, 
He that speaks here, conversely, has done nothing so far but reflect: a philosopher 
and solitary by instinct, who has found his advantage in standing aside and 
outside, in patience, in procrastination, in staying behind; as a spirit of daring and 
experiment that has already lost its way once in every labyrinth of the future; as a 
soothsayer-bird spirit who looks back when relating what will come; as the first 
perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of 
nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself.  (Ibid. , 3)   
Nietzsche speaks of the advancing European nihilism as if it has passed. He appears to have ex-
perienced what is going to-be-experienced in the future. Through this ironic expression of pro-
phetical pronouncement of the past, Nietzsche conveys the essential feature of nihilism and his 
philosophy.  Nietzsche speaks,  
For one should make no mistake about the meaning of the title that this gospel of 
the future wants to bear. "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All 
Values"--in this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both 
principle and task; a movement that in some future will take the place of this 
perfect nihilism--but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly 
can come only after and out of it. For why has the advent of nihilism become 
necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final 
consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our 
great values and ideals--because we must experience nihilism before we can find 
out what value these "values" really had.--We require, sometime, new values. 
(Ibid. , 4) 




tion, marks his concept of transvaluation and revaluation of values, which aims at exhausting ni-
hility and finally formulating a countermovement. Accordingly, the following section will briefly 
discuss Nietzsche’s key concepts that amalgamate what we discussed so far and as springboard 
for the coming chapter.         
1.5 MAJOR CONCEPTS  
1.5.1 Will to Power  
Nietzsche has tried to demonstrate the concept of will to power in relation to its manifold modes 
of expression. Nevertheless, despite its seemingly different reference, the concept appears to lie 
beneath what has been said so far. Let us begin from its broadest manifestation and narrow down 
to its appropriation within Nietzsche’s philosophy. In its extensive mode the will to power ap-
pears as the essence of life. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche states, “for, what is not cannot 
will; but what is in existence, how could this still will to exist! Only where life is, is there also 
will; but not will to life, instead – thus, I teach you – will to power!” (TSZ, 90) This conception 
of Nietzsche sets the will to power as an origin, even to the will to life. Accordingly, he also op-
poses Schopenhauer’s positing of the “will to life” as the originative will, he states, “for life is 
merely a special case of the will to power; -it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to 
enter into this form of the will to power” (TWP, 369). Hence, in its broadest mode of expression, 
the will to power poses at the foundation. However, this indispensability of the will creates con-
fusion with regard to the instinct of self-preservation; considering this Nietzsche states, 
the wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress of a 
limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of 




… and in nature it is not conditions of distress that are dominant but overflow and 
squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an 
exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle 
always revolves around superiority around growth and expansion, around power: 
in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life. (F. Nietzsche, GS 
1974, 291-292) 
Nietzsche attempted to resolve the question of fundamentality between the will to power and the 
struggle for existence (of self-preservation) by posing the will to power, as a most fundamental 
will. He demonstrated his argument by stating the conditions in which the self-preservation is 
jeopardized and sacrificed for the sake of expansion of power. Moreover, for Nietzsche, the en-
dangerment of existence also does not show the fundamentality of the will to life but the re-
striction of the manifold modes of expression of the will to power. Hence, in this case the will to 
power is restricted to be manifested only as the will to life. In its part, this point arouses curiosi-
ty, precisely if life is necessarily clung to its “exploitative aspects”. In response to this enigma 
Nietzsche states,     
life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and 
weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and 
at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words 
in which a slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages? (F. Nietzsche, BGE 
1966, 203) 
Nietzsche poses a question, he requests the questioner his reason to situate the strife in life as un-
necessary—as eradicable. He demands our consistent pejorative usage of terms denoting the 




Here we must beware of superficiality and get to the bottom of the matter, 
resisting all sentimental weakness: Even the body within which individuals treat 
each other as equals, as suggested before—and this happens in every healthy 
aristocracy—if it is a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what 
the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other; it will have to be an 
incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become 
predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and 
because life simply is will to power … everywhere people are now raving, even 
under scientific disguises, about coming conditions of society in which “the 
exploitative aspect” will be removed—which sounds to me as if they promised to 
invent a way of life that would dispense with all organic functions. “Exploitation” 
does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to 
the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the 
will to power, which is after all the will of life. If this should be an innovation as a 
theory — as a reality, it is the primordial fact of all history: people ought to be 
honest with themselves at least that far. (F. Nietzsche, BGE 1966, 203) 
Nietzsche demands honesty in regarding the necessity or dispensability of “exploitation”. He ap-
pears to be alerted by how one would be conceived when one speaks of “exploitation” far from 
its pejorative usage. However, for him such contention appears to be an invention. From what?—
history. This point seems to cohere with those hawkish pictures of Nietzsche—the war instigator, 
and the demonized depiction of his Übermensch (Overman). Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s discourse 
about life in general and man in particular appears to involve distinctions. His proposition, to go 
beyond man indicates this tendency. Similarly, the prevalence of the will to power within man 
embeds peculiarities. Accordingly, the coming pages will contain a brief discussion of the will to 





Wherever I found the living, there I found the will to power; and even in the will 
of the serving I found the will to be master … And where there are sacrificing and 
favors and love-looks, there too is the will to be master. Along secret passages the 
weaker sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful–and 
there it steals power. And this secret life itself spoke to me: “Behold,” it said, “I 
am that which must always overcome itself. (F. Nietzsche, TSZ 1966, 89) 
The above reference of the will to power involves an intertwined prevalence with life and over-
coming. Moreover, this link embeds an identification of life as the will to power manifested 
through constant overcoming. Here noting Nietzsche’s remark about the book (Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra) seems important, in Ecce Homo he states,    
My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on solitude or, if I have been understood, 
on cleanliness.—fortunately not on pure foolishness?—those who have eyes for 
colors will compare it to a diamond.—Nausea over man, over the “rabble,” was 
always my greatest danger. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 234) 
The previous quotes and Nietzsche’s statement about Zarathustra allows a conceptual link with 
what we have discussed throughout the last section. In the prefaces of Human All Too Human, 
The Gay Science and The Will to Power Nietzsche appears to assert and reassert the identifica-
tion of life as the will to power manifested through constant overcoming. However, he does not 
use the term “will to power” in the first two prefaces; Nietzsche’s philosophical journey orbits 
constant self-overcoming. Moreover, this intertwinement also resonates in Nietzsche's recogni-
tion of the inner world called ‘man’  
as adventurers and circumnavigators of that inner world called 'man', as surveyors 
and guagers of that 'higher' and 'one upon the other' that is likewise called 'man'- 
penetrating everywhere, almost without fear, disdaining nothing, losing nothing, 




as it were thoroughly sifting it- until at last we had the right to say, we free spirits: 
'Here - a new problem! Here a long ladder upon whose rungs we ourselves have 
sat and climbed - which we ourselves have at some time been! Here a higher, a 
deeper, a beneath-us, a tremendous long ordering, an order of rank, which we see: 
here- our problem!' -- (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 10) 
Accordingly, this constant self-overcoming manifests the prevalence of the will to power—
becoming more powerful through knowing oneself, mastering oneself and developing control 
over one’s virtues. In Zarathustra Nietzsche expresses the destination of the journey as the 
Overman. He states, “I teach you the Overman, Human being is something that must be over-
come.” (TSZ, 5). Noting this, recalling Nietzsche’s statement about his writings could enrich our 
discussion; he says:  
“My writings speak only of my overcomings:  'I' am in them, together with 
everything that was inimical to me, my very own self, indeed, if a  yet prouder 
expression be permitted,  my innermost self” (HA, 209). 
All previously quoted contentions of Nietzsche encompass the concept what he later called the 
will to power. The philosopher appears to have exemplary role in his teachings, the romanticized 
(perhaps, demonized) picture of Nietzsche’s Overman also gives the idea of the conqueror of his 
own inner world—‘man’. In relation to the Overman, one essential feature of the will has to be 
acknowledged, i.e. the will to power is a creative force. For instance, in the constant self-
overcoming a new species of man emerges, however the difference between man and Overman is 
manifested in his control over oneself, or in his mastery over one’s virtues. Nietzsche states,  
I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and 




of existence a reproach to it, but hope rather that it will one day be more evil and 
painful than hitherto— (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 206) 
This assertion of Nietzsche elucidates the introspective and individual character of the Overman, 
as well as, suggests the meditative stance of the journey. Here, it seems appropriate to recall that, 
for Nietzsche it is unusual usage of the term “exploitation”, which goes up to asserting its indis-
pensability, and relates it with his demand of constant self-overcoming. In view of that, to picture 
of an anti-Semite philosopher, who inspired legions of bloodthirsty soldiers, appears to become 
difficult. In the preface of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote, “I never speak to masses…” (EH, 326). 
Accordingly, it becomes clearer what the philosopher tried to assert regarding the will to power 
within man—constant self-overcoming of ‘man’ unto the Overman. This being Nietzsche’s first 
reference of the will to power, the second will regard its prevalence within his other concept—
human, all too human. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demonstrates this presence through 
the relation between the will to power and philosophy. He states,  
As soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world 
in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, 
the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the causa prima 
(First cause). (BGE, 15-16)  
Nietzsche’s assertion of a relation between the will to power and philosophy magnifies the crea-
tive potency of the will. In the same book, he consolidates it by using the stoic imperative “live 
according to nature". Accordingly, for him, this imperative of the Stoa is an imposition of the 
morality and ideal stoicism on nature. Beneath, there is a strong drive to create all existence to 
exist only after the eternally glorified and generalized image of Stoicism. In view of that, Nie-





For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, so 
rigidly-hypnotically to see nature the wrong way, namely Stoically, that you are 
no longer able to see her differently. And some abysmal arrogance finally still 
inspires you with the insane hope13 that because you know how to tyrannize 
yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized: is 
not the Stoic—a piece of nature? (BGE, 15) 
For Nietzsche, this “creation of the world” characterizes hitherto philosophies. Accordingly, he 
contends “Genuine philosophers…are commanders and legislators: they say, “Thus it 
shall be!”… Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—
will to power (BGE, 136).    
Another important point in Nietzsche’s discussion of the will to power is its relation to the ‘slave 
revolt in morality’. In Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche called this specific manifestation as “the 
will to power of the weakest” (GM, 122-123). As discussed before Nietzsche states, “the slave 
revolt in morality” begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: 
the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate them-
selves with an imaginary revenge.” (Ibid. , 36) Accordingly, within this ‘imaginary revenge’ the 
same active force is at work, though on a grander scale. “It creates for itself a bad conscience and 
builds negative ideals—namely, the instinct for freedom (in my language: the will to power) 
(Ibid. , 122). According to Nietzsche, in this case the creativeness of the will appears to involve 
reactivity at its outset. Nietzsche states, 
                                                 




“We alone are the good and just,” they say, “we alone are Men of good will.”… 
The will of the weak to represent some form of superiority, their instinct for 
devious paths to tyranny over the healthy—where can it not be discovered, this 
will to power of the weakest! (GM, 123)     
This prevalence of the will to power reminds Nietzsche’s Zarathustra saying, “The weaker 
sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful–and there it steals power.” 
(TSZ, 89) Here, it has to be noted that despite the prevalence of the will in the living, its mode of 
expression become to have manifold manifestation that have a complex and deceiving mecha-
nisms. Likewise, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demonstrates this manifestation of the will 
in relation to the rise of the saint. In this case, the powerful of the world encounters a new, 
strange, yet unconquered enemy. With the saint, the will to power reveals as self-conquest and 
deliberate final renunciation. This manifestation of the will involves a typical peculiarity that 
surmounts by virtue of its enigma—as long as it remains an enigma. Accordingly, the next sec-
tion will discuss Nietzsche’s notion of Perspectivism in relation to its significance as a means of 
knowledge and the manifold expressivity of the will to power.      
1.5.2 Perspectivism  
In discussing the preface of Human All Too Human, we have read Nietzsche stating, “means and 
fishhook of knowledge involves an inclusive feature that permits access to many and contradic-
tory modes of thought” (HA I, 8). These words convey the peculiarity of his notion. With this 
eye, Nietzsche challenges one of the most hitherto valued concepts in philosophy. In Genealogy 
of Morals, Nietzsche stood against what he called “dangerous old conceptual fiction” by saying:    
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old 




subject"; let us  guard against  the snares of such contradictory concepts as  "pure 
reason," "absolute spirituality,"  "knowledge in  itself":  these  always  demand  
that we  should think of an eye that is  completely unthinkable,  an eye turned in 
no  particular  direction,  in  which  the  active  and  interpreting  forces, through  
which  alone  seeing  becomes  seeing  something,  are  supposed  to be lacking; 
these always  demand  of the  eye  an absurdity  and a nonsense. (F. Nietzsche, 
GM 1989, 119) 
While criticizing the epistemic edifies of the philosophies of millennia, Nietzsche also indicates 
the constituents of Perspectivism—by going against the dangers lurking in the old conceptual 
fiction,  he also undermines the purported existence of an objective Truth that is claimed to be 
founded through such type of knowing subject. In the place of a pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
knowing subject Nietzsche asserts the perspectivist. Consequently, in the place of "pure reason," 
"absolute spirituality”, “knowledge in itself" of he asserts, Perspectivism—“the more complete 
will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our “objectivity”, (Ibid. , 119).  According to him, knowledge 
should be approached by the knower in relation to its manifold presence, “there is only a per-
spective seeing, only  a  perspective "knowing"; and the more  affects  we  allow  to  speak about 
one thing,  the  more  eyes,  different  eyes;  we  can  use  to  observe  one thing” (Ibid. , 119). 
This stance of Nietzsche bestows inclusiveness on the acquisition of knowledge that was lacking 
in the former approaches. Moreover, with this point, Nietzsche attacks conventionalism. In Hu-
man All Too Human, he describes its constituents by saying, 
Conviction is the belief that on some particular point of knowledge one is in 
possession of the unqualified truth. This belief thus presupposes that unqualified 




discovered; finally, that everyone who possesses convictions avails himself of 
these perfect methods.14  (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 199)          
Accordingly, there are three lurking dangers that are necessarily found within conventionalism 
that corresponds with the branches of philosophy: metaphysically—the purported existence of 
unqualified truth, and epistemologically—the presumed presence of perfect methods to acquire 
the supposably existing unqualified truth. and the last corresponds to ethics (since it regards the 
relation among people), regarding this Nietzsche states, “It is not conflict of opinions that has 
made history so violent but conflict of belief in opinions, that is to say conflict of convictions” 
(Ibid. , 199) The philosopher even questions if anyone has sacrificed himself for truth. He says, 
“Those countless numbers who have sacrificed themselves for their convictions thought they 
were doing so for unqualified truth. In this, they were all wrong: probably a man has never yet 
sacrificed himself for truth” (Ibid. , 199). Taking this into account, the remedies within Nie-
tzsche’s notion of Perspectivism becomes laudable, “it excludes the possible danger that the spir-
it may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxi-
cated in some corner or other” (Ibid., p. 8). Moreover, this element also permits another im-
portant feature, i.e. experimentalism. This approach is signified by the freedom of the spirit. 
Freedom from what?—from unconditional submissiveness to a convention harbored by people in 
authority (fathers, friends, teachers, princes), that has penetrated to the extent of arousing a kind 
of pang of conscience if one fails to do so. (Ibid. , 200)  On the other hand, Perspectivism allows 
as much different eyes as possible—retaining the independence of the spirit from remaining 
clung in one eye or the other. In relation to the discussion so far, Nietzsche appears to have clear 
stand on dogmatism. However, his stance on dogmatism and conviction cannot be left without 
                                                 




anticipating the quest on their conceptual opposites—skepticism. It seems sound to look at his 
stance on skepticism, in Beyond Good and Evil, which states, 
For the skeptic, being a delicate creature, is frightened all too easily; his 
conscience is trained to quiver at every No, indeed even at a Yes that is decisive 
and hard, and to feel as if it had been bitten. Yes and No—that goes against his 
morality; conversely, he likes to treat his virtue to a feast of noble abstinence, say, 
by repeating Montaigne’s “What do I know?” or Socrates’ “I know that I know 
nothing.” Or: “Here I don’t trust myself, here no door is open to me.” Or: “Even if 
one were open, why enter right away?” Or: “What use are all rash hypotheses? 
Entertaining no hypotheses at all might well be part of good taste. Must you insist 
on immediately straightening what is crooked? on filling up every hole with 
oakum? Isn’t there time? Doesn’t time have time? O you devilish brood, are you 
incapable of waiting? The uncertain has its charms, too…” (F. Nietzsche, BGE 
1966, 129-130) 
Nietzsche’s admiration of skepticism involves the recognition of a constitution that allows the 
independence of the spirit. As he states in The Gay Science, “the more mistrust, the more philos-
ophy” (286) in skepticism Nietzsche entertains the un-submissiveness—allowing unobstructed 
questioning of everything. Likewise, the freedom found in skepticism also coheres with his ex-
perimentalism. Accordingly, he states, “I favor any skeptics to which I may reply: "Let us try it!" 
But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any ex-
periment. This is the limit of my "truthfulness"… (GS, 115). Regarding this point raises an im-
portant question—what is knowledge for the perspectivist? Nietzsche states, 
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it 
is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. 
"Perspectivism." It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their for 




it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. (F. Nietzsche, 
TWP 1968, 267) 
The philosopher defines knowledge with interpretation. The knowability of the world residing in 
its interpretability, beneath this conception underlies an opposition to viewpoints that anticipate 
the prevalence of one and only Meaning. However, while rejecting this, it has to be noted that 
Nietzsche is asserting a path that regards every purported Meaning as a part of countless mean-
ings. In view of that, Nietzsche contends,  
No limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted; every interpretation a 
symptom of growth or of decline. Inertia needs unity (monism); plurality of 
interpretations a sign of strength. Not to desire to deprive the world of its 
disturbing and enigmatic character! (Ibid. , 326) 
Accordingly, the world is an enigma, the enhancement of our knowledge also moves to the ex-
tent of our recognition of its disturbing and enigmatic character. For this, the spirit shall be free 
and cautious not to become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other—it 
needs a perspectival eye that adheres the enigmatical character, and that do not seek shelter from 
the disturbance with denial through conceptual fiction. In the next section I will briefly discuss 
the Genealogical approach of Nietzsche, which can be considered as an amalgamation of his ma-
jor concepts—the will to power and Perspectivism.             
1.5.3 Genealogy 
Genealogy is an account of the origin and historical development of something, or it is the study 
of lines of descent. These phrases convey the broadest definition of genealogy, but also blur the 
distinct lines that are marked with novelty. Nietzsche’s version of genealogy appears novel 




human” outlook as well as the will to power and Perspectivism. In our discussion of transvalua-
tion and revaluation of values, we have read Nietzsche saying, “with the Jews there begins the 
slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and 
which we no longer see because it—has been victorious. (GM, 34) Similarly, in his demonstra-
tion of the will to power, we have discussed how he explored the revolt as representing the will 
to power of the weakest, i.e. ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values. 
Moreover, with regard to Perspectivism we have discussed Nietzsche’s criticism on convention-
alism for its obstruction of knowledge with its belief in the existence of unqualified truth. Let us 
note what he states in the preface of On the Genealogy of Morals regarding the novelty of a ge-
nealogical approach towards moral values, he says:    
Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of 
these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is 
needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, 
under which they evolved and changed … a knowledge of a kind that has never 
yet existed or even been desired… One has taken the value of these “values” as 
given, as factual, as beyond all question… (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 20) 
If one looks closely, one will recognize the prevalence of an approach that rejects given-ness, 
there stands a diagnostician with searching for the veiled setting of the beginnings that have mys-
tified to the extent of having no such outset. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche briefly portrays the un-
folding of the setting by stating,  
Every time a beginning that is calculated to mislead: cool, scientific, even ironic, 
deliberately foreground, deliberately holding off. Gradually more unrest; sporadic 
lightning; very disagreeable truths are heard grumbling in the distance—until 




tremendous tension. In the end, in the midst of perfectly gruesome detonations, 
a new truth becomes visible every time among thick clouds. (F. Nietzsche, EH 
1989, 312) 
Even though, Nietzsche has had the idea of his genealogical approach, a publication of Paul 
Rée’s book titled The Origin of Moral Sensations appears to trigger the integration and clarifica-
tion of his thoughts concerning genealogy (of morals). In this book, Rée tried to explain the oc-
currence of altruistic feelings in human beings, and the interpretative process, which denoted al-
truistic feelings as moral. Rée argued that acquired habits could be passed to later generations as 
innate characteristics. Accordingly, he claimed altruism was among the inherited human drives 
that over the course of centuries have been strengthened by selection. Considering the interpre-
tive process that denoted altruistic feelings as moral, Rée contended that the behavior was so 
beneficial, it came to be praised unconditionally, as something good in itself, apart from its out-
comes (Wikipedia Contributors; 2013). Regarding the genealogical approach Rée followed, Nie-
tzsche states:   
The Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unassuming moral milksop who “no 
longer bites” politely link hands, the latter wearing an expression of a certain 
good-natured and refined indolence, with which is mingled even a grain of 
pessimism and weariness … (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 21) 
According to Nietzsche, Rée’s genealogical approach lacked the perceptiveness that could have 
led to a better direction than the Darwinian-ization of morality. Following this unsuccessful at-
tempt, Nietzsche began to advance his own genealogical hypothesis that involves the analysis of 
hieroglyphic record of the moral past of humankind. In our discussion of transvaluation and re-
valuation of values, we have read Nietzsche stating the vastness of this examination as requiring 




cused on the origin of morality. Similar to Rée, Nietzsche rejected the given-ness of moral val-
ues, however, his rejection stood on a different angle. Nietzsche directed his study towards ques-
tioning the values of the moral values. The examination stands at the heart of his version of ge-
nealogy, it also integrates the “human, all too human” outlook, the will to power and Perspectiv-
ism. In the preface of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche states: 
…under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and 
evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or 
furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the 
degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, 
force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future? Thereupon I discovered and 
ventured diverse answers; I distinguished between ages, peoples, degrees of rank 
among individuals; I departmentalized my problem; out of my answers there grew 
new questions, inquiries, conjectures, probabilities—until at length I had a 
country of my own, a soil of my own, an entire discrete, thriving, flourishing 
world, like a secret garden the existence of which no one suspected. (F. Nietzsche, 
GM 1989, 17) 
Within these questions, Nietzsche inscribes the integration of “human, all too human”, the will to 
power and Perspectivism. One possible demonstration of this view is to recognize the underpin-
ning approach of the “value” of moral values as the products of human beings—as not given, 
factual and beyond all questioning, in Nietzsche’s words, seeing what is human, when one 
should see the ideal. Until the philosopher acquires this eye, the possibility of an examination of 
the conditions in which value judgments of what good and evil emerged appears implausible. 
Once the genealogical approach incorporates this outlook, the precision of possible factors that 
induced the difference among developments of moral value judgments, as well as the “values” 




to power. In his book, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze explains the will to power as 
“essentially creative and giving… power is in the will as "the bestowing virtue", through power 
the will itself bestows sense and value." (Deleuze, 85) In Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis, the 
will is incorporated in the bestowal of the “values” which are possessed by moral value judg-
ments (of good and evil). Let us recall our discussion of the Jewish revaluation or the slave 
revolt in morality to clarify the bestowal of value on moral value judgments (good and evil). 
Deleuze states,   
Here are the two formulae: "I am good, therefore you are evil" — "You are evil 
therefore I am good" … Who utters the first of these formulae, who utters the 
second? And what does each one want? The same person cannot utter both 
because the good of the one is precisely the evil of the other… We ask: who is it 
that begins by saying: "I am good"? It is certainly not the one who compares 
himself to others, nor the one who compares his actions and his works to superior 
and transcendent values: such a one would not begin. The one who says: "I am 
good", does not wait to be called good. He refers to himself in this way, he names 
himself and describes himself thus to the extent that he acts, affirms and enjoys. 
(Deleuze 1983, 121) 
The two formulae represent the outcome of Nietzsche’s genealogical study of morality—his dis-
tinction of master and slave morality. The first utterer who says, "I am good, therefore you are 
evil” signifies the master morality, on the other hand, the second utterer who pronounces, "You 
are evil therefore I am good" represents the slave morality. Fundamentally the same active force 
is at work—the will to power. In the case of slave morality, the bestowal of value on moral value 
judgments involves reactivity, i.e. its activity appears predetermined by the actions of an outsid-
er. Accordingly, the master-ness and slave-ness of the moralities also emanates from how the 




the former do not need the initiation of the latter. Nietzsche was also careful of the terminology, 
in the case of the master morality; the moral judgment appears as good and bad, while in among 
the slave it is good and evil. Nietzsche states, 
…how different these words “bad” and “evil” are, although they are both 
apparently the opposite of the same concept “good.” But it is not the same 
concept “good”: one should ask rather precisely who is “evil” in the sense of the 
morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the “good 
man” of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed 
in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the 
venomous eye of ressentiment.    (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 40)           
At this point Nietzsche’s genealogical approach as the integration of the “human, all too human” 
outlook and the will to power appears more vivid. Within the genealogy of morals Nietzsche 
sought what is human, and in seeking what is human he discovers the will to power—with the 
will to power, he discloses different moral climates of different psychologies. Likewise, if one 
looks closer, one will find an eye capable of this pursuit—a perspectival eye. As remembered, 
through Perspectivism Nietzsche proclaims, “there is only a perspective seeing, only  a  perspec-
tive "knowing"; and the more  affects  we  allow  to  speak about one thing,  the  more  eyes,  dif-
ferent  eyes;  we  can  use  to  observe  one thing” (Ibid. , 119). Accordingly, he describes the 
incorporation of Perspectivism within his genealogical analysis as seeing extra-morally.—“There 
are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpre-






NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM  




2.1  NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM 
“Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more 
condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from 
time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in 
life—without faith in reason in life.” (GS, 75) 
These words of Nietzsche convey the uniqueness residing within being human; it isolates the 
human existence from other living things with its additional requirement. However, this distinct 
extra-condition demarcates a point of departure, it distinguishes the course of human existence 
with its interminable need for ground that vitalize and revitalize its motives and reassure the wor-
thiness of life. As Nietzsche states in the Gay Science, “again and again the human race will de-
cree from time to time: ‘There is something at which it is absolutely forbidden henceforth to 
laugh’.'' (Ibid. ). Within this peculiarity, i.e. the posit-ability of the meaning in existence—
periodic trust in life, lurks a danger—collapsibility. Accordingly, for Nietzsche:  
Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at existence has become 




suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed; but because it 
was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all 
in existence, as if everything were in vain. (TWP, 35) 
Let us take a moment and reflect on what has been shortly discussed. The above quotes of Nie-
tzsche convey the crux of his discourse on nihilism, how he thought about human existence and 
its meaning, as well as, how man conceived it from time to time. Moreover, it portrays an entan-
gled image of the existential history of humanity; it sheds light on the difficulties that have 
passed, and awaiting to take place. Above all, the previously mentioned points necessitate re-
calling every section of the previous chapter. Perhaps, it appears the philosopher of “human, all 
too human” and his noble concepts (the will to power, Perspectivism, and genealogy) reach their 
fullest meaning and vivacity within his discourse on nihilism. Moreover, The Eternal Recur-
rence, another novel idea of Nietzsche also appears exuberant when considered interwoven-ly 
with his discourse on nihilism. If this is considered the case, a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s 
demonstration of nihilism shall be the first of all that will follow. 
 In The Will to Power, Nietzsche defined nihilism by stating, “What does nihilism mean? That 
the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer.” (TWP, 9). 
At the beginning of this section, we have read how Nietzsche identified man’s existence, i.e. 
“man has to believe, to know, from time to time, why he exists…” this unique condition of hu-
man existence is posed as a necessity; hence, without it the human race could not flourish. When 
we relate this additional condition of human existence with the above definition, nihilism marks 





Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I always find 
them concerned with a single task, all of them and every one of them in particular: 
to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. Not from any feeling of 
love for the race, but merely because nothing in them is older, stronger, more 
inexorable and unconquerable than this instinct-because this instinct constitutes 
the essence15 of our species, our herd. (GS, 73) 
Nietzsche wrote the above words under the title “The teachers of the purpose of existence” 
wherein he recognizes the preservers of the species who “wants to make sure that we do not 
laugh at existence, or at ourselves—or at them…” (Ibid. , 75) . For him, the founders of morali-
ties and religions, the instigators of fights over moral valuations, the teachers of remorse and re-
ligious wars; as he called them “the tragedians”, they too, “by promoting ·the faith in life. 'Life is 
worth living,’ every one of them shouts; there is something to life, there is something behind life, 
beneath it; beware! (Ibid. , 74). However, as it is said before, within the additional condition of 
existence, which is the posit-ability of the meaning in existence—periodic trust in life, lurks a 
danger—collapsibility. Let us consider two quotes, the first marking the posit-ability and the lat-
ter regarding the collapsibility of what has served in the bestowal of trust and worthiness of life. 
Accordingly, on the posit-ability Nietzsche states,  
Whenever “the hero” appeared on the stage, something new was attained: the 
gruesome counterpart of laughter, that profound emotional shock felt by many 
individuals at the thought: "Yes, I am worthy of living!" Life and I and you and 
all of us became interesting to ourselves once again for a little while. (Ibid. , 75) 
Nevertheless, the spring of enthusiasms in life withers, and takes away all its charm and efficien-
cy—henceforth, the collapsibility of the posited supreme values appears clearer. In Nietzsche’s 
                                                 




words, “There is no denying that in the long run every one of these great teachers of a purpose 
was vanquished by laughter, reason, and nature: the short tragedy always gave way again and 
returned into the eternal comedy of existence16” (Ibid. )  Yet, the additional condition of exist-
ence remains a necessity—man wallowing in anticipation to see something new, to stand firmly. 
Accordingly for Nietzsche,  
In spite of all this laughter which makes the required corrections, human nature 
has nevertheless been changed by the ever new appearance of these teachers of 
the purpose of existence: It now has one additional need-the need for the ever new 
appearance of such teachers and teachings of a "purpose." (GS, 75) 
Let us recollect points made in the previous chapter17, in which we read Nietzsche self-
proclaiming “as the first perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has even now lived through the 
whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself”.  (TWP, 3). Moreover, we have 
also noted him involving in “the formulation a countermovement ...  regarding both principle and 
task; a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect nihilism—but presuppos-
es it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. (Ibid. , 4) 
These two statements unveils the twofold aspect of Nietzsche’s approach towards nihilism—the 
first marking his journey into nihilism and the second against nihilism. With the former ap-
proach, the philosopher becomes the perfect nihilist of Europe. And with the latter, that neces-
sarily follows from the former he attempts to overcome nihilism. Furthermore, in discussing this 
twofold approach, the recalling of Nietzsche’s madman appears inevitable. Because, through his 
madman, Nietzsche declares the death of God, i.e. he became conscious of something tremen-
                                                 
16 My emphasis  




dous, he recognizes the advent of nihilism—through his mouthpiece, Nietzsche asks, “Are we 
not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?” (GS, 
182). Bearing this in mind, as well as the two-folded approach towards nihilism, let us add an-
other crucial point, namely, the necessity of complete nihilism. In the Will to Power, Nietzsche 
asserts the necessity of complete nihilism by identifying the lurking dangers of incomplete nihil-
ism. He states, “Attempts to escape nihilism without revaluating our values so far18: they produce 
the opposite, make the problem more acute.” (TWP, 19)  Accordingly, for Nietzsche attempts to 
escape nihilism, would not serve the overcoming of it but its severity. Another ground for the 
completion of nihilism is related with acquiring axiological clarity, i.e. “we must experience ni-
hilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’ really had.” (Ibid., 4)  Regarding these 
assertions as whys of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism, let us proceed to his critique of 
metaphysics of transcendence, by using his philosophical diagnosis of nihilism as a psychologi-
cal state as springboard.   
2.1.1 Nihilism and the Critique of Metaphysics of Transcendence  
 
In his analysis of nihilism as a psychological state, Nietzsche demonstrates what has been dis-
cussed at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. the positing and collapse of man’s unique condition 
of existence. Through his diagnosis, the philosopher discloses the groundwork of nihilism that 
has underpinned the supreme values that has bestowed vitality on this unique condition ; he un-
veils its critical constituents that served its efficient sustenance of fulfilling man’s periodic trust 
in life, and knowledge on the why of his existence. Moreover, with this analysis, Nietzsche 
stands against the “mendaciousness of millennia”. 
                                                 




Considering these, the philosopher contends the declining of three categories (namely, of “aim”, 
“unity” and “truth”) as the cause of nihilism. Precisely speaking, the realization of their absence 
constitutes nihilism as psychological state. In the case of the first category, i.e. “aim”, resides the 
presumption of a goal in the process of becoming—it entails that something is to be achieved 
through the process. Similarly, in the second case, i.e. “unity”, resides an alleged presence of a 
totality, systematization, indeed any organization in all events. The decline of the two categories 
is conceptually interconnected. Let us add one point that sheds light on this connection. Regard-
ing the advent of nihilism in relation to the fist category Nietzsche states,  
“And now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing. — 
Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of 
nihilism… (Man no longer the collaborator, let alone the center, of becoming).” 
(TWP, 12)  
With this disappointment, regarding the absence of the alleged aim in the process of becoming 
unfolds the crumbling of the purported unity, wherein man acquired a special place. For the aim 
of becoming to be achieved, requires an organization in all events. And since this unity and total-
ity underpins the achievability of the aim, most importantly assigns task to man’s life and bestow 
a meaning on his existence. Hence, with the disappointment considering the alleged aim crum-
bles the unity. This realization appears to involve agonizing sigh—“for what it is united?” Nihil-
ism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength; at this point, “man has lost the faith in 
his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such a 
whole in order to be able to believe in his own value” (Ibid. ). With the realization of these, 
comes the third category, i.e. “truth”. Here, the philosopher’s demonstration becomes interesting; 




world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world.” (Ibid. )  
Let us take a moment and reflect on what has been shortly discussed. In his analysis of nihilism 
as psychological state, the philosopher has identified three crucial events; the realization of ab-
sence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, followed by the denunciation of the purported 
“unity” underlying it. Moreover, he has demonstrated the desperate attempt to seek refuge from 
the trauma caused by the realization—the invention of a world beyond it, a true world. What has 
been passed so far seems capable of crashing, but as he states at the beginning of preface of The 
Will to Power, one should not sympathize. In his words, “Of what is great one must either be si-
lent or speak with greatness. With greatness-that means cynically and with innocence.” (Ibid. , 3) 
With this manner, the philosopher drops the greatest of all—Man disappointed by the absence of 
“aim” and “unity”, and attempting an escape to the beyond arrives at the last form of nihilism.  
Beneath this form of nihilism underlies the experiencing of first and second forms of nihilism 
(the devaluation of three categories). Moreover, with this last form, a foundation unfolds, an ul-
timate realization that transcendence specificity, Nietzsche states,    
“As soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological 
needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes 
into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any 
belief in a true world.19” (Ibid. , 13).  
Accordingly, the last form marks a dead-end—an exhaustion of faith through which man’s 
unique condition of existence acquired its meaning. Here the believer awakes from the dogmatic 
slumber—for he becomes conscious of “the hyperbolic naiveté of man: positing himself as the 
                                                 




meaning and measure of the value of things.” (TWP, 14) Let us add one more point from his 
book Human, All Too Human, wherein Nietzsche exclaims the hyperbolic naiveté of man by say-
ing “the creature which calls its history world history!—man is the vanity of vanities.” (HA II, 
307) Considering this point, let us enrich our discussion by relating it with Nietzsche’s stand 
against the mendaciousness of millennia.   
In his essay, Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the Greeks, Nietzsche describes how Thales of Mi-
letus becomes the first Greek philosopher. According to him, to take a serious notice at Thales’ 
main proposition (water is the primal origin and the womb of all things) could provide us with 
insights of how he comes to be first of ancient Greek philosophers. For Nietzsche, with this sim-
ple proposition, Thales tells something about the primal origin of all things; moreover, it does so 
in language devoid of image or fable, and finally, contained in it, if only embryonically, is the 
thought, "all things are one" (PTAG, 38-39). Considering these, Nietzsche asserts even though 
the first feature of Thales’ proposition leaves him in the company of the religious and the super-
stitious; the second takes him out of such company and shows him as a natural scientist, but the 
third makes him the first Greek philosopher. (Ibid. ) At this point, Nietzsche’s conception of 
what philosophy signifies unfolds; he asserts the uniqueness of philosophy resides in its selec-
tivity—by its emphasis on the useless. In view of that, Thales through his unity hypothesis (all 
things are one) passed over the horizon of his time. In relation to the unity hypothesis, besides 
being the ground to identify Thales the first Greek philosopher, Nietzsche claims it consistent 
prevalence in every philosophy, together with the ever-renewed attempts at a more suitable ex-
pression, this proposition that "all things are one." (Ibid. , 39). Moreover, he identifies a meta-
physical conviction, which had its origin in a mystic intuition as the source of the unity hypothe-




The Greeks, among whom Thales stood out so suddenly, were the very opposite 
of realists, in that they believed only in the reality of men and gods, looking upon 
all of nature as but a disguise, a masquerade, or a metamorphosis of these god-
men. Man for them was the truth and the core of all things; everything else was 
but semblance and the play of illusion.20 (PTAG, 41) 
Keeping this development of the unity hypothesis in mind, let us proceed to another important 
figure in the history of philosophy—Anaximander of Miletus. Here again Nietzsche refers to the 
crucial words of the other Miletian philosopher pronouncing, "Where the source of things is, to 
that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be 
judged for their injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of time."  Considering this, Nie-
tzsche claims with Anaximander the way of dealing with the origin of this world make a turn. 
Anaximander postulated it as the ultimate unity of "the indefinite”,21 the womb of all things. The 
philosopher was no longer dealing with the question of the origin of this world in a purely physi-
cal way. Referring “the indefinite”, Nietzsche remarks, “the immortality and everlastingness of 
primal being does not lie in its infinitude or its inexhaustibility … but in the fact that it is devoid 
of definite qualities that would lead to its passing” (Ibid. , 47). Moreover, in relation to Anaxi-
mander’s stance regarding “the indefinite” Nietzsche empathizes by saying, “it may not be logi-
cal, but it certainly is human, together with Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it were an 
illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only pen-
ance22.” (Ibid. , 46). For Nietzsche, besides making a shift from the purely physical way of deal-
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21 Nietzsche states we may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian “thing as it is in itself” (not mediated through 
perception by the senses or conceptualization, and therefore unknowable.)  (PTAG, 47) 
22 Later on, the negative atmosphere wherein the philosopher approached all coming-to-be will be discussed in rela-




ing with the question of the origin of this world, Anaximander stands as the first Greek philoso-
pher to comprehend the profoundest problem in ethics. Nietzsche asserts, Anaximander “saw in 
the multiplicity of things that have come-to-be a sum of injustices that must be expiated, he 
grasped with bold fingers the tangle of the profoundest problem in ethics. He was the first Greek 
to do so.” (Ibid., 48) Let us shortly discuss how Anaximander’s realization of becoming inter-
twines with his recognition the profoundest problem of ethics. Recalling his departure from pure-
ly physical way of approaching the question of the origin of this world, we have read Anaximan-
der saying, "Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to 
necessity”. Noting, this coming-to-be and passing away embraces the human life. Nietzsche un-
derlines Anaximander’s gloomy words saying,     
"What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, why are you here? Your 
guilt, I see, causes you to tarry in your existence. With your death, you have to 
expiate it. Look how your earth is withering, how your seas are diminishing and 
drying up; the seashell on the mountaintop can show you how much has dried up 
already. Even now, fire is destroying your world; someday it will go up in fumes 
and smoke. But ever and anew, another such world of ephemerality will construct 
itself. Who is there that could redeem you from the curse of coming-to-be?" 
(PTAG, 48) 
Not comprehending it firsthand but reading these words of the philosopher inflict agony. How-
ever, there remains some question. Anaximander states, “Why hasn't all that came-to-be passed 
away long since, since a whole eternity of time has passed? Whence the ever-renewed stream of 
coming-to-be?” At this point Anaximander seemed to acquire a way-out, which Nietzsche claims 
as mystic possibility. The Miletian philosopher lamented, the conditions for the fall from being 




can be envisaged for the emergence of individual creatures from the womb of the "indefinite”.  
At this point, Nietzsche discovers a line of philosophers, wherein they attempted to get closer to 
the problem of how the definite could ever fall from the indefinite, the ephemeral from the eter-
nal, and the unjust from the just. Nietzsche asserts, the more they attempted to do so the deeper 
grew the night. (PTAG, 50)   
One important figure discussed in Nietzsche’s essay is Heraclitus of Ephesus. According to Nie-
tzsche, the philosopher from Ephesus illuminated the problem of becoming by a “divine stroke 
of lightning. Heraclitus exclaimed, “‘Becoming’ is what I contemplate, and no one else has 
watched so attentively this everlasting wave beat and rhythm of things. And what did I see? 
Lawful order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness, Erinnyes23 (PTAG, 50-51). In 
relation to his predecessor, Heraclitus’ way of dealing with the problem of becoming involved 
two fundamental negations. He denied the duality of totally diverse worlds, (i.e. He no longer 
distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an un-
definable “indefinite”) and consequently, he altogether denied being—for this one world which 
he retained. (Ibid. , 51)    Moreover, Heraclitus’s way of dealing with the problem of becoming 
embeds an epistemological constitution, which according to Nietzsche is the regal possession of 
the philosopher. Heraclitus thought intuitively, and through it he stood against the other type that 
is reason, a type of thinking that is accomplished in concepts and logical combinations. Nie-
tzsche contends the regality of the intuitive thinking by identifying two constituents that are 
overlooked by Aristotle’s criticism of it as a sin against the law of contradiction. Accordingly 
Nietzsche states,  
                                                 





intuitive thinking embraces two things: one, the present many-colored and 
changing world that crowds in upon us in all our experiences, and two, the 
conditions which alone make any experience of this world possible: time and 
space. For they may be perceived intuitively, even without a definite content, 
independent of all experience, purely in themselves. (PTAG, 52) 
Accordingly, through this eye Heraclitus contemplated only becoming—of coming to be and 
passing away. He envisioned the truth as lacking rigidity, completeness and permanence. In view 
of that, he proclaimed the strife of the opposite gives birth to all that comes-to-be. In truth, says 
Heraclitus, “light and dark, bitter and sweet are attached to each other and interlocked at any giv-
en moment like wrestlers of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is on top.” (Ibid. ) 
Hence, for the philosopher the definite qualities, which look permanent to us, express the mo-
mentary ascendency of one partner, which by no means signifies the end of the war; the contest 
endures in all eternity. (Ibid. ) Like his predecessor, Heraclitus believed in the ceaselessly re-
peated end and ever-renewed rise of the world. Considering this point, Nietzsche puts a question 
mark on how Heraclitus’ interpreted the renewed rise of the world. What makes this question 
more serious is Heraclitus’ depiction of the end of the world through conflagration as satiety. By 
recalling the Greek proverb, "Satiety gives birth to hubris" and the prominence of the word hu-
bris for every Heraclitean, Nietzsche wonders whether Heraclitus interpreted the renewal of the 
world as hubris. If this is the case, then the entire world process now an act of punishment for 
hubris, and the many the result of evil-doing, as well as the transformation of the pure into the 
impure24 the consequence of injustice. Accordingly, by reclaiming the intuitive thinking Nie-
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tzsche asserts, since Heraclitus lived consciously by the standards of the logos and the all-
encompassing eye, for him all contradictions run into harmony. More precisely, according to 
Nietzsche, Heraclitus understood the ever-renewed rise of new world, not as hubris but an instant 
of satiety (Ibid. , 62). Above all, according to Nietzsche in the philosophy of Heraclitus, what 
outshines is a philosopher describing the world as it is and taking the same contemplative pleas-
ure in it that an artist does when he looks at his own work in progress. Moreover, with him what 
comes into light is a coming-to-be and passing away, without any moral additive, in forever-
equal innocence (Ibid. ). In view of that Nietzsche asks, “Who could possibly demand from such 
a philosophy an ethic with its necessary imperatives "thou shalt"? From a philosophy that de-
scribes the world and exclaims, "It is a game, don’t take it so pathetically and—above all-don't 
make morality of it!" (Ibid. , 64) 
Another significant philosopher Nietzsche discussed in his Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the 
Greeks is Parmenides of Elea. According to Nietzsche, when one compares Parmenides with his 
predecessors, one finds totally different point of view. As we previously discussed, Anaximander 
condemned the world as the place of wickedness and simultaneously of atonement for the un-
justness of all coming-to-be. On the other hand, gazing at that world doomed by Anaximander 
Heraclitus, discovered a wonderful order, regularity and certainty manifested themselves in all 
coming-to-be, which by itself could not be anything evil or unjust. Parmenides gazed at the same 
world as his predecessors, according to Nietzsche, the Eleatic philosopher followed a totally dif-
ferent orientation, i.e. he compared the qualities and believed that he found them not equal, but 
divided into two rubrics… he differentiated between positive and negative qualities, seriously 
attempting to find and note this basic contradictory principle throughout all nature (Ibid. , 72). In 




the latter, negative qualities. Moreover, he explained the relation between the two qualities by 
asserting the latter (negative qualities) are just the absence of the former, (positive qualities)—
this correlation of the qualities is clearly represented in his reference of the positive qualities as 
existent and the negative qualities as nonexistent. Henceforth, Parmenides’ approach towards the 
problem of becoming shaped within this differentiation; his investigation on the essential of ex-
istent and nonexistent induced a tautology, with the question, “can something which is not, be a 
quality?” or can something which is not, be? Parmenides proclaimed, “What is, is. And what is 
not, is not”. This tautology further complicated the problem of becoming. For Nietzsche, at this 
point, Parmenides “really dipped into the cold bath of his awe-inspiring abstractions” (Ibid. , 78). 
He stated, the existent could not have come-to-be, for out of what could it have come? From the 
nonexistent, but what is not, is not—it cannot produce anything. Discarding the nonexistent, he 
tested the possibility of the existent as a source. Nevertheless, this would reproduce nothing but 
itself. It is the same with passing-away. Parmenides went even deeper, he proclaimed,  
“Passing away is just as impossible as coming-to-be, as is all change, all decrease, 
all increase. In fact, the only valid proposition that can be stated is "Everything of 
which you can say 'it has been' or 'it will be' is not; of the existent you can never 
say 'it is not." The existent is indivisible, for where is the second power that could 
divide it? It is immobile, for where could it move to? It can be neither infinitely 
large nor infinitely small, for it is perfect, and a perfectly given infinity is a 
contradiction. Thus it hovers: bounded, finished, immobile, everywhere in 
balance, equally perfect at each point, like a globe, though not in space, for this 
space would be a second existent. But there cannot be several existents… Thus 
there is only eternal unity.” (Ibid. , 78) 
In addition to the differentiation of being and nonbeing, the invalidation of coming-to-be and 




latter history of philosophy—the first critique of man's apparatus of knowledge, i.e. the sense. As 
for him, all sense perceptions, yield but illusions. And their main illusoriness lies in their pre-
tense that the nonexistent coexists with the existent, that Becoming, too, has Being (PTAG, 79).  
On the consistent prevalence of this standpoint in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche states,  
This is a critique as yet in-adequate but doomed to bear dire consequences.  By 
wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction. In other words by 
splitting up mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he 
demolished intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous 
distinction between "spirit" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies upon 
philosophy like a curse. (Ibid. , 79) 
For Nietzsche Parmenides represented a significant turn in the history of philosophy. By him 
magnificent wall is erected, how he attempted to deal with the problem of becoming has deter-
mined the direction of philosophy. Nietzsche states,   
When one makes as total a judgment as does Parmenides about the whole of the 
world, one ceases to be a scientist, an investigator into any of the world's parts. 
One's sympathy toward phenomena atrophies; one even develops a hatred for 
phenomena including oneself, a hatred for being unable to get rid of the 
everlasting deceitfulness of sensation. Henceforward truth shall live only in the 
palest, most abstracted generalities, in the empty husks of the most indefinite 
terms, as though in a house of cobwebs. And beside such truth now sits our 
philosopher, likewise as bloodless as his abstractions, in the spun out fabric of his 
formulas. (PTAG, 80)   
 Let us hold our discussion with one last point to smoothen the remembrance of our main con-
cern, i.e. his discourse on nihilism, vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and epistemology. Re-




all subsequent philosophers and nature investigators. They all deny the possibility 
of coming-to-be and passing-away, as ordinary people imagine it and as 
Anaximander and Heraclitus had assumed it with more profound reflectivity, yet 
still unreflectively. Such mythological origin in nothingness, disappearance into 
nothingness… but so was, and for the same reasons, the origin of the many in the 
one, of manifold qualities in the one primal quality, in short the whole derivation 
of the world from a single primal substance as Thales and Heraclitus had taught it. 
(PTAG, 90)   
Nietzsche wrote this in the 19th century, thousands of years after Thales, Anaximander, Heracli-
tus, and Parmenides. Even though in this time numerous philosophers have arrived, contemplat-
ed and dealt with the problem of becoming. Nonetheless, for him none of them could surpass the 
novelty of the pre-Socratics. Perhaps in his Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche appears to convey 
this lack of novelty by paying tributes to Heraclitus of Ephesus for standing in difference from 
what followed him regarding the credibility of the testimony of the senses. Even though both 
Heraclitus and Parmenides rejected the testimony of the senses, the former rejected their testi-
mony because it represented things as if they had permanence and unity, whereas the later assert-
ed the opposite as his reason. At this point, to ask the philosophical significance of the problem 
of becoming seems important, as well as, whether it is relevant to Nietzsche discourse on nihil-
ism.  
In our previous discussion, we have read Anaximander asking, “Who is there that could redeem 
you from the curse of coming-to-be?” this question of the philosopher, appears to reproach to-
wards coming-to-be. With the exception of Heraclitus, philosophers reproached coming-to-be 




What is, does not become; what becomes, is not . . . So they all believe, 
desperately even, in being. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for 
reasons why it is kept from them. 'There must be some deception here, some 
illusory level of appearances preventing us from perceiving things that have 
being: where is the deceiver?' - 'We've got it! ‘They shout in ecstasy, 'it is in 
sensibility! (Ibid. , 167) 
Let us relate this reproach towards becoming with Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism as psycholog-
ical state. Accordingly, few pages back, we have read Nietzsche identifying three forms of nihil-
ism the first marked by the realization of absence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, 
followed by the denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. And the third form of nihil-
ism marked by the attempt to escape by passing sentence on this whole world of becoming as a 
deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world. Followed man’s comprehension of the 
true world as his own invention derived initiated by his psychological needs, as well as the reali-
zation of how he has absolutely no right to it. At the end, i.e. this third and last form of nihilism 
involves man’s abandonment of any belief in any metaphysical world.  
Anaximander has viewed all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from 
eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance. Heraclitus has described it as 
the only thing he contemplated and Parmenides has invalidated it as the illusion of the senses. In 
Nietzsche’s discussion of nihilism, another way of dealing with becoming is presented, i.e. the 
alleging of a goal, or purporting that something is to be achieved through the process. Nietzsche 
states,           
one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing.—Thus, 
disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of nihilism: 




hypotheses about aims that concern the whole "evolution" are inadequate (man no 
longer the collaborator, let alone the center, of becoming). (TWP, 12) 
Here we should note that Nietzsche’s italicizations of the words “achieved” and “nothing” signi-
fies that the achievable aim is not a certified aim of becoming, which would not require postula-
tion. Rather, it is “human, all too human”—allegedly posited by human, and allegedly “not 
found” by human. What is more interesting in this analysis is, Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
human psychology. When man allegedly purports an aim in the process of becoming, in other 
words, when man desires the process of becoming to achieve something; there will be another 
interwoven demands—the need to acquire a special place in the process than every other thing in 
the process.             
The second form of nihilism also essentially exhibits a stand exposed in the first form but here 
other ingredients are found. In this form of nihilism, man posits a totality, a systematization, in-
deed any organization in all events, and underneath all events. This postulation involves sophis-
tication—man attends the totality as a soul that longs to admire and revere has wallowed in the 
idea of some supreme form of domination and administration. (Ibid. )  Nietzsche states, herein 
man acquires a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole 
that is infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a mode of the deity. (Ibid. ) However, as 
the first demanded “aim” of the process of becoming here again man finds himself to be no dif-
ferent but him playing with himself—like a child’s play. Accordingly, the realization of this van-
quishes the alleged “whole” wherein man acquired special position. Similarly, Nietzsche’s 
knowledge of human psychology is deployed here, indicating the human fingerprint in the al-
leged “system” Nietzsche sarcastically states, “If the soul be that of a logician, complete con-




recall his comment on Anaximander’s melancholic reaction to coming-to-be, where Nietzsche 
empathized “It may not be logical, but it certainly is human, to view now, together with Anaxi-
mander, all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a 
wrong for which destruction is the only penance.” (PTAG, 46) Nietzsche who is also a man 
shares the misery of Anaximander. Nevertheless, becoming, (coming-to-be and passing away) is 
“heartless” and do not recognize man as he recognizes with others.  
Before proceeding to the third form of nihilism, let us enrich our discussion by embracing the 
conceptual development of the posited “aim” and “unity” within the process of becoming. In 
view of that, it appears necessary to recall the “Parmenidean effect”. As it can be remembered in 
Nietzsche’s discussion of Parmenides, he identified the Parmenidean critique of the senses as a 
“significant first critique of man's apparatus of knowledge, a critique as yet inadequate” (PTAG, 
79). This assertion demands the discussion on the advancement of Parmenides’ critique that 
would make it an adequate critique. Therefore, let us began the development with Nietzsche 
words stating, 
“By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction. In other words by 
splitting up mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he 
demolished intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous 
distinction between "spirit" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies upon 
philosophy like a curse.25 (Ibid. )  
Here, Nietzsche mentions the name of a great philosopher that has tremendously influenced the 
history of philosophy—Plato. For Nietzsche, with Plato “something entirely new has its begin-
                                                 




ning.” At this point, it seems appropriate to ask what Nietzsche discovers in the philosophy of 
Plato. Considering this, in the preface of his book Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts,  
“the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a 
dogmatist's error-namely, Plato's invention of  the pure spirit and the good as 
such… To be sure, it meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective, 
the basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did.” 
(BGE, 3)  
Plato’s philosophy establishes a metaphysics of transcendence and an epistemology of dogma-
tism (the denial of ‘perspectivity’). His metaphysics of transcendence posited hierarchically the 
world of Forms, Abstract objects and mathematics, the sensible world and images. Accordingly, 
he proclaimed the epistemological supremacy of the knowledge of the Forms over all the rest. In 
proclaiming, the metaphysical and epistemological supremacy of the world of Forms, and Ab-
stract objects and mathematics, Plato grounded on their eternality and un-changeability. On the 
other hand, for Plato, the effect of time and change belongs to the sensory world. For Nietzsche 
this position of Plato involves notable differences from his predecessors. In Philosophy in the 
Tragic Ages of the Greeks, he asserts, while his predecessors “fled from an over-abundant reality 
as though it were but the tricky scheming of the imagination, into the rigor mortis of the coldest 
emptiest concept of all, i.e. the concept of being.” Plato took flight into, “the land of eternal ide-
as, into the workshop of the world-creator, feasting one's eyes on the unblemished unbreakable 
archetypes” (PTAG, 80). Another crucial development in Plato’s philosophy, which Nietzsche 
identifies as a great influence on the history of philosophy is the postulation of the Form of the 
Good in the world of Forms as the setter of objective standard for morality, accordingly Plato 
proclaimed the absolute truthiness of moral values. Again, with this position Plato laid a founda-




In praxi, this means that moral judgments are torn from their conditionality, in 
which they have grown and alone possess any meaning, from their Greek and 
Greek-political ground and soil, to be denaturalized under the pretense of 
sublimation. The great concepts "good" and "just" are severed from the 
presuppositions to which they belong and, as liberated "ideas," become objects of 
dialectic. One looks for truth in them, one takes them for entities or signs of 
entities: one invents a world where they are at home, where they originate— (F. 
W. Nietzsche 1968, 234-235) 
Up to this point, Nietzsche has identified three major advancements triggered by Plato, namely, 
metaphysics of transcendence, dogmatism (the denial of perspectives) and morality. However, 
regarding moral interpretations, one has to note that Nietzsche is not claiming, “Plato started eve-
rything from nothing”, for his predecessors such as Anaximander and Heraclitus (though inade-
quately)26 have introduced the standpoints, which he latter grandly established. Yet, we should 
also note the variances exhibited in the influences of the predecessors. Among these, what Nie-
tzsche underlines regarding Parmenides’ flight appears remarkable; he identified its peculiarity 
with its total lack of religiosity and ethical warmth. Moreover, unlike the philosophies of Py-
thagoras and Empedocles, Nietzsche admires the flight of Parmenides, for its lack of the dark 
intoxicating fragrance of Hindu wisdom—that is evoked by a profound religious conviction as to 
the depravity, ephemerality and accursedness of human existence (PTAG, 81).  For Nietzsche, 
the ultimate goal of Parmenides’ flight i.e. peace in being, was not striven after as though it were 
the mystic absorption into one all-sufficing ecstatic state of mind, which is the enigma, and vexa-
tion of ordinary minds. (Ibid. , 81)  
                                                 
26 i.e. with Anaximander, the perishing of all things as punishment for their emancipation from pure being; with 
Heraclitus, the regularity of phenomena as witness to the moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. (F. 




Let us take a moment and recall the conceptual flow of what has been discussed so far. At the 
beginning of the chapter, we have read Nietzsche’s identification of man’s uniquely required 
condition of existence, through which he fulfills the why of his existence—his faith in life. 
Moreover, secondly we have noted the posit-ability and consequently the essential collapsibility 
of this meaning of existence through which man acquires the periodic trust in life. In view of 
that, we have identified nihilism as the collapse of the posited meaning of existence. Then by 
embracing Nietzsche’s proclamation of being “the first prefect nihilist of Europe”, we have iden-
tified his discourse on nihilism as having twofold aspects—into nihilism and against nihilism.  
With the division of the discourse, his claim of the necessity to complete and not attempt escape 
has been underlined. After this, we have proceeded to discuss his journey into nihilism by in-
volving his analysis of nihilism as psychological state, through which he demonstrated the phe-
nomenon of nihilism in relation to the realization of the absence the three categories (“aim”, 
“unity” and “truth”) which were postulated as if embedded in the process of becoming. Moreo-
ver, in this analysis we have read Nietzsche ascribing the attempt to escape the nihilism inflicted 
by the realization through seeking refuge into the metaphysical world—the beyond or true world; 
Followed by man’s discovery of his psychological needs as its source, and the consequent renun-
ciation of any metaphysical world. Lastly, we have embraced the conceptual development of 
what Nietzsche later called “the mendaciousness of millennia”, in view of that we have briefly 
reviewed his analysis of the pre-Socratic philosophers (Thales, Anaximander, Heraclites and 
Parmenides) in relation to their ways of dealing with the process of becoming. Then we proceed-
ed to discuss the remarkable ideas of Plato which Nietzsche claimed as tremendously influenced 
the latter history of philosophy—metaphysics of transcendence, dogmatist epistemology and the 




to’s influence on the latter history of philosophy, one has to be aware of its manifold appearance. 
Perhaps, this implication can be explained with the distinction of “Plato” and “Platonism”, ac-
cordingly, while in referring “Plato” what should come into our mind be his world of Forms, Ab-
stract objects and mathematics, the sensible world and images. Respectively, when referring to 
“Platonism” the metaphysics of transcendence. Similarly, we will refer to dogmatism (the denial 
of perspective) and an ethic that is dictated by such metaphysics and epistemology—as the 
rhythms of Platonism. Nietzsche perceived these hallmarks of Platonism melodized in Christiani-
ty and the philosophies of millennia going more and more mendacious unto the death of God. As 
he proclaims in the preface of Ecce Homo,  
One has deprived reality of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness, to precisely the 
extent to which one has mendaciously invented an ideal world. The “true world” 
and the “apparent world”—that means: the mendaciously invented world and 
reality. The lie of the ideal has so far been the curse on reality; on account of it, 
mankind itself has become mendacious and false down to its most fundamental 
instincts—to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those which alone 
would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its future. (EH, 217-218) 
The echo of the metaphysics of transcendence acquires its peculiar tone with its division of 
worlds. Among the most entertained division of this metaphysics the distinction of the “true 
world” and the “apparent world” served as a concealed substructure beneath the systems that 
shaped how man perceived his existence—its meaning and purpose. Moreover, for Nietzsche, 
the epistemological, religio-moral, political and aesthetical edifices developed upon this meta-
physics of transcendence has gone as far as positing the “opposite”. Here the notion of opposi-
tion prompts us to ask what the edifies are opposed to. How shall we understand this claim? Be-




metaphysics of transcendence. In his book Human, all too human Nietzsche identifies two ways 
philosophizations that seemed to have foundational difference, yet remained foundationally the 
same. Accordingly, in the case of the first type the philosophers station themselves before life 
and experience (or the “apparent world”). Regarding it as apparent or in Nietzsche’s words “a 
painting that has been unrolled once and for all and unchangeably depicts the same scene” (HA, 
19). However, for the philosophers, the extraction of the final and unchanging depiction (the 
“true world”) requires further contemplation—a correct interpretation of the “apparent world”. 
Hence, through this process of interpretation the philosophers draw the conclusion of the nature 
of the being that produced the picture. What is more is that, this type of philosophization recog-
nizes the metaphysical world resulting from the correct interpretation “as the sufficient reason 
for the existence of the world of appearance” (Ibid. ).  On the other hand, the second type of phi-
losophization (which Nietzsche regarded as more rigorous) denies the acclaimed connection be-
tween the unconditioned (the metaphysical world) and the world we know. Nietzsche asserts this 
philosophization retains a clearer identification of the metaphysical world as the unconditioned, 
consequently, also unconditioning. Hence, “what appears in appearance is precisely not the thing 
in itself, and no conclusion can be drawn from the former as to the nature of the latter” (Ibid. ).  
The difference between the two types of philosophizations remained within the realm of the met-
aphysics of transcendence. While both accepted the division of the world as “the metaphysical 
world” and “the world we know”, the first type asserted the former world as the sufficient reason 
for the existence of the latter. On the other hand, the second type rejected this connection. Con-
sidering this, let us consider the question raised above, it is stated that for Nietzsche, the episte-
mological, religio-moral, political and aesthetical edifices developed upon this metaphysics of 




Concerning this point, what Nietzsche states regarding the two kinds of philosophization can 
shed lights on Nietzsche’s position vis-à-vis the metaphysics of transcendence. Accordingly, he 
states 
Both parties, however, overlook the possibility that this painting - that which we 
humans call life and experience - has gradually become, is indeed still fully in 
course of becoming, and should thus not be regarded as a fixed object on the basis 
of which a conclusion as to the nature of its originator (the sufficient reason) may 
either be drawn or pronounced undrawable. (HA, 20) 
These words of Nietzsche aim at the foundation of the metaphysics of transcendence, while the 
two types of philosophizations fundamentally accept the division of the world. Nietzsche puts a 
question mark on the possibility of such division. Above all, in doing so, he acclaims an essential 
characteristics that is overlooked by the foundation of the metaphysics of transcendence—the 
process of becoming. Moreover, Nietzsche’s saying of “this painting - that which we humans call 
life and experience” needs to be remarked, since with it he is indicating a crucial constituent in 
his discourse on nihilism as well as his critique of metaphysics and epistemology. With this point 
the philosopher exposes a place where philosophers of the last millennia gazed at the world—he 
marks the juxtaposition of “man and the world” in the genesis of thought. This point also marks 
the philosopher’s stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia. Accordingly, in The 
Will to Power, Nietzsche asserts-          
The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories 
of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, 
toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed in them the 
criterion of truth and reality … The naiveté was to take an anthropocentric 




short, to make absolute something conditioned. And behold, suddenly the world 
fell apart into a "true" world and an "apparent" world: and precisely the world that 
man's reason had devised for him to live and settle in was discredited. Instead of 
employing the forms as a tool for making the world manageable and calculable, 
the philosophers divined that in these categories is presented the concept of that 
world to which the one in which man lives does not correspond— The means 
were misunderstood as measures of value, even as a condemnation of their real 
intention- (TWP, 314-315)  
In the above passage, Nietzsche advances his argument against the metaphysics of transcendence 
in relation to its deviant presence in philosophy caused by the error of the philosopher. As re-
membered, in the last chapter we have discussed Nietzsche stating the inclination that advances 
when “any philosophy begins to believe in itself, it always creates the world in its own image; it 
cannot do otherwise” (BGE, 16).  However, when such “believe” and such “creation of world” 
prevails in fertile foundations capable of shaping the history of philosophy, its consequences—
the poison and antidote will be tremendous. The case of the metaphysics of transcendence, 
demonstrates this supposition. Nietzsche identifies three significant conditions of its reappear-
ance through the philosopher, the religious man and the moral man. Accordingly, by retaining its 
essential presumptions, mainly the division of the world and its valuation (i.e. the “other world” 
as criterion of truth and reality, whereas the one in which man lives weighs less), the metaphys-
ics of transcendence has persisted by the philosopher as “true” world—as world of reason, where 
the logical functions and reason suffice. On the other hand, by the religious man, as the "divine 
world"—“denaturalized, anti-natural”; as well as, by the moral man, as "free world"—"good, 
perfect, just, holy" world (TWP, 322). All three manifestation exhibits the aberrance Nietzsche 
identified, i.e. naiveté to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things—to make 




ground Nietzsche is making such a claim. In answering this question, the discussion of his analy-
sis on the psychology of metaphysics seems appropriate. Let us recall what we noted from the 
preface of The Gay Science regarding “the involuntary detours, side lanes, resting places, and 
sunny places of thought to which suffering thinkers are led and misled on account of their suffer-
ing” (GS, 34). In his analysis of the psychological foundation of hitherto metaphysics, Nietzsche 
sought to discover encoded conditions of human existence, and modes of valuation. Accordingly, 
he discovered what he called “blind trust in reason” signified with its presumption “if A exists, 
then the opposite concept B must also exist”. The prevalence of such assumption in the meta-
physics of transcendence determined the relation between the two worlds. For Nietzsche, this 
point gave birth to false conclusions such as,   This  world  is  apparent:  consequently  there  is  
a  true  world; and this  world is  a world of  becoming:  consequently there  is  a  world of being 
(TWP, 310). Within the context of the metaphysics of transcendence, the former worlds (the ap-
parent, and the world of becoming) acquired less value than their counter-worlds (the true, and 
world of being). This in turn incites wonderment whether there is anything behind such division 
and valuation. Let us first discuss the distinction and valuation of “the world of becoming” and 
“the world of being”. Noting this analysis as having great importance in Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysics, as well as his criticism of hitherto philosophers, he conceived the division of the 
world as “of becoming” and “of being”, correspondingly, the valuation beneath as the  objection 
of   the former by the postulation of the latter. In Twilight of The Idols, Nietzsche states about 
hitherto philosophers (with the exception of Heraclitus of Ephesus) as using only mummified 
concepts. He states, “they see death, change, and age, as well as procreation and growth, as ob-
jections, - refutations even.  What is, does not become; what becomes, is not  ... So they all be-




lingered throughout the history of philosophy; however, after Plato’s way there seems to be no 
fundamental difference in the philosophers’ approach. What Nietzsche called “the aberration of 
philosophy” remained unnoticed. Likewise, what came with the philosophy of Hegel and later of 
Schopenhauer failed to approach it in a way that fundamentally differs from the thousand year’s 
tradition of approaching the problem of becoming. Hegel employed a logico-metaphysical way 
of dealing with the problem. Despite this slightly different approach if one wonders whether He-
gel was facing the problem of becoming with its simplicity as Plato did. Because, chronological-
ly the age Plato lived in provides with the possibility of contemplating the problem of becoming 
with the freshness as Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides—uncomplicated by voluminous 
philosophies. On the other hand, between the pre-Socratics and Hegel, numerous hands of the 
“geniuses” have left their fingerprint. This lengthily journey is depicted in Hegelian way, which 
according to Nietzsche is, “a piece of romanticism and reaction, at the same time a symptom of 
the historical sense, of a new strength: the ‘spirit’ itself is the ‘self-revealing and self-realizing 
ideal’: more and more of this ideal in which we believe manifests itself in the course of its ‘pro-
cess’, in ‘becoming’ ” (TWP, 147). For Nietzsche, the Hegelian way of dealing with the problem 
of becoming incites his longing for the “return” of the Greeks, looking back to antiquity Nie-
tzsche states,  
How far it takes one from "pressure and stress," from the mechanistic 
awkwardness of the natural sciences, from the market hubbub of "modern ideas"! 
One wants to go back, through the Church Fathers to the Greeks, from the north 
to the south, from the formulas to the Forms; one still relishes the exit from 
antiquity, Christianity, as an entrance to it, as in itself a goodly piece of the old 





Nietzsche marks the developing mechanistic natural science and Christianity standing on the way 
back to the Greeks. For the enrichment of our discussion, let us consider the role of Christianity, 
i.e. its intertwinement with the metaphysics of transcendence, and the denaturalization of moral 
values. Noting the occurrence of Christianity has significantly shaped the later influences of the 
Greeks in the later history of philosophy. Furthermore, at this point, we should remark Nie-
tzsche’s assertion of how on account of the metaphysics of transcendence “mankind has become 
mendacious and falls down to its most fundamental instincts—to the point of worshipping the 
opposite values of those which alone would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its 
future” (EH, 217-218). Moreover, here the mentioning of Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of 
metaphysics is important. In discussing his investigation of the psychological drives within met-
aphysics, to be aware of his backward inference is crucial. In The Gay Science, he explains this 
eye by stating, “the backward inference from the work to the maker, from the deed to the doer, 
from the ideal to those who need it, from every way of thinking and valuing to the commanding 
need behind it”27 (GS, 329). Employing this insight in the investigation of the psychological 
foundations metaphysics of transcendence would unfold the obscured division and valuation 
within hitherto philosophy and religio-moral system. In Nietzsche’s philosophy, this insight has 
served a great significance—in the transvaluation and revaluation of value, also underpins the 
“human, all too human” outlook. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche applies his method of back-
ward inference and tries to claim hatred and fear as psychological drives behind the invention of 
God as antithesis of evil and being-in-it-self. He states,  
                                                 
27In the previous chapter, we have read Nietzsche making distinction among philosophers and philosophies, i.e. “In 
some it is their deprivations that philosophize; in others, their riches  and strengths. The former need their philoso-
phy, whether it be prop, a  sedative,  medicine, redemption,  elevation,  or self-alienation. For the latter it is merely a 
beautiful luxury-in the best cases, the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that eventually still has to  inscribe 




That which has been feared the most, the cause of the most powerful suffering 
(lust to rule, sex, etc.), has been treated by men with the greatest amount of 
hostility and eliminated from the "true" world. Thus they have eliminated the 
affects one by one —posited God as the antithesis of evil, that is, placed reality in 
the negation of the desires and affects (i.e., in nothingness). In the same way, they 
have hated the irrational, the arbitrary, the accidental (as the causes of 
immeasurable physical suffering). As a consequence, they negated this element in 
being-in-itself and conceived it as absolute "rationality" and "purposiveness." 
(TWP, 309-310) 
These flights to God (as anti-thesis of “evil”) and being-in-it-self as a negation of the irrational, 
the arbitrary, the accidental; incites suspicion on hitherto metaphysics. However, according to 
Nietzsche, on the account of metaphysics of transcendence, humankind has become mendacious 
to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those, which alone would guarantee its health 
and its future. It has prepared the way for the fatal kind of megalomania there has ever been on 
earth—Christianity28 (TWP, 118). In relation to the metaphysics of transcendence, Christianity 
stands as a religio-moral system that practically demonstrated the dangers lurking in the meta-
physics of transcendence. Nietzsche denounces Plato by saying, “the great viaduct of corruption, 
who first refused to see nature in morality, who had already debased the Greek gods with his 
concept "good," who was already marked by Jewish bigotry (—in Egypt?)” (Ibid., 118). As we 
discussed in the previous chapter under the section “The transvaluation and revaluation of val-
ues”, beneath Nietzsche’s reproach towards the religio-moral system of Christianity, his criticism 
                                                 
28 The discussion of Nietzsche’s approach towards Christianity by itself requires its own examination. However, one 
should remark his distinction of Jesus Christ and institutionalized Christianity. For Nietzsche, “One should not con-
fuse Christianity as a historical reality with that one root that its name calls to mind: the other roots from which it 
has grown up have been far more powerful. It is an unexampled misuse of words when such manifestations of decay 
and abortions as "Christian church," "Christian faith" and "Christian life" label themselves with that holy name. 




of  the mode of valuation and division of the world, in other words, the shrewd use of the meta-
physics of transcendence resides as the springboard of declaring its devaluation and revaluation. 
Moreover, we have also discussed Nietzsche’s deployment of backward inference the prevalence 
of anthropocentric idiosyncrasies within the “otherworldly” transcendence of the Christian 
religio-moral system—namely ressentiment. This concealed driving force, according to Nie-
tzsche is obscured to the extent of hampering the understanding of Christianity, since as a matter 
of principle religio-moral system fights against ressentiment, he states as the Masterstroke—“to 
deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is, continually to display, by word and deed, 
the antithesis of this drive” (TWP, 109).  
In spite of criticizing Christianity as never before, Nietzsche acknowledges its service of being 
the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism (TWP, 10). In other words, the Chris-
tian moral hypothesis has served the fulfillment of man’s unique condition of existence—it has 
provided man a periodic trust in life, i.e. belief and knowledge of why he exists. However, one 
should be careful not to regard this acknowledgement as a confirmation. In view of that, in The 
Will to Power, Nietzsche identifies the cruxes that underpinned the Christian moral hypothesis as 
the antidote of practical and theoretical nihilism. Accordingly, the bestowal of absolute value of 
man in the flux of becoming and passing away, marks the first recipe of its remedial-ness. From 
our discussion so far, this appears an extraordinary achievement, since the problem of becoming 
has been ground shaking for Greek philosophers. Now with Christianity, man has acquired abso-
lute value as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the flux. The second recipe 
of the antidote involves the positing of man as having knowledge of absolute values of what is 
most important. Even though, these two would be the source of great consolation, the other 




sides against life, from despairing of knowledge (TWP, 9-10), but these remedies incites won-
derment—how could all these be possible? There should be something untold, perhaps, some-
thing to pay?  
In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche attempts to uncover the foundation of the system that comfort-
ed humankind with its antidotes. He states, “Christianity is a system, a carefully considered, in-
tegrated view of things. If you break off a main tenet, the belief in God, you smash the whole 
system along with it: you lose your grip on anything necessary” (TI, 6). With Christianity, the 
philosophers’ struggle of comprehending coming-to-be and passing away makes a radical shift 
that remolded the influence of the Greeks—Christianization of the pagan philosophers. In our 
discussion of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides the problem of becoming ap-
peared first-hand, i.e. with its entire enigmas. Furthermore, this spirit resonated within the later 
Greeks, compared to what came with Christianity the curiosity regarding coming-to-be and pass-
ing away stands racking the philosophical minds. On the other hand, with Christianity what Nie-
tzsche called “the aberration of philosophy” resonated louder and louder. Within the moral meta-
physics of transcendence prevailed as moral interpretation. After millennia, tombstone of the 
enigma (of coming-to-be and passing away) began to crack. Within German idealism, first Kant-
ianism and then Hegelianism made the most desperate attempts to cement the cracking tomb-
stone. The former embarked epistemological movement that declared “God is unknowable for us 
and not demonstrable by us—the hidden meaning of the epistemological movement” (TWP, 
147). While the latter followed different approach (yet, seen from the angel of metaphysics of 
transcendence it exhibited the same ground), and advanced counterargument that is a historical 
movement, which proclaims, “God is demonstrable but as something in process of becoming, 




two philosophical attempts remained within the metaphysics of transcendence, i.e. neither of the 
criticism is directed at the ideal itself, but only at the problem, where the opposition to it origi-
nates—why it has not yet been achieved or why it is not demonstrable in small things and in 
great (Ibid. ). This lack of fundamental difference of philosophization is also manifested in their 
approach of moral values. Accordingly, while Kant asserted the realm of moral values are with-
drawn from us, invisible but real. Hegel argued demonstrable development, a becoming-visible 
of the moral realm (TWP, 223). As it appeared in the case of God, the differences of the two phi-
losophies overlooked the questioning of the very existence of the realm of moral values—i.e. 
neither of the criticism is directed at the ideal itself. For Nietzsche, even though it sustained the 
immunity of the ideal, the Hegelian way out contains a feature distinct enough to be recognized 
in relation to Plato. With this feature, i.e. the inclusion of historicity, Hegelianism attempted the 
exhumation of the buried legend—the process of becoming. Yet, it later reinstated its faith to the 
ideal and offered the legend as a sacrifice—as the locomotive system of the ideal. As we have 
noted before, Christianity has significantly shaped the influences of the Greeks in the later histo-
ry of philosophy. This influence is mainly manifested in the deployment of ecclesiastical inter-
pretations on the philosophies of the Greeks, with a special emphasis on the consolidation of the 
“moral world order”—the Christianization of the Pagans. The metaphysics of transcendence, de-
nial of perspective and denaturalization of moral values redesigned ecclesiastically. Accordingly, 
in relation to Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism, the nearest appearance of the influence of Chris-
tianity is signified by the philosophy of Hegel. Beneath all the sophisticated construction of his 
logico-metaphysical edifice, Nietzsche found a pious philosopher. Considering this in The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche criticized Hegel as “the delayer par excellence of triumph of atheism” (GS, 




pealing as a last resort to our sixth sense, the historical sense," (Ibid. , 306). As we have noted 
before, the Christian moral hypothesis has prevented man from practical and theoretical nihilism. 
Accordingly, with the faith in the posited Christian religio-moral system certain fundamental 
question of existence remains hidden. Even if the fundamental questions of existence is asked by 
the believer, his faith would prevent him (perhaps, “protect” him) from approaching the question 
un-moderated—rather with all the lightning and thunder. Nietzsche states, “as we thus reject the 
Christian interpretation and condemn its “meaning” like counterfeit, Schopenhauer's question 
immediately comes to us in a terrifying way: Has existence any meaning at all?” (Ibid. , 308). 
For Nietzsche, the philosophy of Schopenhauer signifies “the unchristian” eye gazing at the 
world. Among the German philosophers, Schopenhauer stands as the first admitted and inexora-
ble atheist (Ibid. , 306).  In his essay titled, On The Sufferings Of The World, Schopenhauer de-
clares: 
I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless—because I speak the 
truth; and people prefer to be assured that everything the Lord has made is good. 
Go to the priests, then, and leave philosophers in peace! At any rate, do not ask us 
to accommodate our doctrines to the lessons you have been taught. That is what 
those rascals of sham philosophers will do for you. Ask them for any doctrine you 
please, and you will get it. (On The Sufferings Of The World, 7) 
In relation to what we have discussed in this chapter, these words of Schopenhauer involve his 
departure from the Christianized metaphysics of transcendence. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer as-
serts his philosophy goes deeper into resolving the prolonged philosophization signified by the 
moral interpretation of the world29, Nietzsche identifies the leap in Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
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that have inhibited it from reaching such profounder level. In The Will to Power Nietzsche states, 
Schopenhauer was still so much subject to the dominion of Christian values that, 
as soon as the thing-in-itself was no longer "God" for him, he had to see it as bad, 
stupid, and absolutely reprehensible. He failed to grasp that there can be an 
infinite variety of ways of being different, even of being god. (TWP, 521) 
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, despite his remarkable advancement in the critique of the Christian-
ized metaphysics of transcendence, i.e. for one has unlearned the habit of conceding to this posit-
ed ideal the reality of a person; one has become atheistic (Ibid. , 15). The philosophy of Scho-
penhauer remained entangled. Since the liberation from the entrapment in the metaphysics of 
transcendence requires the renunciation of the absoluteness of the ideal. Yet, in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, the ideal still reigns as the opposite of the Christianized ideal, i.e. "evil, blind will". 
Hence, it has failed to overcome the foundation of the edifice dominating thousand years of phi-
losophization. Nonetheless, to the extent of renouncing the Christianized ideal, Nietzsche identi-
fies Schopenhauer as a nihilist, however, not the “perfect nihilist” as he latter proclaimed him-
self.   
2.1.2 Nihilism and the Critique of Epistemology 
So far, we have briefly discussed Nietzsche’s critique on metaphysics of transcendence, and 
hereafter we will involve his critique of epistemology. Noting the notion of epistemology is wid-
er than how Nietzsche conceived it, henceforth, the reference of the term shall be regarded in re-
                                                                                                                                                             
propound  a  philosophy  that  would  leave  no  questions  unanswered.  In  this  sense,  philosophy  is actually  im-
possible ;  it  would  be  the  science  of  omniscience.  But  ‘There  is  a  limit  up  to  which  one  can  go,  even  if  
one  cannot  go  beyond it.’  there  is  a  limit  up  to which  reflection  can  penetrate,  and  so  far illuminate  the  
night of  our existence,  although  the  horizon  always  remains  dark.  This  limit  is reached  by  my  doctrine  in  
the  will-to-live  that  affirms or  denies  itself in  its  own  phenomenon.  To  want  to  go  beyond  this  is,  in  my  
view, like  wanting  to  fly  beyond  the  atmosphere.  We  must  stop  here,  although  new  problems  arise  from  




lation to the metaphysics of transcendence.  Accordingly, let us begin our discussion with the 
words of the philosopher of “human, all too human” stating,  
It  is  true,  there  could  be  a  metaphysical world;  the absolute  possibility  of  it  
is  hardly  to  be  disputed. We  behold  all  things through the  human head and 
cannot cut off this head; while the question nonetheless remains what of the  
world would still be there if one had cut it off … (HA I, 15)  
These words of Nietzsche, sarcastically puts question mark on the hitherto purported existence of 
metaphysical world independent of the human mind. Moreover, without omitting the question 
mark, it poses the possibility of the human intellect as the origin and residence of the metaphysi-
cal world. Figuratively questioning what of the metaphysical world would remain without the 
presence of the human intellect, yet, this by itself is another riddle—who can answer that. On the 
other hand, if considered leaving out the sarcasm and the figure of speech, the message of the 
philosopher conjures up against everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. 
Accordingly Nietzsche states,  
all that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrible, delightful  
to them, all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-
deception;  the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, 
have taught belief in them.30 When one has disclosed these methods as the  
foundation of all extant religions and metaphysical systems, one has refuted  
them!  (HA I, 15)  
This exclaimed pronouncement unfolds a sketch of Nietzsche’s discovery of foundational inter-
twinement of hitherto metaphysical systems and religions with their corresponding epistemologi-
                                                 




cal paths, i.e. methods of acquiring knowledge. In this way, the philosopher identified a method 
that has reigned over the history of human knowledge—dogmatist epistemology. For millennia, 
the metaphysics of transcendence and the dogmatist epistemology predominantly underpinned 
man’s value systems. Specially, through moral valuation they have determined his daily life. Ac-
cording to Nietzsche, the covenant that sealed the marriage of metaphysics of transcendence and 
dogmatist epistemology has devastatingly hampered the expedition of human knowledge. Con-
sidering this in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche states,  
But if all those who have thought so highly of their convictions, brought to them 
sacrifices of every kind, and have not spared honour, body or life in their service, 
had devoted only half their energy to investigating with what right they adhered to 
this or that conviction, by what path they had arrived at it, 31 how peaceable a 
picture the history of mankind would present! How much more knowledge there 
would be! (HA I, 200) 
The above passage of the philosopher contains his regret in behalf of the possible enrichment of 
human knowledge that would have been realized, if it were not bound by metaphysics of tran-
scendence and dogmatist epistemology. Yet, the philosopher did not allow to be tormented by 
this despairing rather attempted to overcome it by speculating the origin of the “with what right 
one adheres to this or that conviction, by what path one had arrived at it”. Noting this investiga-
tion holds significance in Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology, as well as in his journey into ni-
hilism, we will proceed to a brief discussion of the philosopher’s expedition, with his statement 
from Human, All Too Human, 
                                                 




this world has gradually become so marvelously variegated, frightful, meaningful, 
soulful, it has acquired color - but we have been the colorists it is the human 
intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic 
conceptions into things.32 (HA I, 20) 
In this passage, the philosopher becomes conscious of juxtaposition the worlds (as colorized by 
the human intellect) the colorable world. As we have noted before (with what Nietzsche called 
“the aberration of philosophy”), the dogmatist epistemology taught, “to take an anthropocentric 
idiosyncrasy as the measure of things” (TWP, 315). For Nietzsche, among all human beings who 
submitted under such kind of naiveté, the philosopher’s submission poses as accusable—for 
among all human beings he (the philosopher) should have stood alerted. Accordingly, if we re-
visit Nietzsche’s words in Ecce Homo33, the criticizable of the philosopher resides in overlooking 
the aberration. In his attempt to become such philosopher, Nietzsche asks  
…But who is it really, who tells us that the apparent world must be of less value 
than the true one? … Above all: how do we arrive at the idea that our world is not 
the true world? … And finally: what gives us the right to posit, as it were, degrees 
of reality? (TWP, 321) 
Let us reconsider, Nietzsche saying “this world has acquired color - but we have been the color-
ists it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic 
conceptions into things” (HA I, 20). What Nietzsche asserts about the human intellect in his es-
                                                 
32 Because we have for millennia made moral, aesthetic, religious demands on the world, looked upon it with blind 
desire, passion or fear, and abandoned ourselves to the bad habits of illogical thinking, this world has gradually be-
come so marvelously variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired color - but we have been the colorists 
it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things. 
(HA I, 20) 
33 “The lie of the ideal has so far been the curse on reality; on account of it, mankind itself has become mendacious 
and falls down to its most fundamental instincts—to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those which 




say titled On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, could help shed the light on this reconsid-
eration.  
There have been eternities when it (the human intellect) did not exist; and when it 
is done for again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further 
mission that would lead beyond human life. It is human, rather, and only its 
owner and producer gives it such importance,34 as if the world pivoted around it. 
(TLE, 1) 
The understanding of this assertion requires a different perspective; one way of interpreting the 
philosopher’s words is to wonder the lonely existence of man and his adorned intellect. The hu-
man intellect is lonely in the sense of “not having other species of intellect” that would enable 
the vis-à-vis evaluation of it. Hitherto, man has been valuing himself; he has been making mis-
takes and correcting his mistakes. Hitherto, man has been the writer, the reader; he has been the 
critic as well as the appraiser. Nietzsche is trying to make him conscious of this, as he said it in 
Ecce Homo the philosopher is regarding  “the causes that so far have prompted moralizing and 
idealizing in a very different light from what may seem desirable: the hidden history of the phi-
losophers, the psychology of the great names, came to light for me” (EH, 218). His critique of 
hitherto metaphysics and epistemology, have to be understood in this light. Let us add one state-
ment of the philosopher that would elucidate the atmosphere of his critique. In The Will to Pow-
er, Nietzsche states, “We  possess  no  categories  by  which  we  can  distinguish  a  true  from  
an  apparent  world.  (There  might  only  be  an  apparent  world,  but  not  our  apparent  
world.)” (TWP, 313). In this quoted statement, the word “our” is italicized; the philosopher is 
trying to tell something. Since the apparentness of our apparent world is determined in relation to 
                                                 




the true world, and since the true world is our true world (our—humanly, all too humanly true 
world); the possible existence of an apparent world (without the adjective “our”) will remain in-
demonstrable and every time we try to demonstrate it, the adjective “our” will simultaneously be 
implied. Hence, when Nietzsche says, “We  possess  no  categories  by  which  we  can  distin-
guish  a  true  from  an  apparent  world.” it is important to note he is not saying, We  possess  no  
categories  by  which  we  can  distinguish  our  true  from  our  apparent  world. Hence, as long 
as the “our-ness” of our metaphysical assumptions is at all times considered, there, the aberration 
of philosophy, i.e. the naiveté of making anthropocentric idiosyncrasies the measure of things 
and the teaching of belief in them will be exhausted. Here, it seems appropriate to wonder 
whether Nietzsche is a skeptic, however, despite his repeated admiration of the spirit of skepti-
cism, in The Will to Power he identifies three reproachable types of skepticisms. The first marks 
the philosopher who uses skepticism to be able to speak dogmatically about his main interest 
(TWP, 247). The second type signifies, the skeptic who is inspired by the Haired of the dogma-
tist—or a need for rest, weariness (TWP, 250) Third, Skepticism with a "for"—disintegrates to 
restore (TWP, 229). Considering these, one can rule out suspecting Nietzsche of these kinds of 
skepticism. Moreover, the proceeding discussion of the philosopher’s pronouncement in The Gay 
Science will shed light regarding his stance as a “skeptic”. With this discussion, we will also fi-
nalize Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism. Here, the philosopher becomes conscious and reflect 
not as individuals but as mankind. Accordingly, Nietzsche writes, “this world is anything but di-
vine; even by human standards it is not rational, merciful, or just. We know it well; the world in 
which we live is ungodly, immoral, ‘inhuman’” (GS, 286). These words convey the philoso-
pher’s stance in the hitherto idealization of the world, it is a conclusive denouncement of the 




philosopher’s assertion of the world as “ungodly, immoral, ‘inhuman’” one might misled to the 
pejoratively overladen connotation of these words. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s assertion of the 
“ungodliness” of the world should not be considered as the opposite of “godliness” for their rela-
tion in this context involves opposition. The same caution works on “immoral” as the opposite of 
“moral” and “inhuman” as the opposite of “human”. On the other hand, these words should be 
understood as representing the essential irrelevancy of ascribing such judgments. As he states, 
“the world is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it wish to become any of these 
things; it does not by any means strive to imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral judg-
ments apply to it (Ibid. , 168). Regarding this point and what follows from it, one should always 
remember what Nietzsche called “the aberration of philosophy35”, accordingly he states, 
We are far from claiming that the world is worth less; indeed it would seem 
laughable to us today if man were to insist on inventing values that were supposed 
to excel the value of the actual world. This is precisely what we have turned our 
backs on as an extravagant aberration of human vanity and unreason that for a 
long time was not recognized as such. (Ibid. , 286) 
These words of the philosopher sheds light on Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism, since it puts 
sign on the philosopher’s vantage point in his criticism of hitherto metaphysics of transcendence 
and dogmatist epistemology. Accordingly, with the disentangling of the world from the anthro-
pocentric idiosyncrasies that was hitherto attributed to the world as its essence and used to judge 
it (without recognizing the anthropomorphism beneath) the valuation of it (as worthy or worth 
                                                 
35The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the ad-
justment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed 




less) comes to end. We have noted how Nietzsche described the vanity of man36, with his oblivi-
ous immersion into the valuation of the world in a way that eluded (the essential prevalence of 
human perspective) and thought of his valuation as exceling the human, all too human. With this 
point the philosopher acquires his unique stand in the hitherto history of philosophy, the renunci-
ation of “the juxtaposition of ‘man and world’ separated by the sublime presumption of the little 
word ‘and’” (Ibid. , 287). This little word “and” signifies the aberration; it raises the wonderment 
on whether such a stand is still possible? Above all, with this point an opposition is revealed—
“an opposition between the world in which we were at home up to now with our reverences that 
perhaps made it possible for us to endure life, and another world that consists of us—” (Ibid.). 
Noting what we have discussed so far, the sustenance of such stationing prevented man from 
falling into the abyss of nothingness. At this point, it is appropriate to recall Nietzsche’s critique 
of Schopenhauer, for Schopenhauer has philosophized in the same path. However, he was unable 
in the discovering of the profounder substrate of what he denounced—the Christian god. Consid-
ering this let us discuss if Nietzsche has discovered this substrate. As Schopenhauer has gone 
beyond Christianized metaphysics, Nietzsche has gone beyond metaphysics, with his human, all 
too human; with his discovery of the aberration of philosophy; and with his consciousness of the 
vanity of man Nietzsche looked down at the why of man’s existence—thus spoke his Zarathustra: 
Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing 
beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir! … Alas, 
the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of 
                                                 




the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself37. 
Behold, I show you the last man. (TSZ, 17)        
The underlined words of Nietzsche convey the nothingness; behold the emptiness in the philoso-
pher’s portrayal of the last man, unable to despise oneself—for on what base can he do that. 
Similarly, Nietzsche’s philosophy also stands on such enigma; it represents the point of depar-
ture. His place is depicted in The Gay Science where he states, “Ours is no longer the bitterness 
and passion of the person who has torn himself away and still feels compelled to turn his unbelief 
into a new belief, a purpose, a martyrdom” (GS, 286). In relation to the hitherto history of phi-
losophy, in the line of the hitherto brilliance this compulsion has served as initiation. Moreover, 
to withdraw such compulsion appears to distort the philosophization, which prompts the ques-
tion—is philosophy possible after such annihilation in grand style? In the face of such question, 
the remembrance of Nietzsche’s philosophical analysis of nihilism as psychological state would 
help us to get nearer to the answer. However, this time we will revisit it with a more enriched 
eye, sharpened by the philosopher’s journey into nihilism.   
In his analysis of nihilism as a psychological state, the philosopher has identified three crucial 
events; the realization of absence of alleged, “aim” in the process of becoming, followed by the 
denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. Moreover, he has pointed the desperate at-
tempt to seek refuge from the trauma caused by the realization—the invention of a world beyond 
it—the “truth” as an escape. The disappointed creature “passes sentence on this whole world of 
becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world.” (TWP, 13) . Lastly, this 
man (who has been through the aforementioned events) will realize “how that world is fabricated 
                                                 




solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it” (Ibid. ). This last form 
of nihilism includes the disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true 
world.” (Ibid. , 13). What Nietzsche states after this disbelief involves a great importance in the 
following discussion, he states “having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becom-
ing as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false 
divinities—but cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.” (Ibid. , 13). Con-
sidering these events, let us try to interpret the journey as an expedition that took thousands of 
years. Throughout this chapter, we have seen the positing of “aim”, “unity” and “truth” (via met-
aphysics of transcendence and dogmatic epistemology); moreover, we have also noted how the 
Christian religio-moral system38 refurnished these three concepts, prevented man from despair 
and the leap into nothing. In addition, we have remarked the thousands years triumph of the 
Christian moral hypothesis within philosophy, which reached its climax of sophistication with 
Hegel’s intertwinement of “aim”, “unity” and “truth” with the Christian God. In relation to the 
events within nihilism as a psychological state, Schopenhauer’s atheistic philosophy has passed 
through the realization of the absence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, the denuncia-
tion of the purported “unity” underlying it. However, it fails short to reach the third stage—the 
disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world. On the other 
hand, as we discussed Nietzsche, with his journey into nihilism reached this stage. Accordingly, 
it can be said the philosopher is the one who is encountered by the dilemma rising in the last 
                                                 
38 In The Will to Power, Nietzsche identified  the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis as the great antidote 
against practical and theoretical nihilism: (1) It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his small- ness and 
accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away. (2) It served the advocates of God insofar as it con-
ceded to the world, in spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection—including "freedom": evil appeared 
full of meaning. (3) It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate knowledge precisely 
regarding what is most important. (4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides against 




form of nihilism—one cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it” (TWP, 
13). As it can be recalled, we have attempted to understand Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism as 
having twofold aspects, namely into nihilism and against nihilism. Moreover, we have also re-
marked his distinction of nihilism as complete nihilism and incomplete nihilism. Besides these, 
Nietzsche has also identified other standpoints from which one could analyze nihilism. Accord-
ingly, besides complete and incomplete nihilism, Nietzsche identifies active and passive nihil-
ism, radical nihilism, and lastly Nihilism as a transitional stage. Throughout these distinctions of 
nihilism, the philosopher demonstrates nihilism in ways that involve striking difference. Accord-
ingly, let us discuss his distinction of nihilism as active and passive nihilism.  
One way of understanding the distinction of nihilism as “active” and “passive” is to conceive the 
former “as a sign of increased power of the spirit” and the latter as decline and recession of the 
power of the spirit (TWP, 17). Accordingly, nihilism in its active sense involves the growth of 
the human condition of existence beyond the conviction and faith under which one flourishes; on 
the other hand, nihilism in its passive presence denotes the lack of strength, “to pose for oneself 
,productively, a goal, a why, or faith”. Nietzsche’s identification of passive nihilism goes fur-
therer into the discovery of a sense of strength constrained within the passivity. Accordingly, this 
strength of passive nihilism reaches its maximum level as a force of destruction. However, this 
“active state” of passive nihilism has its opposite—weary nihilism. This weary state of passive 
nihilism abstinence—it no longer attacks. Nietzsche regards Buddhism as a typical instance of 
it—as a sign of weariness.   
Placing our question mark under which category Nietzsche’s approach toward nihilism falls, let 




“the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the 
highest values one recognizes; plus the realization that we lack the least right39 to 
posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be "divine" or morality in-
carnate.” (TWP, 9) 
Noting the possible cohesiveness of radical nihilism in relation to the distinction of nihilism as 
active and passive, let us add Nietzsche’s identification of nihilism “as a transitional stage”. In 
this sense, nihilism represents a pathological insight regarding the existence of values: that is 
manifested in “the tremendous generalization that there is no meaning at all”. Moreover, this re-
mains to be the case whether the productive are not yet strong enough or whether decadence still 
hesitates and has not yet invented its remedies (Ibid. , 18). According to Nietzsche, the presuppo-
sition under this tremendous generalization is that “there is no truth, that there is no absolute na-
ture of things nor a ‘thing-in-itself’ (Ibid. , 14). Furthermore, with this supposition, “it places the 
value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their be-
ing merely a symptom of strength on the part of the value-posit-ers (Ibid. ).  
Taking this classification of nihilism into our account, let us reconsider Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism under the light of the classifica-
tion. Accordingly, the first point concerns radical nihilism, in exposing the relation between Nie-
tzsche’s critique and his depiction of radical nihilism the remembrance of nihilism as psycholog-
ical state is worthwhile, since radical nihilism represents the last form of nihilism in which “one 
forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities” (Ibid. , 13). 
However, the radical-ity of this nihilism is embedded in the “conviction of an absolute untenabil-
ity of existence of highest values one recognizes” and in the “lack the least right to posit a be-
                                                 




yond or an in-itself of things that might be ‘divine’ or morality incarnate.” And from our discus-
sion so far, the understanding of such claims must be conceptualized vis-à-vis Nietzsche critique 
of metaphysics of transcendence (through which the tenable existence of highest values is estab-
lished, and the right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be ‘divine’ or morality 
incarnate is presumed). Above all, our understanding of radical nihilism should embrace the 
“human, all too human” outlook, for it develops in it. With this outlook a limit is disclosed, first, 
the naiveté in any claim of un-anthropocentric “right” to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things 
that might be ‘divine’ or morality incarnate and second naiveté of believing in the un-
anthropocentric tenable existence of highest values comes to light. In summa, the radical-ity of 
this nihilism resides in the becoming conscious of the anthropocentric megalomania idiosyncra-
sies within making such claims exceling the human intellect.  
The other case of nihilism (as a transitional stage), represents the setting after such contempla-
tion. Nietzsche has identified the tremendous generalization projecting nothingness as the recog-
nizable feature of this state. However, in exposing the development such outlook he has high-
lighted the base that inflicted the nothingness, namely, the absence of truth, absolute nature of 
things and a ‘thing-in-itself’. The understanding of this point entails the remembrance of our dis-
cussion on the aberration of philosophy, i.e. the cause of nihilism is not a loss of something that 
really and universally existed apart from man, rather, it is the becoming conscious of anthropo-
morphism within the hitherto ideals—truth, absolute nature of things and ‘thing-in-itself’. After 
such contemplation, the nihilist under transition comes to recognize those concepts consider in-
dependent of human intellect as mere symptom of strength on the part of the value-posit-ers, a 
simplification for the sake of life. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s consideration of nihilism as transi-




transcendence and dogmatist epistemology—the idealizer and the dogmatizer of the ideal.   
Considering these, let us proceed to discuss Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemolo-
gy vis-à-vis his distinction of nihilism as active and passive. To determine whether Nietzsche 
approached nihilism in the sense of active or passive the reconsideration of the cornerstone of his 
critique of metaphysics and epistemology in the light of the peculiar characters of each case of 
nihilism is appropriate. In doing so, we place three question marks—Does Nietzsche’s journey 
into nihilism get its relative strength as a force of destruction? (If so, this will be the active state 
of passive nihilism.) On the other hand, is it the weary state of passive nihilism, which expresses 
Nietzsche’s nihilism? Finally, we place our third question mark on whether Nietzsche’s approach 
coheres with the peculiarity of active nihilism (i.e. the growth of the human condition of exist-
ence beyond the conviction and faith under which one flourishes). In answering this question let 
us read, what Nietzsche states in The Gay Science,  
Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits” feel,  when we hear the news that “the 
old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with 
gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears 
free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture 
out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge 
is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet 
been such an "open sea." (GS, 280) 
The spirit within these words of Nietzsche resonates throughout his approach towards nihilism. 
Nietzsche did not stop by saying, “Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that 
is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.” (TSZ, 17) . For him the 
“last man” represented an end, however, this end is not signifying termination, but a new begin-




great noon, let this be our last will (Ibid. , 79). This spirit unclogs Nietzsche’s nihilism from the 
peculiar feature of “passive nihilism”, and this remains to be the case in the active state of pas-
sive nihilism, which reaches it relative strength as a force of destruction. Nevertheless, the phi-
losopher we discussed in chapter one goes furtherer, i.e. in the case of Nietzsche destruction (cri-
tique) marks a certain stage, thus speak his Zarathustra,     
God is  a conjecture;  but I desire that your conjectures should be limited by what 
is thinkable. Could you think a god? But this is what the will to truth should mean 
to you: that everything be changed into what is thinkable for man, visible for man, 
feelable by man. You should think through your own senses to  their 
consequences. (Ibid. , 79) 
Accordingly, the critique of metaphysics and epistemology does not mark the end of philosophy, 
similarly the last man do not recognize the end man as such. For the philosopher, the tremendous 
event, besides its crisis, presents an opening—the dawn. For those who can only survive in water 
and for those who can only survive on land, nihilism brings nothingness. However, there remains 
one type—the amphibian. What is nihilism for him? Well, for him nihilism is something to over-
come. Likewise, the last man is simply something to overcome. As Nietzsche states, “one inter-
pretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation40, it now seems as if 
there was no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain” (TWP, 35). Note that, the 
philosopher does not say “everything were in vain,” he adds the “as if” and this words show that 
it is not the end, nihilism is not something to be idealized as it has been in the case of the “be-
yond” and “thing in itself”, and it is not something to be believed as the truth. Let us add one last 
point that would enrich our discussion, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche discusses the possible lin-
                                                 




gering of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism under the title Believers 
And Their Need To Believe, he states, 
Metaphysics is still needed by some; but so is that impetuous demand for 
certainty ... The demand  that one wants by all means that something should be 
firm … this too,  is still the demand for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct of 
weakness which. to be sure, does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and 
convictions of all kinds but—conserves them. (GS, 288)     
For Nietzsche, nihilism can be dealt within such context, i.e. nihilism can be “conserved”. Yet, 
one might wonder, how? The philosopher answers,     
The vehemence with which our most intelligent contemporaries lose themselves 
in wretched nooks and crannies, for example, into patriotism ( what the French 
call “chauvinisms” and the Germans "German") or into nihilism à la Petersburg 
(meaning the belief in unbelief even to the point of martyrdom) always manifests 
above all the need for a faith, a support, backbone, something to fall back on. 
(Ibid. , 288-289) 
For the philosopher, the belief in unbelief even to the point of martyrdom is “laughable”. It is the 
same idolater, idealizing unbelief and the dogmatizers dogmatizing the belief in it. We have dis-
cussed Nietzsche as radical nihilist but we have also noted in what sense the radical-ity resides. 
Yet, it is important to shed light on what he called “the most terrible form of nihilism”, which is 
“the eternal recurrence” of nihilism—the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally! (TWP, 35). Be-
fore discussing the thought of nihilism in relation to the eternal recurrence, let us enrich our con-
ception of Nietzsche’s idea of “the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable” or the 
eternal recurrence, with a section from The Gay Science, titled the greatest weight. In this section 




with the single question, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”. The 
“eternal recurrence” is a question of the loneliest loneliness, where no one will have any one and 
anywhere to hide. Moreover, there will be no one to intimidate and pressure you, except your-
self. With the eternal recurrence, one’s life will be rewritten. —The same life you wrote will be 
rewritten with the pen of perpetuity, with a single question at the end of the paper stating, "Do 
you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" (Remember, there will be no one 
there—it is your loneliest loneliness.) The philosopher confronts us with eternal repetition of 
everything, and to choose what is included and left out is not an option, it is a game of “take it or 
leave it”. i.e. take every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unuttera-
bly small or great in your life, or leave it. The deployment of this perspective on nihilism unfolds 
the thunder and lightning within. It makes the thought of it as shocking as possible, the meaning-
lessness becomes meaningless as possible, it would make un-postponable. In addition, as a phi-
losopher, the idea of the “eternal recurrence” marks Nietzsche’s “active nihilism” for it poses the 
human existence the greatest weight as it has never been before.    
Considering this, the next chapter will revisit what we have discussed so far in the light of expos-
ing the fundamental conceptual indispensability of the critique of metaphysics and epistemology 
in Nietzsche discourse of nihilism. Likewise, this chapter will attempt to critically expose the 
fundamental conceptual indispensability of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemolo-
gy in his critique of morality. Following these discussions, it will shed light on Nietzsche’s dis-
course on nihilism vis-à-vis his critique of metaphysics and epistemology as having centrality in 
the understanding of his philosophy. The last section of the chapter will contain a commentary 
concerning the possible understandability of Nietzsche from non-European perspective. In view 




dity that surpasses mere historicism and continental-ism. Taking these into account, let us pro-
ceed to discuss the fundamental conceptual indispensability of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphys-




III   
REVISITING NIETZSCHE  
HIS DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM VIS-À-VIS CRITIQUE OF 
METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 
There  is  a  lake  which  one  day  refused  to  flow  off  and  erected  a  dam 
where  it  had  hitherto  flowed  off: ever  since,  this  lake  has been  rising  higher  
and  higher.  Perhaps  that  very  renunciation  will also  lend  us  the  strength  to  
bear  the renunciation  itself;  perhaps  man  will  rise  ever  higher  when  he once  
ceases  to  flow  out  into  a  god. (GS, 230) 
Nietzsche inscribed these words in The Gay Science, through it the philosopher looks back and 
forth. When he looks back, he conceives a lake, yet unlike other lakes, this lake has a different 
origin. One way of understanding its history takes us thousands of years back, wherein a philos-
opher declares, “You cannot step twice into the same river” this “river” of Heraclitus bears kin-
ship with the “lake” of Nietzsche, amid these distant relatives, a dam stands with magnificence—
with its erection the river becomes the lake. Yet this did not make the metaphor of Heraclitus, for 
with the erection of the dam the river ceases to be a river, hence whatever is said in reference to 
the dammed river finds its expression in the lake, one might say “You can step twice and innu-
merable times into the same lake”. The previous chapter tried to expose the riddle in the tale of 
the River and the Lake—i.e. of Becoming and Being.  It has tried to show Nietzsche’s attempt to 




inhabitants around. Despite the prevalence of earlier accounts, the last chapter mostly focused on 
the development of discourses in ancient Greece, wherein Thales of Ionia presented his proposi-
tion that claims water as the primal origin of the world41. Yet, instead of Thales, the discourse of 
becoming and being finds its expression in the philosophy of Anaximander. Compared to his 
predecessor who dealt with the physical aspect of the origin of the word; Anaximander repre-
sents a shift that attempted to incorporate nonphysical aspects in the examination of the origin of 
the world. In view of that, we have remarked his discovery of coming to be and passing away at 
the heart of all things. In relation to the later development of the discourse of being and becom-
ing, Anaximander, with his shift, stands as the inaugurator of an enigma that sought answer for 
the problem of how the definite could ever fall from the indefinite. Besides this, with Anaximan-
der we have noted the postulation of the profound problem of ethics vis-à-vis his interpretation 
of becoming.42 Noting the Milestian philosopher as the first, the second significant development 
appeared in the discourse of becoming and being in the philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus.  
Unlike his predecessor Heraclitus denied the duality of totally diverse worlds (i.e. He no longer 
distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an un-
definable “indefinite”) consequently, he altogether denied being—for this one world which he 
retained. (PTAG, 51). Moreover, upon this denial, Heraclitus envisioned the truth as lacking ri-
gidity, completeness and permanence as dictated by the metaphysical edifies of Anaximander. 
Moreover, unlike his predecessor, Heraclitus conceived lawful order, unfailing certainties, and 
                                                 
41 Thales tells something about the primal origin of all things; moreover, it does so in language devoid of image or 
fable, and finally, contained in it, if only embryonically, is the thought, "all things are one" (PTAG, 38-39). 
42 Note that, with Anaximander the relation between metaphysics, epistemology and ethics comes forward. i.e. by 
metaphysics he discovers coming to be and passing away; by epistemology he interprets it and upon this interpreta-
tion he poses the profound problem of ethics. –“"Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass 
away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the 




ever-like orbits of lawfulness. In relation to this, one should note Nietzsche’s shift of perspective 
vis-à-vis the moral interpretation of the world, formerly, Nietzsche conceived Heraclitus as the 
“describer of the world”—freer from moral interpretation. However, later Nietzsche asserts Her-
aclitus also extracted moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. Besides these, Her-
aclitus remained distinct in his critique of the senses; this distinctiveness becomes clearer in ref-
erence to the latter history of the discourse of becoming and being vis-à-vis the role of the sens-
es. Accordingly, he threw out the testimony of the senses because it made things look permanent 
and unified. As stated before, the uniqueness of Heraclitus becomes clearer in relation to the later 
development of the discourse, among the pre-Socratics, the significant opposition to Heraclitus 
unfolded with the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea. With his philosophy, by establishing con-
cept of being as opposed to becoming, Parmenides overthrow the process of becoming, he pro-
nounced "Everything of which you can say 'it has been' or 'it will be' is not; of the existent you 
can never say 'it is not." Likewise, this approach of the philosopher also shaped his critique of the 
senses, unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides threw the testimony of the sense as illusive representation 
of the coexistence of nonexistent and existent—i.e. as if  Becoming, too, has Being. It was the 
pre-Socratics who inaugurated the irreconcilable contradiction between being and becoming—
the river and the lake. In view of that, among them, the spirit of Parmenides triumphed over Her-
aclitus—for the former outshined the latter in the development of the discourse on being and be-
coming. Accordingly, throughout the history of this discourse, the most reconciliatory insight of 
the two philosophers found the middle ground by moderating their radical positions. In the pre-
vious chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s reflection on the hitherto attempt by marking Plato 
as the point of departure—the mingling of Heraclitean and Parmenidean constituents43. Distin-
                                                 




guishing the denial of being as distinctive to Heraclitus, and the denial of becoming to Parmeni-
des, the mingling of Plato placed the former at the bottom and the latter at the top. As we dis-
cussed before, Heraclitus has thrown the testimony of the sense for their deceptive representation 
of stability, whereas, Parmenides did the same upon the opposite ground— i.e. the illusory testi-
monial of flux. Hence, in reconciling these two extremes a critique of the senses seemed inevita-
ble. As we discussed in the previous chapter, Plato attempted to resolve the contradiction be-
tween becoming and being via his theory of forms, and in postulating degrees of realities he uti-
lized his predecessors’ critique of the sense vis-à-vis the hierarchical edifice of the degrees of 
realities. Besides these legacies of Platonism, we have noted Nietzsche’s criticism of Plato re-
garding the idealization of moral values. In this respect, it is worthy of remarking the influence 
of Socrates, which induced "practical" philosophy to the fore—the inauguration of morality and 
religion as chief interests. Considering this, to reexamine whether the “legacies” of Plato are ex-
clusive to him is important—is Plato an exception or a strong magnifying glass that makes a 
general but creeping and elusive calamity visible. If the latter is the case, then, what did Nie-
tzsche discover in Plato, could we trace back the prevalence of the Platonic legacies before Pla-
to, perhaps, before the Greeks? The answer seems affirmative. For instance, in Ecce Homo Nie-
tzsche inscribed his testimony regarding what Zarathustra means in his mouth, he shows the con-
cealed meaning that is found in the relation between the Zarathustra of Persia and the Zarathustra 
in his most celebrated work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Accordingly, Nietzsche states the Zarathus-
tra of Persia “was the first to consider … the transposition of morality into the metaphysical 
                                                                                                                                                             




realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is his work (EH, 329)44 and the Zarathustra in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra performing the opposite. He asserts Zarathustra (of Persia) created the most 
calamitous error that is morality; consequently, “he must also be the first to recognize it”. (Ibid. 
). Hence, this implies the relation between the critique (of metaphysics of transcendence and 
epistemology of dogmatism) and the discourse (on nihilism) is profounder than the context of 
commonly called western philosophy. In the preface of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche sheds 
light on the earlier presence of the dogmatist philosophy and its “supra-terrestrial” claims, by 
saying, “we owe the grand style of architecture in Asia and Egypt” (BGE, 2). Nonetheless, one 
might ask why we would bother ourselves with this historical aspect. The answer appears simple 
and clear, when we unclog the development of what is called metaphysics of transcendence and 
epistemology from mere Occidentalism, and recognize at least one more root, what we discussed 
so far considering Nietzsche gets profounder. In other words, by historicizing our study, we de-
historicize it—for the realization of a wider prevalence gives us profounder insights on the basis 
of humanness (lessening the impact of the specific conditions). Likewise, to revisit Nietzsche’s 
critique of metaphysics and epistemology vis-à-vis his discourse on nihilism with this eye would 
provide an understanding of Nietzsche as human being—his confrontation as of humanity. Bear-
ing this, let us return to Nietzsche’s discovery of other roots of what Plato built in Europe. In the 
                                                 
44 I have not been asked, as I should have been asked, what the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth, the mouth 
of the first immoralist: for what constitutes the tremendous historical uniqueness of that Persian is just the opposite 
of this. Zarathustra was the first to consider the fight of good and evil the very wheel in the machinery of things: the 
transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is his work. But this ques-
tion itself is at bottom its own answer. Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he 
must also be the first to recognize it. Not only has he more experience in this matter, for a longer time, than any oth-
er thinker—after all, the whole of history is the refutation by experiment of the principle of the so-called "moral 
world order"—what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine and 
his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue; this means the opposite of the cowardice of the "idealist" who 
flees from reality; Zarathustra has more intestinal fortitude than all other thinkers taken together. To speak the truth 
and to shoot well with arrows that is Persian virtue— Am I understood?— The self-overcoming of morality, out of 
truthfulness; the self-overcoming of the moralist, into his opposite—into me—that is what the name of Zarathustra 




preface of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts “supra-terrestrials-ism” and dogmatism as 
“monstrous  and  frightening  masks serving to  inscribe ‘all great things’  in  the  hearts  of  hu-
manity  with  eternal  demands” (Ibid. , 3). This view takes us back to the beginning of chapter 
two wherein Nietzsche states the one more condition of existence, precisely, to his view, which 
indiscriminately acknowledges the hitherto endeavors of men upon the basis of the one more 
condition of existence45. Among such masks, Nietzsche identifies the Vedanta doctrine in Asia 
and Platonism in Europe. This makes us wonder why he passed the pre-Socratic philosopher 
from representing such a mask. In Philosophy in The Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche states 
the “Greeks justify philosophers. Only among them, they are not comets” (PTAG, 34) In other 
words, with the Seven Sages46 the Greeks marked the cessation of the “philosopher comet”—the 
random wonderer. Moreover, Nietzsche distinguishes the Greeks from other people, for while 
“other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages” (Ibid. , 32). Even though, the Greeks have 
learnt abroad, yet they used  everything  they  learn as  a  foothold, i.e. they  knew  how  to  pick  
up  the  spear  and throw  it  onward  from  the  point  where  others had left it (Ibid. , 30). It is 
very important to note with regard to Nietzsche’s salute of the pre-Socratic, since the most ad-
mired qualities marks magnificent solitude devoid of conventionality of philosophic or academic 
professionalism. These features of the pre-Socratic bring to mind Nietzsche’s admiration of 
                                                 
45It is  easy  enough  to  divide  our  neighbors  quickly,  with  the  usual myopia, from  a mere five  paces  away  
into  useful  and  harmful, good and evil  men;  but in  any large-scale  accounting, when  we reflect on  the whole a 
little longer, we become suspicious of this neat  division  and  finally  abandon  it. Even  the  most  harmful man  
may  really  be  the  most  useful  when  it comes  to  the  preservation  of the  species;  for  he  nurtures  either in  
himself  or  in others,  through  his  effects,  instincts  without  which  humanity would  long  have  become  feeble  
or  rotten … What  is  the meaning of the ever new appearance  of  these  founders  of moralities  and  religions,  
these  instigators  of  fights  over moral  valuations,  these  teachers  of  remorse  and  religious  wars?  …  It is obvi-
ous  that these  tragedians, too,  promote  the  interests  of the species, even if they should believe that they promote 
the interest of God or work as God's emissaries. They, too, promote  the life  of  the  species,  by  promoting -the  
faith  in  life.  “Life  is  worth living,"  everyone of them shouts;  “there is something to life, there is something be-
hind life, beneath it;  beware!" (GS, 74) 




Schopenhauer, yet, as he stood against him, he also stands opposed to their thoughts. Perhaps in 
understanding Nietzsche’s admiration of the pre-Socratics, the examination of later development 
of philosophy bears significance. Perhaps, Nietzsche’s longing for the Greeks may signify the 
freshness of their environment to philosophize. This standpoint becomes more vivid in relation to 
the extent and profundity of Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism. In a letter written to his friend 
(Overbeck) Nietzsche stated, “…what I experience as "solitude" really did not yet exist…” (PN, 
441). One might wonder, the extent of the philosopher’s isolation that initiated such strong ex-
pression, perhaps, our question should also place the possibility of a solitude that is different in 
kind—perhaps a new experience of solitude. But, before examining this, let us reflect on the dif-
ferent roots of “supra-terrestrial-ism” and dogmatism. In view of that, we have noted Zarathus-
tra of Persia and the Vedanta doctrine as examples of their earlier prevalence, yet in his The Will 
to Power, Nietzsche goes back and forth in exposing the reemergence. Accordingly, he identifies 
Mohammedanism as an example of super-terrestrial-ism and dogmatism, yet, Mohammedanism 
is relatively young compared to the oldness of the character trait it exemplify, there we found its 
prototype—Christianity. Again, the birth of Christianity also stands younger. In view of that, 
Nietzsche identifies three origins of antiquity of ancient Asia, Plato, but above all the Egyptians 
(TWP, 92-93). Considering the relative remoteness of the Asiatic and Egyptian roots, the Platon-
ic roots of “supra-terrestrial-ism” and dogmatism can be identified as its robust manifestation 
that served as the fertile soil of the legendry religio-moral system—Christianity47. In the preface 
                                                 
47 An  artist  cannot  endure  reality,  he  looks  away  from  it,  back… he  believes  that  the  more  subtilized,  at-
tenuated,  transient  a  thing  or  a  man  is,  the  more  valuable  he  becomes;  the  less  real,  the  more valuable.  
This  is  Platonism,  which,  however, involved  yet  another  bold  reversal:  Plato  measured  the  degree  of  reality  
by  the  degree of  value  and  said:  The  more  "Idea,"  the  more  being. He  reversed  the concept "reality" and 
said:  "What you  take for  real is  an  error, and  the  nearer  we  approach  the  'Idea,'  the  nearer  we  approach  
'truth.' "—Is  this  understood? It was  the  greatest  of  rebaptisms; and because it has been adopted by Christianity 




of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche expresses the relation between Platonism and Christianity 
by saying, “Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’”. However, before proceeding to Nie-
tzsche’s critique of Christianity (as Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia), let us com-
ment on whether we should identify Nietzsche’s solitude in relation to the depth of its penetra-
tion or in relation to a new solitude that emerged with his journey into nihilism. In view of that, 
what Nietzsche inscribed in The Gay Science would shed light on the state of the philosopher’s 
experience of solitude. Nietzsche states, “for the pious there is as yet no solitude; this invention 
was made only by us, the godless” (GS, 324). Considering being godless as the distinguishing 
element of what Nietzsche meant by solitude, let us note, his expression of godlessness, since 
this word also denote wickedness. In the same book, Nietzsche inscribed his “godlessness” as a 
state wherein one “will  never  pray  again,  never  adore again,  never  again  rest in  endless  
trust…” above all, godlessness denotes “denying oneself  any  stopping  before  ultimate  wis-
dom,  ultimate goodness,  ultimate  power…” (Ibid., 230). Accordingly, in this case, to be god-
less involves a renunciation—namely, final renunciation. Yet, this may not give us the clearest 
understanding of what Nietzsche experienced as solitude—what he called godlessness. At this 
point, the inclusion of the anti-metaphysician besides the godlessness appears inducive to a 
clearer understanding. In the previous chapter, we have noted Nietzsche’s critique of Schopen-
hauer, based on his failure in renouncing the absoluteness of the ideal. Even though Schopen-
hauer renounced the Christian God, and pronounced atheism, he later slipped into the same ideal. 
Schopenhauer is godless, yet he is not anti-metaphysician, for the latter involved the renunciation 
of metaphysical faith—the lacuna in every philosophy. This faith remained a lacuna, “because  
truth  was  posited  as  being,  as  God,  as  the  highest court of appeal”, thus, for Nietzsche the 




was not permitted to be a problem at all, is this "permitted" understood?” (GM, 152-153). Per-
haps the understanding of what this “permitted” denotes will take us closer, for this kind of ques-
tioning requires an eye that has ever existed. This eye is the eye of the anti-metaphysician, when 
one looks through it one will experience what Nietzsche called “solitude”. The solitary traveler 
stands lonely even amid the loneliest travelers who somehow still had a "God" for company (PN, 
441). However, in the “solitude” of Nietzsche—therein, everything is human, all-too-human!  
Noting Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism as discussed in the previous chapter represents this 
“solitude”(the godless and anti-metaphysician), let us now proceed to discussing the relation be-
tween Nietzsche’s critique of Christian morality under the light of what has been stated so far 
regarding his discourse on nihilism vis-à-vis his critique of metaphysics and epistemology.  
3.1  THE DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF MORALITY  
Tragic wisdom was lacking; I have looked in vain for signs of it even among 
the great Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries before Socrates. … I 
retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether 
warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and 
destroying … saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical 
repudiation of the very concept of being… (EH, 273) 
These words of the philosopher glue what has been discussed so far. Above all, it provides us 
with enriched insights on our subject that focuses on the exposition of the fundamental presence 
of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism under his critique of morality. In view of that, this sec-
tion will cover how Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology that is summed-up 
under the “human-all-too-human” outlook underpins the subject matter, which has taken much of 




alization of the morals, on the transposition of the moral values in the metaphysical realm. In 
other words, Nietzsche’s critique of morality as the body part of his critique of metaphysics and 
epistemology—Morality, too is human all too human. Hence, unless we understand how Nie-
tzsche criticized metaphysics and epistemology, we will never comprehend his discourse on mo-
rality; furthermore, his opposition to the Christian moral hypothesis necessarily requires the un-
derstanding of morality as all too human. Let us advance this standpoint by involving Nie-
tzsche’s Dionysian philosophy into the discussion. For the philosopher, Dionysian represents a 
uniqueness that finds its expression in his philosophy. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche recognizes Her-
aclitus’ proximity to his Dionysian philosophy for his affirmation of passing away and destroy-
ing. However, Nietzsche’s admiration of Heraclitus is marked with proximity (compared to other 
philosophers), i.e., within the affirmation of passing away and destroying Heraclitus has also 
passed judgment upon the whole world—as the regularity of phenomenon, as witness for the 
moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. Since it can be said, Heraclitus did not 
repudiate being and affirm becoming through the eye of the all-too-human. In other words, his 
rejection of being is as dogmatic as his affirmation of becoming, likewise, his criticism of the 
senses is also as dogmatic as Parmenides’ critique of the senses. Hence, even Heraclitus’ philos-
ophy remained one among the mendaciousness of Millennia. Previously we have discussed the 
connection between Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism under the light of his realization of the all-
too-human, which finds its expression in his critique of metaphysics and epistemology. Yet, as 
we slightly remarked, the understanding of their fundamentality stands as a prerequisite to com-
prehend his discourse on morality, as well its distinctiveness also comes into light vis-à-vis his 
journey into nihilism. In view of that, at this point the anti-metaphysical and the perspectivist 




rality of this immoralist resides in his daring to take morality as a problem, as problematic—for 
“to criticize morality itself, to regard morality as a problem, as problematic: what? Has that not 
been—is that not—immoral?” (D, 2) Considering this, it is appropriate to wonder whether Nie-
tzsche’s denotation of morality as in itself imply the existence of morality as something inde-
pendent from the all-too-human phenomena. One way of elucidating this confusion is to look at 
the expansive ground upon which Nietzsche examined the Christian moral hypothesis—as proto-
type of morality. Upon the first and the broadest ground, Nietzsche investigates the moral hy-
pothesis in relation to its subjection to supra-terrestrial-ism and conviction-ism, which reappeared 
through metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism. On the other hand, the 
second narrower ground examines the psychological conditions that prompted the moralization. 
In view of that, Christian morality is first and foremost an all too human phenomenon and sec-
ondly a manifestation of specific condition of certain psychological state, which is demonstrated 
in Nietzsche’s distinction of “master” and “slave” morality. In being all too human, Christianity 
follows the supra-terrestrial-ism and dogmatism of Zarathustra of Persia, ancient Egyptians, the 
Vedanta doctrine of Asia, and Platonism. In other words, in being all too human, the Christian 
moral hypothesis stands as the renewed appearance of an ancient faith. On the other hand, in re-
lation to the second context Christianity acquires its own image—covertly resenting and overtly 
piteous moralization—(transposing morality into the metaphysical realm).      
Considering this, let us proceed to the all too human development of Christianity with the re-
membrance of the Madman from The Gay Science, declaring the death of the Christian God. 
However, at this point, we will pay attention to the line wherein Nietzsche’s “madman” states, 
“Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.” (GS, 181) 




involves foundational importance for Nietzsche’s most renowned declaration—“God is dead”. In 
stating, “Gods, too, decompose” Nietzsche is conveying the decomposability of Gods—not only 
the Christian God, but also other Gods. Hence, with it one should note that the Christian God is 
not an exception but an example. Previously we have briefly discussed the service of the Chris-
tian moral hypothesis as antidote of theoretical and practical nihilism. Likewise, we have noted 
this antidote-ness of Christian moral hypothesis (as preventative of theoretical and practical ni-
hilism) resides in its positing of man as having absolute value in the flux of becoming and pass-
ing, as well, as having knowledge of absolute values. Without such grounds the “thou shalt and 
shalt not” of Christian morality would lose their meaning. Morality in this sense is built upon 
such metaphysical and epistemological postulation to allow unconditional and imperative-istic 
moral values. This kind of conceptual architecture is not unique to Christianity, for it has been 
employed before (by the ancient Egyptians, the Vedanta doctrine, and Plato) and after Christiani-
ty (by Mohammedanism). At this point, it is important to recognize the separability of the differ-
ent moral motives and their metaphysical and epistemological foundations. However, regardless 
of this separability, the conceptual architecture remains the same. Hence, to look its conceptual 
structure, i.e. how the moral motives become incorporated into a systematic unconditional decla-
ration should not be confused by its chronological account. For instance, in the case of the Chris-
tian-moral hypothesis the problem of becoming does not appear as problematic as it was among 
the Greeks. i.e. in the Christian moral hypothesis, it is implicitly presumed as answered. Like-
wise, the problem of the possibility of knowledge that was related to the flux-ness of becoming 
and passing away was implicitly presumed as resolved. Yet, Christianity achieved this not by 
dealing with the problem of becoming firsthand, rather it absorbed what has been attained by the 




logical basis of Christian moral hypothesis is subjected to what we have discussed in the previ-
ous chapter under the critique of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism. 
Christianity is the same all-too-human phenomena—anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. For 
the anti-metaphysician, the perspectivist as well as the immoralist, in summa, for the perfect ni-
hilist Christianity appears simply the utilization of Christian-izable constituents of what has been 
cultivated before. Remarking the resemblance between Nietzsche’s admiration to Schopenhauer 
and the pre-Socratics48; let us briefly discuss the prevalence of the communal old-habit that has 
hitherto underpinned the theoretical and practical edifice reigning over humanity.  
At the beginning of this section, Nietzsche has been quoted asserting the lack of tragic wisdom 
even in the philosophy of the great Greeks—the pre-Socratics. On the other hand, notwithstand-
ing its dogmatic constitution (denial of perspective), Heraclitus remained an exception for his 
affirmation of passing away and destroying. Before him with Anaximander,49 we have recog-
nized the melancholic interpretation that somehow resembles the resenting instinct of the “slave” 
in the moral revaluation. However, this was moderated by Heraclitus’ positive accreditation. Yet 
with Parmenides, the process of coming-to-be and passing away lost its validity. Plato took this 
Parmenidean effect50 furtherer, by granting the senses and the world of sensation lower degree of 
reality and inferior epistemic status in his ladder of knowledge. For thousands of years such kind 
of pessimism remained within metaphysics of transcendence. Moreover, this conviction on the 
truthfulness of their philosophies remained to be authentic and universally valid (going beyond 
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49 In Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the Greeks Nietzsche regards the melancholic interpretation of Anaximander 
by saying, “it may not be logical, but it certainly is human, together with Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it 
were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance”. (PTAG, 
46); See also P. 57-59






being all too human). Noting we are discussing metaphysics and epistemology as paths through 
which man approached the world, the philosophers reproach of coming to be and passing away 
exhibits the “slave’s” reproach of the “master”. Here, we should note that what the philosopher 
and the “slave” have in common is neither metaphysical nor ethical but how they dealt with 
these—how the philosopher approaches the world (passing away and destroying) and the “slave” 
with their “good and evil” reproached the “good and bad” of the “master”51 as well, how they 
sought to overcome the juxtaposition. Taking the case of Anaximander as an archetype of such 
philosophization, we have noted Nietzsche empathizing the melancholic interpretation of coming 
to be and passing away as “human, but certainly not logical”, similarly he have also empathized 
the resentment of the “slave” as understandable. Nonetheless, in both cases Nietzsche firmly op-
posed in making this “negative” feelings a ground to defame coming to be and passing away (in 
the case of the philosopher) and the condition of the “master” (in the case of the “slave”). Previ-
ously, we have noted Christianity as beneficiary of Greek philosophy. Considering the above 
discussion on the parallelism of how the philosophers dealt with the world and the “slave” dealt 
with their “master”, the conceptual integrate-ability of the way the Greeks dealt with the world 
and the Judeo-Christian moral revaluation comes into light. Taking the service of Christian moral 
hypothesis as antidote of theoretical and practical nihilism, the metaphysic and epistemic estab-
lishment of the Greeks can be conceived as a fertile soil for the theoretical constitution, which 
advanced (vivified) through moralization into Christian-moral hypothesis. This historical and 
conceptual kinship of Christianity (which at least goes as far as ancient Egypt) prevents the criti-
cism of Christianity upon the first and broadest ground. For on the radarscope of the perfect ni-
hilist, the appearance of Christianity as supra-terrestrial and dogmatic, blinks as one among 
                                                 




many. Yet, this identification stands as a foothold for the examination of Christianity from the 
second ground52 (as a manifestation of psychological condition)53, i.e. there is no shortcut to con-
template it as an expression of a certain condition of life, and this sight comes with “Alas”—
“where you see ideal things, I see what is-human, alas, all-too-human”. Hence, without the anti-
metaphysician and the perspectivist, the immoralist is impossible, and without the immoralist, 
the Antichrist is inconceivable. Bearing this connexion in mind, let us proceed to discuss the dis-
course of nihilism as groundwork of Nietzsche’s philosophy.   
3.2 NIHILISM AS GROUNDWORK OF NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY 
Our discussion on Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and 
epistemology has brought us the above-mentioned relation. Nonetheless, there remains further 
exposition on the role of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism and on the course of his journey 
against nihilism. In view of that, our first focus will be the discussion of Nietzsche’s notion of 
                                                 
52 In relation to understanding Nietzsche’s evaluation of moralities and religions, one should also be cautious of the 
presenting grounds of evaluation, for instance at the beginning of the second chapter, we have been acquainted with 
an eye that indiscriminately acknowledge the hitherto activities of men vis-à-vis the one more condition of existence. 
On this ground, Nietzsche withholds his ammunitions—here everybody is shouting, “There is something to life, 
there is something behind life, beneath it; beware!” (GS, 74). This viewpoint marks a thanksgiving for all that has 
prevented the end of human. Above all, it should also signify a ground on which all that will be attacked falls upon, 
i.e. whatever is said about these “reasons of life” would not withdraw this gratitude. Hence, the recognition of this 
“indiscriminative ground” would help us to avoid the confusion that unfolds vis-à-vis the development of various 
touchstones. One way of understanding this development takes us to Nietzsche’s distinction of religions as “nega-
tive” and “affirmative”52. Compared to the “indiscriminative eye” this approach towards religions involves certain 
standards of evaluation. At this point, Nietzsche’s enquiry focuses on “What is deified?”—intentionally overlooking 
the prevalence of deification.  
53 What Nietzsche states in The Will to Power depicts the cruxes of his insights discovered with the examination of 
Christianity from the second ground (as an expression of  certain condition of life), accordingly, he asserts, “The 
whole absurd residue of Christian fable, conceptual cobweb-spinning and theology does not concern us; it could be a 
thousand times more absurd and we would not lift a finger against it …What is it we combat in Christianity? That it 
wants to break the strong, that it wants to discourage their courage, exploit their bad hours and their occasional wea-
riness, convert their proud assurance into unease and distress of conscience, that it knows how to poison and sicken 
the noble instincts until their strength, their will to power turns backward, against itself—until the strong perish 




eternal recurrence vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and epistemology. As it can be recalled, 
previously we have slightly touched upon this notion as Nietzsche’s way of posing the question 
of life in its heaviest state.54 However, besides creating the “greatest weight” this notion also has 
a significant implication concerning one of the oldest riddles of philosophy, i.e. that of Being and 
Becoming. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche explains this human role as imposition of the charac-
ter of being upon becoming – as “everything recurs”.  Through this imposition, Nietzsche did 
not claim final settlement but the closest approximation of the world of being and becoming 
“this is a high point of the mediation. That involves a twofold falsification on the point of the 
senses and the spirit—a world which is, which abides, which is equivalent.” (TWP, 330) Yet this 
approach towards being and becoming contains the boldest reversal of the hitherto postulation of 
being and becoming—here, “being” stands as appearance, as reversal of values, as which con-
ferred values. Noting that under this light, the notion of “knowledge-in-itself” becomes incon-
ceivable  
 Yet it seems appropriate to ask whether Nietzsche himself is sneaked by the idealization he crit-
icized. But, we find his Human, all too human intact. Amid this “imposition”, i.e. becoming too 
is among the inventions of human beings. The most important point one must grasp is that Nie-
tzsche’s journey against nihilism gains its novelty, in its attempt to deal with Being and becom-
ing with the eye of the human, all too human. As he stated in Ecce homo “no new ideals are 
erected.” Moreover, the former ideals are not refuted—since refutation requires an authentic 
conviction on the impossibility of the ideals. This point marks Nietzsche’s redemption from 
skepticism, (wherein one denies dogmatically). i.e. he ceased to be a skeptic, but in doing so he 
                                                 




has again learned to affirm  What is more is that, in relation to this, art stands as the will to over-
come becoming—short sighted “eternalization” depending on the perspective. Here, the amphib-
ian comes to life. Metaphorically speaking, if hitherto philosophers have been either aquatic or 
terrestrial, then Nietzsche is the amphibian55. Accordingly, the most important peculiarity of Nie-
tzsche’s countermovement resides in not slipping to the ideal. At this point, the inclusion of Nie-
tzsche’s “Dionysian philosophy” could do a great deal in elucidating this standpoint. The coinage 
for Nietzsche’s representation of Dionysus finds its expression through his journey against nihil-
ism. How is this possible, one might ask the answer will be in saying yes to becoming (i.e. in 
“granting” its supremacy over being in all aspects that were negated and obscured through the 
mist of being.) all expeditions become “possible”—notwithstanding human-all-too-human.  
Remarking the human all too human as the fusion of the anti-metaphysician, the perspectivist 
and the immoralist (in relation to the journey into nihilism), as well as the touchstone of the jour-
ney against nihilism. Let us add some important points regarding its prevalence in Nietzsche’s 
countermovement of nihilism. In view of that, our primary concern will take us to morality. This 
insight enables us to understand of Nietzsche’s “immoralism” in a way that is far from the pejo-
rative atmosphere of this terminology. Previously we have noted how metaphysics and episte-
mology served as a nutshell of morality. On the other hand, we have also discussed Nietzsche’s 
critique of this “nutshell”, which have made his examination of morality possible—i.e. the sight 
that goes beyond good and evil, and its demonstrativeness through the genealogical approach. At 
this point, it is appropriate to pose our question mark on, what would come out of a man of such 
profound renunciation. Should one follow one’s feelings? Or after pronouncing “everything is 
                                                 




false! Everything is permitted”, should one plunge and leap uncontrollably?  
One way of understanding “morality” in post-nihilism takes us to the exposition of Nietzsche’s 
journey into nihilism vis-à-vis the shift in the examination of man. In his book Human, All Too 
Human, Nietzsche criticizes hitherto philosophers for their lack of historical sense in the analysis 
of man. Noting this lack is not bounded in the analysis of man, but goes to the extent of being the 
character trait of hitherto philosophers56. Above all, Nietzsche’s criticism of this lack of histori-
cal sense acquires an indispensible fundamentality in his journey into nihilism. Bearing this, let 
us discuss how it finds its expression in Nietzsche analysis of man. For him hitherto philosophers 
have involuntarily  thought  of  'man' “as something everlastingly true,  as  something  that  re-
mains  constant  in  the  midst  of  all flux,  as  a  sure  measure  of  things” (HA I, 12). Moreo-
ver, in thinking man as such, philosophers have taken the man of a very limited period of time 
(the man of the four thousand years we more or less know about) as the archetype of man. On the 
other hand, Nietzsche presumes “Everything essential57 in the development of mankind took 
place in primeval times” (Ibid., 13). In understanding this assertion, the omission of the italiciza-
tion of the word “essential” brings dire misconception of Nietzsche’s point, for by italicizing it 
Nietzsche is alerting his reader not to mistakenly associate his point with the “essential” that 
connotes unalterable absolutism. Accordingly, our understanding of his usage of essential in the 
development of mankind should be considered as a way that is emancipated from such absolut-
ism. Bearing this in mind, Nietzsche asserts during the four thousand years, mankind may well 
not have altered very much. To explore ‘man’ from this perspective, Nietzsche emphasizes the 
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need for “historical philosophizing58, and with it the virtue of modesty” (Ibid. , 13). Again, Nie-
tzsche’s italicization of “historical philosophizing” must not be overlooked, since Nietzsche has 
renovated this historical philosophization. In the case of Nietzsche, historical philosophization is 
emancipated from any supra-necessity. In spite of its previous prevalence, historical philosophi-
zation has reached its apex with the philosophy of Hegel, which is further explored by the Right-
Hegelians and the Left-Hegelians (that includes Karl Marx). Nietzsche’s deviation, which is the 
result of his journey into nihilism, gives his historical philosophization a unique tone. For him 
the whole teleology of previous attempts of historical philosophizations “is  constructed by  
speaking of the  man of the last  four  millennia  as  of an  eternal  man towards  whom all  things  
in  the world have had a natural relationship from the time he began.” (Ibid. , 13)  But, as we dis-
cussed so far, for the philosopher of human, all too human “everything  has  become:  there  are  
no eternal facts,  just  as  there  are no  absolute truths” (Ibid. ). Accordingly, with Nietzsche, 
historical philosophization is renovated within the human, all too human, and in this renovation 
modesty is required as opposed to the vanity, which has been discussed in the previous chapter 
vis-à-vis the mendaciousness of millennia and the aberration of philosophy.59 Bearing this in 
mind, let us return our focus to condense what has been said so far in relation to Nietzsche’s 
analysis of man—wherein the philosopher sees “'instincts' in man and assumes that these belong 
to the unalterable facts of mankind and to that  extent  could  provide  a key to the  understanding 
of the world in general” (HA I, 13). Yet, Nietzsche’s conception of ‘instincts’ is influenced by 
his journey into nihilism—let us call it “instinctive-ization” and briefly discuss it. In the Dawn, 
Nietzsche demonstrates the kind of instinctive-ization, which occurs in the commercial culture. 
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In view of that, the philosopher resembles the role of commerce as the soul of the culture, as 
“personal contest was with the ancient Greeks and as war, victory and justice were for the Ro-
mans” (D, 106). In this commercial culture, “'who and how many will consume this?' is the ques-
tion of questions. And through time this type of appraisal will prevail instinctively and all the 
time in the productions of the arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesmen, peoples 
and parties, of the entire age—“in the minutest and subtlest detail and imprinted in every will 
and every faculty” (Ibid. ). Similarly, Nietzsche also conceives morality as having significance in 
the development of ‘instinct’. Regarding this, he states in Human, All Too Human, “morality is 
preceded by compulsion … Later it becomes custom, later still voluntary obedience, finally al-
most instinct: then, like all that has for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with 
pleasure - and is now called virtue (HA I, 53). In one of his earliest works titled On the Ad-
vantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, Nietzsche made a point that could shed light in the 
relation between instincts and “instinctive-ization”. He claims that we are the products of the 
aberrations, passions, mistakes, and even crimes of earlier generations, moreover he stresses it is 
impossible to loose oneself from this chain of entirety by saying, even if “we condemn those ab-
errations and think ourselves quite exempt from them, the fact that we are descended from them 
is not eliminated60” (ADOH, 22). In view of that, Nietzsche asserts the most effective way of 
dealing with the effects of the past would be to bring about a conflict; between our inherited, in-
nate nature and our knowledge, as well as a battle between a strict new discipline and ancient 
education and breeding; we implant a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature so that the first 
nature withers away61” (Ibid. ). Here two important points are emphasized, the first being the 
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condemnation of the past do not vindicate a complete salvation from it (as if we have not been 
through). On the other hand, following from this, he devises a possible way out in dealing with 
the aberrations and errors of the past, which hold creativity as its guiding principle. i.e. even 
though we cannot change the past, we still have the ability to determine its impact on our fu-
ture—use or abuse it. One more important point regarding Nietzsche’s sight of ‘instincts’ in man 
is that instinctive activities go even into philosophical thinking. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nie-
tzsche asserts, “behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valua-
tions or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life62” 
(BGE, 11) . The recognition this relation between instincts and “instinctive-ization”, acquires 
significance in understanding the special effects of Nietzsche’s journey into and against nihilism, 
on his perspectival standpoints regarding the past and the future of humanity. Most importantly, 
with the recognition of this relation, a profound understanding of Nietzsche’s teaching of the 
Lastman and the Übermensch (The Overman) comes into light. In view of that, unless one rec-
ognizes Nietzsche’s sight of ‘instincts’ in man, a dire misunderstanding of the relation between 
the Lastman and the Overman is inevitable. An eye-opening statement that could shed light on 
this connection is found in The Antichrist, wherein Nietzsche states, “the  problem  I  am  posing 
is  not what  should  replace  humanity  in  the order of being (—the  human is an endpoint63): 
but  instead what type of human should be bred, should be willed64” (AC, 4). Nietzsche claims 
why this is problematic by saying, “This more valuable type has appeared often enough already: 
but only as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as willed” (Ibid. , 4). Under this light, we can 
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grasp the most significant factor in Nietzsche’s discourse on man unto the Overman, which de-
mands the valuable type of man should be willed and bred. In view of that, let us briefly describe 
how the Overman stands as the willed type of man, and how the journey into nihilism (anti-
metaphysician, perspectivist and immoralist) underpins the willing and breeding of this type of 
man. Moreover, this exposition also provides us with insights regarding morality in post-
nihilism, (i.e. previously, we have placed our question mark on the fate of “morality” after the 
journey into nihilism—after pronouncing, “Everything is false! Everything is permitted”, should 
one plunge and leap uncontrollably? Or Should one follow one’s feelings?).  
Let us begin our discussion with the scene from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, wherein the crowd in-
terrupts Zarathustra’s first speech, and shout “‘Give us this last man, O Zarathustra,’… ‘Turn us 
into these last men! Then we shall make you a gift of the Overman!’” (TSZ, 18). In reaction to 
the demand of the crowed, Nietzsche states, “But  Zarathustra  became  sad  and  said  to  his  
heart: ‘They  do  not  understand  me. I am not the mouth for these ears...” (Ibid. ). Through these 
lines, Nietzsche warns his reader against a possible approach that is founded upon the expecta-
tion of command from the outside—wherein one obeys. However, for the Lastman and the 
Overman are introspective activities that require the will to command and obey within oneself, 
external compulsion is of no use—the inner world called ‘man’ is accessed only by the individu-
al. Previously we have discussed the foundational role of metaphysics and epistemology in the 
deification of morality—i.e. the “beyond” is absolutely necessary, if faith in morality is to be 
maintained. On the other hand, in the journey into nihilism or in becoming the Lastman, the free-
dom from the “beyond” is of vital importance, it is the character trait of the Lastman. Regarding 
this freedom, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra proclaims, “There are some who threw away their last val-




your eyes should tell me brightly: free for what?” (Ibid. , 63). When we revisit Nietzsche’s jour-
ney into and against nihilism under the light of this captivity and freedom, the first journey 
marks rebellion and freedom, yet when freedom is attained, when everything becomes human, 
all too human the future confronts us with a trembling question “free for what?” The understand-
ing of the magnitude of this question takes us back to the former question “free from what?” 
Moreover, the answer to this question also determines the latter—to know what one is free from, 
determines the extent of possible paths upon which he can embark his expedition. Under this 
light, Nietzsche’s discourse on the Overman can be understood as the portrayal of his persona 
that represents the answer for the question “free from what?” In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nie-
tzsche asks, “Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your own will 
over yourself as a law? Can you be your own judge and avenger of your law?” (Ibid. )  When 
one looks closer, one can grasp the extent of the freedom through the questions asked. In the 
previous chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s criticism of metaphysics and epistemology that 
is summoned up as human, all too human and previously we have remarked its implication on 
morality. The Overman represents a new type of man—a new type of countermovement promis-
ing the flourish-ment of the human after the twilight of the idols. Yet, this time no idol will be 
erected, no “believer” is needed—this time, no escape is permitted.  
In summa, Nietzsche’s criticism of hitherto philosophers can be conceived from two frontiers, 
the first marking their failure to realize the twilight of the idols by diving into the ultimate safety 
place, and, the second that follows from the first failure is their strategy of “an ideal for an ide-
al”. Considering this, the peculiarity of Nietzsche’s philosophy resides in its attempt to break this 
cult. And without his critique of metaphysics and epistemology this attempt could have been in-




comes after it requires much of the philosopher’s integrity for the expedition involving the explo-
ration of wilderness wherein thinkers have not been allowed to enter. In The Will to Power, Nie-
tzsche inscribed the challenges one will face in attempting to overcome such aberration that has 
been in the blood for too long. Accordingly, he states, “the old habit, however, of associating a 
goal with every event and a guiding, creative God with the world, is so powerful that it requires 
an effort for a thinker not to fall into thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended. 
(TWP, 546). Likewise, Nietzsche also sheds light on a nihilistic way of questioning that could 
create the effects of the aberration from the beginning, in the same book he states, “the nihilistic 
question "for what?" is  rooted in the old habit of supposing that the goal must be put up65, given, 
demanded from outside—by some superhuman authority” (Ibid. , 16). Accordingly, he remarks 
unless this unquestioned yet decisive supposition is brought into question, its recurrence and its 
lurking dangers are inevitable. Whether one speaks under the authority of reason or the social 
instinct (the herd), or history with an immanent spirit and a goal within, Nihilism stands at the 
door—as the uncanniest of all guests.  
On the other hand, the Overman represents Nietzsche’s persona that have the strength to flourish 
in the human, all too human world. With this new type, Nietzsche attempts to make sense of life 
anew. The Overman is Dionysian he has developed the internal fortitude to live in the godless 
and idol-less world. He slowly responds to every stimuli and every temptation, for he knows this 
control is what makes the Overman go over-man. In the past, on the account of these stimulus 
men has been led and misled, taking “involuntary detours, side lanes, resting places, and sunny 
places of thought” (GS, 34). The Overman goes over-man with his constant self-overcoming 
                                                 




through which he becomes the master—who permits and forbids the expression of the inclina-
tion. For too long the permissions and forbiddances have descended from outside, above and be-
yond; for too long man has managed to escape the Confrontation by taking flights into nothing-
ness. Nietzsche’s portrayal of the Overman also signifies the newfound respect of man for him-
self. For, in the past man has acquired this respect by identifying himself with superhuman au-
thorities; hence, with the annihilation of these qualifiers, man’s respect for himself will be in 
jeopardy. On the other hand, the Overman marks the “Adventurer and circumnavigator of that 
inner world called 'man', as surveyor and measurer of that 'higher' and 'one upon the other' that is 
likewise called 'man'”. (HA I, 10). Thus, the Overman represents the newfound respect of man 
that is acquired by constant self-overcoming. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche distinguishes the 
Overman from man and the hitherto asceticism by saying, “Greatness  of  character  does  not  
consist  in  not  possessing  these  affects—on  the  contrary,  one  possesses  them  to  the  high-
est  degree—but in  having  them  under  control. And  even  that  without  any  pleasure  in  this  
restraint,  but  merely  because—66 (TWP, 490). In view of that, the distinction between man and 
the Overman should not be conceived as essential, i.e. as where the Overman is over-man be-
cause he does not possess the character of man, but as the overcoming of these characters—as 
having them under control. On the other hand, this type of activity has been the character trait of 
the ascetic ideal—who sought their end chiefly in the overcoming. However, the Overman goes 
far from this mere overcoming. This farseeing implication of self-overcoming of the Overman is 
related to man’s one more condition of existence—the why of man’s life. In his Thus Spoke Zar-
athustra, Nietzsche pronounces, “To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! … Through es-
teeming alone is there value and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear 
                                                 




this, you creators! Change of values—that is a change of creators…” (TSZ, 59). Considering 
man as the creator of values, Nietzsche’s demand of the Overman (the self-overcoming of man 
as discussed above) implies his demand of new creators—new esteem-ers. Noting the above ex-
posed uniqueness of Overman from ‘man’ and the hitherto ascetic ideal (the hitherto higher type 
of man), at least one fundamental position of Nietzsche’s journey against nihilism comes forth—
his project of revaluation of values penetrated into the foundation—to the preparation of the cre-
ator. Similarly, in recognizing this relation, the question raised regarding the “fate” of morality 
in post-nihilism also gets its answer—as experimental morality: to give oneself a goal (TWP, 
151). Another important point in Nietzsche’s demand to go over-man is his discovery of the 
“rock bottom” of man’s valuation—a will to nothingness—for man would rather 
will nothingness than not will. Hence with the self-overcoming of man (the inner world) Nie-
tzsche pursued a philosophy of the future, the Overman—the constant self-overcoming—not to 
remain stuck, for “one must know how to conserve oneself: the hardest test of independence” 
(BGE, 52).  
3.3 NIETZSCHE AS EDUCATOR 
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! … it is only 
your afternoon, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have 
colors … but nobody will guess from that how you looked in your morning, you 
sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved—wicked 
thoughts! (BGE, 236-237) 
Nietzsche inscribed these words in his Beyond Good and Evil, through it the philosopher points 
towards a way of understanding his writings, he demands his readers to guess the “mornings” of 




“morning” and “afternoon” evokes his approach towards the written and painted thoughts of oth-
er philosophers. As we remember, Nietzsche tried to understand the thoughts “in a very different 
light from what may seem desirable: the hidden history of the philosophers, the psychology of 
the great names, came to light for me” (EH, 218). Considering this, Nietzsche’s demand to guess 
the “morning” of his thoughts in the “afternoon” calls for an interpretation that would compre-
hend his thoughts by reviving the vigor, which is immortalized (i.e. written and painted).  
In his book Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche67, Richard Howey states, “every philosopher 
presents special problems of interpretation. With Nietzsche these problems are especially cru-
cial.” (Howey 1973 , 1). In his examination, Howey identifies the strength and weakness in 
Heidegger’s and Jaspers’ interpretation of Nietzsche in relation to the difference in their hori-
zons. According to him, while “Heidegger underscores the necessity for taking Nietzsche seri-
ously as a metaphysician, who, rather than being a philosophical anomaly, belongs essentially to 
a rich philosophical tradition” (Ibid. , 106). On the other hand, Howey states, “Jaspers' attempts 
at a dialogue with Nietzsche re-instate a human element which is lacking in Heidegger's interpre-
tation” (Ibid. , 106). In his article The Development of Heidegger‘s Nietzsche-Interpretation, Mi-
chael Zimmerman identifies two conflicting sub-horizons within Heidegger’s interpretations of 
Nietzsche. Accordingly, in the first interpretation, Heidegger conceived Nietzsche as “the first 
thinker to point the way to a new beginning for the West”. On the other hand, Heidegger made a 
radical shift in his interpretation of Nietzsche, and assert, “Nietzsche was the final thinker of the 
first beginning, that is, he was the herald of planetary industrial nihilism, which was the destiny 
of Greek productionist metaphysics” (Zimmerman 2005, 1). Behind this shift of interpretation 
                                                 




resides Heidegger’s expectation (of Nietzsche) that is shaped by the main horizon, which sought 
Nietzsche’s stance vis-à-vis the history of Western philosophy. In his book Heidegger Through 
Phenomenology To Thought, William Richardson states, Heidegger conceived Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy as an attempt “to overcome the metaphysical nihilism of the times by a nihilism of a 
higher sort, a positive one” (Richardson 2003, 363). Noting the positive character of this coun-
termovement resides in his conception of Nietzsche’s revaluation as seeking new principle of 
values in something alive (that is not supra sensible), Heidegger argues the revaluation “fails 
completely to vindicate its claims simply because it remains metaphysics” (Ibid. , 363). Like-
wise, Zimmerman elucidates this position of Heidegger in relation to his realization of Nie-
tzsche’s failure to “discern the difference between otherworldly, eternity seeking transcendence 
and the transcendence involved in the truth of Being, on the other. Throwing out the transcen-
dental baby with the metaphysical bath, Nietzsche was unable to develop a post-metaphysical 
conception of humankind” (Zimmerman 2005, 7). Another way of understanding Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche resides in his analysis of Nietzsche in relation to the previous philos-
ophers of the western metaphysical tradition. Accordingly, in his first interpretation Heidegger 
considered the philosophy of Hegel as the culmination of western metaphysical tradition. Ac-
cording to Zimmerman, this position allowed Heidegger to “interpret Nietzsche as Nietzsche un-
derstood himself”—as the initiator of the necessary new beginning. However, at this point one 
should stress whether Nietzsche understood himself as it is claimed above, in other words does 
Nietzsche considers the new beginning as “necessary”. As we discussed Nietzsche’s discourse 
on nihilism in the previous and this chapter, his strong ground of utterance involved the annihila-
tion of such compelling words. Hence, if “necessary” is used to represent the “indispensable new 




which claims to understand Nietzsche in his own terms would fail because it overlooked one of 
the crucial features that constitute his unique stand as a philosopher—as the voluntary endeavor 
that demanded a way that was avoidable. Above all, one way to comprehend this “avoidablity” 
recalls Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer and his hopeless utterance on the oblivious stance 
of his contemporaries. Noting this, let us return to, Zimmerman’s discussion on the shift of per-
spective within Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. As stated above, Heidegger’s first inter-
pretation has conceived Hegel as the culmination of western metaphysics, and posed Nietzsche 
as the “initiator of the necessary new beginning. On the other hand, in his second interpretation 
Heidegger recognizes Nietzsche with the place he conceived Hegel before—in this case, Nie-
tzsche becomes the last metaphysician—who in his own way draws the culmination of western 
metaphysics. However, such analysis should also include the significant moment that is found 
between Hegel and Nietzsche—namely the Schopenhauerian moment. At this point, the men-
tioning of his critique of Hegelianism could shed light on the atmosphere that is emitted by 
Schopenhauer, which have greatly influenced Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism. In his essay 
“On Authorship and Style” Schopenhauer states, “they intend to represent the mask of intellect: 
this mask may possibly deceive the inexperienced for a while, until it is recognized as being 
nothing but a dead mask, when it is laughed at and exchanged for another” (Schopenhauer 2005, 
32). Schopenhauer stood between Hegel and Nietzsche with such intense spirit, later on, Scho-
penhauer also became the subject of similar criticism—failed to renounce the absoluteness of the 
ideal. Yet, when we look at Heidegger’s stand, it appears to place Nietzsche in the place of his 
predecessor. Keeping this in mind, let us remark some more points on Heidegger’s interpreta-
tions of Nietzsche, accordingly the first point concerns how Heidegger’s shift also affected his 




stood the Overman as “as the transition to the post-metaphysical man of the new beginning” 
(Ibid. , 11). On the other hand, with his radical shift, Nietzsche’s Overman appeared to represent 
“the culmination of the tradition that reduced humans to clever animals seeking control over all 
other entities” (Ibid. , 11). According to this interpretation, Heidegger conceived the life of the 
Modern Mensch as bound by this drive, seeking control over all other entities. Nietzsche’s 
Overman stands among the manifestation of “man bounded by this drive” and in its case, the 
manifestation appears “as the creating of a humankind which finds its essential Gestalt neither in 
the ‘individual’ nor in the ‘masses’, but instead in the ‘typus’ i.e. ‘type’” (Ibid. , 11). In view of 
that, Heidegger asserts, “this Overman or ‘typus’ nihilistically negates the previous conception of 
Mensch as rational animal, by a reversal that puts the rational in the service of the animal (Ibid. , 
12). Considering this as the sketchy presentation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, let 
us briefly discuss Karl Jaspers’ interpretation of Nietzsche, which re-instaes the human-element 
that lacked in Heidegger’s Nietzsche. In his analysis of Jaspers’ Nietzsche, Richard Howey 
states, “Jaspers reminds us that Nietzsche's ideas were the product of a very real, and very human 
struggle” (Howey 1973 , 106). The distinct feature of Japers’ interpretation resides in his objec-
tion to examine the philosopher under certain classification, for him “every great individual 
event and every attempt to classify and categorize his thought is at best an oversimplification” 
(Ibid. , 3). Moreover, Jasper objects a manner of interpretation that seeks to grasp a fixed and 
final form. In his book titled Nietzsche68, Jasper insists the attempt to grasp “the whole, which 
Nietzsche accomplishes through his self-understanding and which we can attain through our own 
understanding, should throw light upon the existential significance of his life and his thought” 
(Jaspers 1979, 47). This approach of Jaspers involves the key elements in understanding the 
                                                 




“morning” of Nietzsche’s written and painted thoughts. Another significant element in Jaspers’ 
approach is his conception of Nietzsche as a philosopher of contradiction. Considering this claim 
of contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy, with such presumption will cause dire distortion in 
our understanding.  
The previous chapters attempted to comprehend the thoughts of Nietzsche under the light of his 
discourse on nihilism, and throughout the discussion, one voice has become louder and louder—
“human, all too human!” we have read the philosopher exclaiming with grief, with concern, also 
cheerfully. We have imagined, Nietzsche shouting “human, all too human!” on the apexes of 
human civilizations, from the ancient civilizations unto his age and then to the upcoming apexes. 
Could one understand these exclamations by seriously considering Nietzsche as a metaphysi-
cian? Or should one seriously consider him as a human being? Or should one seriously consider 
the metaphysician as a human being? Or the reverse?   
Let us involve the words of the psychiatrist Viktor Frankl that survived one of the darkest events 
in human history—the concentration camp (in Nazi Germany). In his book titled Man's search 
for meaning, Frankl states, “Whatever we had gone through could still be an asset to us in the 
future. And I quoted from Nietzsche “That which does not kill me, makes me stronger” Then I 
spoke about the future (Frankl 1959, 89). The psychiatrist survived the tormenting existential 
condition in a way expressed by Nietzsche; yet, here our focus will be on how this utterance is 
possible through Nietzsche’s way. The philosopher inscribed these words in his book Twilight of 
the Idols, perhaps it can be said such utterance is possible after the twilight of the idols. One way 
of understanding its conceptual root in the philosophy of Nietzsche takes us back to his tragic 




in order to get rid of terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its ve-
hement discharge… but in order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and 
pity—that joy which includes even joy in destroying” (EH, 273). Nietzsche’s statement, which 
found its expression in the midst of Auschwitz, has its conceptual parent in the philosopher’s ap-
proach regarding the discourse of being and becoming. As it can be recalled, Nietzsche inferred 
such division and valuation of the world in relation to the one more condition of existence, yet in 
what has been referred as “being” and “becoming”, and above all what has been valued as “be-
ing” and “becoming” he has found no thinker daring to go beyond such concepts that are consid-
ered as given. Nonetheless, he has also understood the dangers of such journey; above all this 
danger becomes even greater in the attempt to devise the mode of valuation that keeps in mind 
the aberration of the mode of valuation that has deeply penetrated throughout the history of man-
kind.  
As a human being Nietzsche’s actual life has its own extra-requirements, i.e. Nietzsche suffered 
from recurring deadly diseases that ended his life after a decade of vegetative life. The most 
comprehensive view of Nietzsche as educator comes into light when one attempts to find Nie-
tzsche-the philosopher in the existential condition of Nietzsche – the human. Despite its renewed 
appearance, Nietzsche stood firmly against one stationing wherein the geniuses of humankind 
retained intact. From ancient times unto the present, this stationing appeared as mysticism, alle-
gory and later on through metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism, this 
mode of valuation bestowed the fear-inspiring feature of religions and moralities. Among these 
moralities and religions, Christianity remained the most enduring symbol of its triumph. Nie-
tzsche attacked on such mode of valuation because it is underpinned by rejection and vengeance. 




reinstates his philosophy as a serious war against vengefulness and rancor. He states, “During 
periods of decadence I forbade myself such feelings as harmful; as soon as my vitality was rich 
and proud enough again, I forbade myself such feelings as beneath me.” (EH, 231). Moreover, 
Nietzsche remarks, his fight against Christianity as “merely a special case of this” (Ibid. ). Simi-
larly, on the account of the retreat that found its expression in the metaphysics of transcendence 
and epistemology of dogmatism, mankind has developed a habit in which, “one does not want to 
fight weakness with a method that strengthens but rather with a kind of justification and morali-
zation; i.e., with an interpretation (TWP, 31). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche inscribes a statement that 
would shed light on the mornings of his written thoughts, “Altogether, I have no welcome mem-
ories whatever from my whole childhood and youth; but it would be folly to drag in so called, 
“moral" reasons” (EH, 241). Hence, within the written and painted thoughts, which Nietzsche 
wrote as anti-metaphysics, perspectivist, and immoralist on the one hand, and what he devised as 
eternal recurrence, tragic philosophy, and experimental morality on the other, outshines the re-
markable metamorphosis of the man who transfigured his states in a way that made him peculiar 
as a philosopher. Likewise, when one gets into the states wherein the philosopher once transfig-
ured, Nietzsche becomes the educator, as it occurred in Auschwitz, his transfigured states regain 
the life, and the color they once had in their “morning”.    
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARK 
The previous three chapters tried to vivify a way of understanding the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. This way of understanding emphasized the role of nihilism in the thoughts of the phi-
losopher. In such a way, an attempt has been made to explore Nietzsche’s journey as into and 




to him, and how he sought after it, as the possible combination of discovering the treasure of the 
thinker. Even though Nietzsche has attempted to go for and against his own ideas, there re-
mained basic patterns of thinking that remained intact from the beginning to the end, in view of 
that, the journey into and against nihilism stands as the chief ground wherein Nietzsche sought 
the past and the future of philosophy. Nietzsche voluntarily becomes a nomad, he becomes a 
homeless, for otherwise the discovery of new lands would be impossible. In view of that, to un-
derstand the philosopher, one should be willing to go along in this way. Above all, one should 
acknowledge the difference between “understanding” and “consuming” for the former requires 
the integrity not fall into the latter. In view of that, the previous chapters tried to expose a possi-
ble way of understanding the philosopher. That contends the primacy of the anti-metaphysician 
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